Two-tier Intrusion Detection System for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks by RAZAK, SHUKOR ABD
Two-tier Intrusion Detection System for Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks 
by 
SHUKOR ABD R A Z A K 
A thesis submitted to the University of Plymouth in partial fliifilment for the degree of 
DOCTOR O F PHILOSOPHY 
School of Computing, Communications & Electronics 
Faculty of Technologyzi^J' l\ 
February^2007= 
Item no^ 
Shelfmaric 
Abstract 
A Two-tier Intrusion Detection System for Mobile Ad Hoc Net>vorks 
Shukor Abd Razak 
Nowadays, a commonly used wireless network (i.e. Wi-Fi) operates with the aid of a fixed 
infrastructure (i.e. an access point) to facilitate communication between nodes when they 
roam from one location to another. The need for such a fixed supporting infrastructure 
limits the adaptability of the wireless network, especially in situations where the 
deployment of such an infrastructure is impractical. In addition, Wi-Fi limits nodes' 
communication as it only provides facility for mobile nodes to send and receive 
information, but not reroute the information across the network. Recent advancements in 
computer network introduced a new wireless network, known as a Mobile Ad Hoc 
Network (MANET), to overcome these limitations. 
MANET has a set of unique characteristics that make it different from other kind of 
wireless networks. Often referred as a peer to peer network, such a network does not have 
any fixed topology, thus nodes are free to roam anywhere, and could join or leave the 
network anytime they desire. Its ability to be setup without the need o f any infrastructure is 
very useftil, especially in geographically constrained environments such as in a military 
battlefield or a disaster relief operation. In addition, through its multi hop routing facility, 
each node could function as a router, thus communication between nodes could be made 
available without the need of a supporting fixed router or an access point. However, these 
handy facilities come with big challenges, especially in dealing with the security issues. 
This research aims to address MANET security issues by proposing a novel intrusion 
detection system that could be used to complement existing prevention mechanisms that 
have been proposed to secure such a network. 
A comprehensive analysis of attacks and the existing security measures proved that there is 
a need for an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to protect MANETs against security threats. 
The analysis also suggested that the existing IDS proposed for MANET are not immune 
against a colluding blackmail attack due to the nature of such a network that comprises 
autonomous and anonymous nodes. The IDS architecture as proposed in this study utilises 
trust relationships between nodes to overcome this nodes' anonymity issue. Through a 
friendship mechanism, the problems of false accusations and false alarms caused by 
blackmail attackers in global detection and response mechanisms could be eliminated. 
The applicability of the friendship concept as well as other proposed mechanisms to solve 
MANET IDS related issues have been validated through a set of simulation experiments. 
Several MANET settings, which differ from each other based on the network's density 
level, the number of initial trusted friends owned by each node, and the duration of the 
simulation times, have been used to study the effects of such factors towards the overall 
performance of the proposed IDS framework. The results obtained from the experiments 
proved that the proposed concepts are capable to at least minimise i f not fully eliminate the 
problem currently faced in MANET IDS. 
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Chapter I : Introduction and Overvie\\f 
1.1 introduction 
Recent progress and advances in the communication technologies have introduced a new 
computer network technology, the Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET). Such a network 
comprises nodes that are anonymous, autonomous, and freely distributed across the 
network without any fixed wire and topology, and thus offers feasibility to create an instant 
network in various ad hoc environments such as in a meeting room, military battlefield, 
and disaster relief operation. This emerging technology was first introduced in US military 
research and has become increasingly popular in commercial applications. In addition, 
with the potentials that it could offer, MANET also might be used as the main tool for 
communication, supporting the wired network in the near fliture. This advancement has 
without doubt introduced new security concerns and for that reason, new security 
mechanisms have to be investigated. 
This thesis analyses current security measures proposed for MANET environments. 
Results from the analysis show that a number of research projects have been undertaken to 
provide security mechanisms for MANET but most of them were focusing on prevention 
measures, leaving the detection measures nearly unexplored. Prevention mechanisms can 
be very useflil as a first defensive wall to protect MANET fi-om adversaries. However, no 
matter how strong the prevention measures are embedded in a network, security breaches 
can always exist that an adversary can exploit (King, 2002). 
This situation led the direction of this study, which is to give more attenfion on the 
detection measures, and to be specific, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Employing an 
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IDS as a second line of defence could be very useftil whenever prevention mechanisms 
failed to protect the network. Various IDS have been proposed to defend wired network 
technology (CERIAS, 2006). However, current IDS employed in wired network cannot be 
simply migrated into MANET environment. The reason is mainly due to the unique 
characteristics of a MANET, which not only add difficulties to detect similar security 
threats inherited from a wired network but also require new techniques to detect novel 
security threats accentuated by the MANET itself Details on how such attacks could 
threaten MANET operations also have been extensively reviewed in this study. 
When this study was started in late 2003, only a few works have been done to secure 
MANET operations using an IDS. The first effort came from Zhang et al. (2003), which 
suggested that an IDS for MANET environments need to be specially designed so that it 
could suit well with such network's characteristics. After that, a few other techniques have 
been proposed by other researchers to improve their initial work. However, the numbers 
are still small and none of them has shown how their techniques could resist attacks from 
colluding blackmail attackers. 
A blackmail attack occurs when an attacker sends false accusations about other nodes' 
integrity in the networks. Such attacks could exist in many forms and usually targeting 
against systems or networks operations that demand nodes collaborative participation. In a 
case of MANET IDS, a blackmail attack is capable to bring down the whole global 
detection and response mechanisms. The main objective of such attack is to make the 
victim nodes look bad in the eyes of other nodes. As a result, other nodes might refuse to 
cooperate with the victim nodes, and thus deny their participation in networks operations. 
A blackmail attack might not be seen as a big issue in a wired network as there is a Central 
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Authority (CA) to monitor such misbehaviour. However, the scenario is different in a 
MANET environment. The absence of a CA to control all network operations in a MANET 
environment makes the blackmail attack more difficult to detect. The situation will become 
worse i f the attackers decided to collude with each other and launch more severe attack, 
namely a colluding blackmail attack. 
This thesis proposes a novel IDS framework aiming to improve the global detection and 
response mechanisms of MANET IDS in the presence of colluding blackmail attackers. 
The proposed framework exploits the concept of friendship between nodes as a self-
defensive measure against such attack. The friendship concept proposed in this study is 
capable of eliminating the problem of node's anonymity, which is the main reason why a 
blackmail attack could exist in MANET environments (Liu et al., 2004). 
1.2 Alms and Objectives of the Research 
The aim of this research is to propose a novel IDS framework that is suitable for MANET 
environments and capable to protect such a network against security threats. In order to 
achieve this aim, several issues need to be thoroughly investigated and analysed, as 
follows; 
I . to investigate the nature of MANET operation and the characteristics that create 
more challenges to ftilfil its security requirements; 
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2. to identify security threats in MANET environments that demand new security 
measures to be deployed; 
3. to analyse and highlight the deficiencies of existing security measures that have 
been proposed for MANET environments, which should support the idea that there 
is a need for an IDS; 
4. to propose and design a novel IDS framework based on the analysis of capabilities 
and limitations of existing IDS previously designed for MANET environments; 
5. to evaluate the performance of the proposed IDS framework; 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
The outcomes of research which addressed the aforementioned objectives are presented in 
this thesis as follows. 
Chapter 2 begins with an overview of MANET, which describes how such a network is 
different from the other types of wireless networks. This is followed by a summary of 
MANET'S characteristics and the environments where it is usually deployed so that a 
better understanding on how such networks operate. Having addressed the background of 
MANET, the chapter then outlines some of the research challenges that must be faced and 
summarises security requirements that must be ftilfilled to ensure MANET usability and 
feasibility as a viable fiiture networking technology. 
-5 
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Chapter 3 presents the outcomes of an investigation carried out to identify important 
security threats in MANET environments. This investigation is essential because in order 
to design a reliable security measure for MANET, a detailed understanding on how attacks 
are launched against such a network is required. The chapter begins with a discussion 
about attack variations, which suggests that attacks against MANET exist in many forms 
depending upon in which environment the attacks are launched, what communication layer 
the attacks are targeting, and which type of ad hoc network mechanisms are being targeted. 
This is followed by a discussion about different characteristics of attackers that exist in 
MANET environments. In this study, special attention has been given to attacks that could 
be launched against MANET routing protocols. This is because routing is the most vital 
mechanism in MANET, and to understand attacks that are threatening its operation is very 
important. For that reason, this chapter also outlines some examples o f attacks related to 
MANET routing protocols. 
Having investigated how security threats could be launched against MANET, Chapter 4 
presents some of existing security solutions that have been proposed to ease the impacts of 
those attacks. The chapter first introduces different types of prevention mechanisms which 
include authentication, secure routing, and cooperation enforcement mechanisms. This is 
then followed by a discussion to establish a reason why these prevention mechanisms are 
insufficient and must be accompanied by suitable detection mechanisms to protect 
MANET ft-om both internal and external attackers. Several solutions have been proposed 
in response for the need of IDS that suit well in MANET environments. Most of the efforts 
have generally attempted to address one of the following vital issues in the intrusion 
detection and response mechanisms: how to collect the audit data; what is the appropriate 
method to detect an intrusion; how to minimise false alarms; and how to respond to the 
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intrusion. This chapter summarises some of the efforts proposed by researchers in 
addressing these issues. 
Chapter 5 presents a conceptual design of the proposed intrusion detection framework, 
which has been designed based on a thorough investigation of previous works. The chapter 
begins with a list of the objectives and criteria that the proposed !DS are intended to 
address. This is then followed by a discussion that justifies the ideas behind the proposed 
design. This chapter also presents a brief overview about each component of the proposed 
detection framework. 
The novel element in this study is on the implementation of the friendship concept to assist 
the global detection and response mechanisms of the proposed IDS framework. Chapter 6 
describes this concept in detail along with experiments aimed to just i fy its applicability in 
MANET environments. The chapter begins with a discussion that justifies the needs of a 
trusted community in MANET envirorunents. This is then followed by a description of the 
trust framework proposed in this study. Following that, the chapter outlines some of the 
key features of the proposed trust framework that make it different from other trust 
frameworks suggested earlier for MANET. Finally, the chapter presents results from the 
experiments carried out to evaluate the capability of the proposed friendship concept in 
creating a trusted community in MANET environments. 
Based on the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 5, Chapter 7 describes simulation 
designs of the proposed IDS framework aimed to evaluate its performance. The chapter 
begins with a detailed description on the implementation of misuse and anomaly detection 
engines. This is then followed by a discussion on the global detection and response 
Chapter 1 : Introduction and Overview 
mechanisms, which utilise the friendship concept. This chapter also describes the need for 
trust and signature management mechanisms, which are also part of the main modules of 
the proposed IDS framework. 
Following the design of local and global detection mechanisms as presented in Chapter 7, 
Chapter 8 presents the results from simulation experiments evaluating the performance of 
the proposed IDS framework. The chapter begins by presenting the performance of the 
proposed IDS framework in detecting intrusions via local (using its own detection 
capability) and global (with the help of ftiend mechanism) means. This is followed by a 
comparison of local and global detection performances to show that the friendship concept 
introduced in the global detection mechanism is capable of increasing the IDS detection 
rate. The chapter then continues by presenting the performance o f the proposed IDS 
framework in terms o f its capability to globally response to intrusions. The chapter also 
presents the capability of the proposed IDS framework in resisting against a colluding 
blackmail attack. 
Finally, Chapter 9 summarises the research conducted and presented in this thesis. The 
chapter begins with a discussion on the achievements and limitations o f the proposed 
framework based on theoretical and experimental analysis. This is followed by a 
discussion to outline the potential of the proposed trust framework in other MANET 
research areas. The chapter then concludes with suggestion on some possible extensions to 
the research for future work. 
The thesis also includes a number of appendices containing additional information to 
support the discussion presented in the main chapters. Source code from the experiments 
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described in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, as well as the raw results are included on an 
accompanying CD. Finally, a number of publications arising from the project are also 
included in this thesis. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Networks are now one of the most popular manifestations of computing technology, and 
the most significant example is the Internet. Online banking, email applications, online 
trading, instant messaging, and news broadcasting are only a few examples to illustrate the 
massive use of the Internet. Recent progress and advances in the communication 
technologies have introduced another type of computer network, the Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks (MANET). MANET represents a combination of peer-to-peer techniques, 
wireless communications and mobile computing, and has become an important field of 
research in recent years. This new technology has been widely used to support 
communications in an environment that might not allow the deployment o f infrastructure 
networks, such as in military battlefields and disaster recovery sites. In addition, this 
technology might be used to replace infrastrucnjre networks where employing the wireless 
networks is more practical (Loo, 2004). Although MANET utilises a wireless medium for 
communications, as in other wireless networks, it has its own unique characteristics that 
make it different from the others. 
This chapter begins with an introduction and comparison of MANET and other wireless 
networking technologies. MANET characteristics and the enviromnent where such 
networks usually deployed will also presented in this chapter. This chapter also outlines 
research challenges that must be faced and security requirements that must be fijlfilled to 
ensure MANET usability and feasibility as a ftiture technology. 
- I I 
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2.2 MANET and the Wireless Network Technologies 
Wireless networks assist in the communication activities between two nodes to provide 
more flexible and easier connectivity. According to the NIST (Karygiannis & Owens, 
2002), wireless networks can be categorised into three main categories: Wireless Wide 
Area Network (WWAN); Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN); and Wireless Personal 
Area Network (WPAN). 
Wireless WAN 
Infrastructure 
WLAN 
Wireless Network 
Wireless LAN 
Infrastructure-less 
WLAN 
Wireless PAN 
Hybrid WLAN 
Figure 2- 1: Types of Wireless Nct>vork 
Figure 2-1 illustrates types of wireless networks and the descriptions for each technology 
are as follows. 
2.2.1 Wireless WAN (WWAN) 
WWAN is a computer network using wireless networking devices to transfer data in a 
wide coverage area. Such technology is generally managed by a service provider and 
- 12 
Chapter 2 : MANET Ox'en iew and Security Issues 
usually offers services to a large number of users. Examples of W W A N technology are 
CDMA, GSM, GPRS, CDPD and satellite networks (Chaplin, 2002). A simple 
implementation of WWAN is as illustrated in Figure 2-2. 
Data transmitted through 
mobile phone sij^nals 
Wireless 
enabled 
noteb<K>k 
I luurc 2- 2: An example of W W A N implementation (Dell US, 2006a) 
2.2.2 Wireless PAN (WPAN) 
WPAN is a collection of personal devices connecting to each other in a limited coverage 
area as illustrated in Figure 2-3. Technologies related to WPAN are IrDA, RFID and 
Bluetooth. Unlike in a WWAN, network connectivity in WPAN is completely controlled 
by the user who operates it, not by the service administrator. Another significant difference 
compared to a WWAN is that there is no charge for connection, as it uses free unlicensed 
frequency band. More explanation about licensed and unlicensed frequencies can be found 
in (CMP Media LLC, 2003). 
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Transmission of data 
through short-range 
radio waves 
Wireless enabled devices 
connect without the 
limitations ot"cables 
Figure 2- 3: An Example of VVPAN usage (Dell US, 2006b) 
2.2.3 Wireless LAN (WLAN) 
WLAN is a computer network designed to allow greater flexibility and mobility in a local 
area network connection. Similar to WPAN, this technology also uses an unlicensed 
frequency band to establish wireless connection. Since no service provider exists in the 
networks, the users must take responsibility to control and manage all the network 
operations by themselves. In general, W L A N can be divided into two main categories, 
namely infrastructure and infrastructure-less networks as described in (Al-Jaroodi, 2002). 
However, recent research in (CISE Wireless Project, 2002) has introduced the third type of 
WLAN technologies: the hybrid WLAN. The descriptions of each W L A N technology are 
as follow: 
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o Infrastructure Wireless Network 
This kind of computer network consists o f several mobile devices connected 
directly to an access point using wireless transmissions. An access point is a 
station that transmits and receives data from users within the network and can 
serve as the point o f interconnection between the W L A N and a fixed wire 
network. 
Infrastructure-less Wireless Network 
This type of WLAN which is also known as a MANET, is a network comprised 
only of mobile wireless devices. Nodes communicate directly with each other 
without the aid o f any access points or wired backbone. 
Hybrid Networks 
Hybrid networks can be used to ease the deployment o f an infrastructure 
wireless network. The main problem in infrastructure wireless networks is the 
constraints in placing the access points. By exploiting the multi-hop capabilities 
in MANET, all nodes (including those in the outer range) are able to reach the 
access point to connect to the Internet. 
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Figure 2-4 illustrates an example of WLAN technologies consisting of infrastructure 
WLAN, infrastructure-less W L A N , and hybrid WLAN. White arrows show that mobile 
devices in MANET can connect to each other without an access point. On the other hand, 
each mobile node in an infrastructure WLAN needs to connect directly to the access point 
to establish connections amongst them. Black arrows show direct connections between 
nodes and access point. Nodes in the circle area connected to each other to establish 
connection between MANET and infrastructure W L A N . Wireless networks created in this 
way are also known as hybrid wireless networks. 
Wired LAN Infrastructure Wireless LAN 
Laptop computer 
Laptop computer 
Infrastructure-tess Wireless LAN 
Laplop computed PDA , ^^,r,7TZnn.Amt 
Laptop computer laptop compute 
>p comi Laptop puter 
(.aptop computer 
Laptop computer 
F ' D A 
Laptop computer 
Figure 2- 4: Wireless L A N Technolojiic ^ 
2.3 MANET Characteristics 
In general, MANET has a number of defining characteristics (Al-Jaroodi, 2002; Rafique. 
2002) as described in the sub-sections that follow. 
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2.3,1 Dynannic Network Topology 
MANET is highly dynamic in nature. Nodes in MANET are mobile and connected to each 
other via wireless links. Wireless connectivity allows nodes to jo in the network and 
dynamically associate to establish routing among themselves. The associations are often 
created and torn down without prior notice and thus make the ad hoc network topologies 
unpredictable. The topologies become more complex when nodes in MANET established a 
connection to any public infrastructure network. 
2.3.2 Distributed Operations 
Operations in MANET are performed in a distributed manner. Successftil routing in 
MANET, for example, needs participation among nodes to collaborate in the route 
discovery process. In addition, since there is no central control for the networks, all the 
management processes in MANET must be carried out in a distributed manner. 
2.3.3 Infrastructure-less 
In a MANET, fixed infrastructure and specialised hardware that help in communication 
operations are necessarily absent. In addition, nodes participating in the network have not 
been given any specific roles such as servers, routers or gateways. These circumstances 
prevent the deployment o f hierarchical node relationships and thus make security 
mechanisms that depend upon these relationships inappropriate. 
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2.3.4 Limited Resources 
Generally, most ad hoc network enabled devices are small in size ranging from notebooks 
to PDAs including cellular phones and can be assumed to rely on batteries for their power 
supplies. Complex and frequent computational tasks must be avoided, as these operations 
will drain power quickly. Network bandwidth is another important resource. Usually 
MANET has a lower bandwidth capacity than a fixed network, and for that reason traffic 
used for connection and maintenance must be kept to a minimal. In addition, MANET also 
has limited CPU processing and limited data storage capabilities (Jung et al., 2005a). 
2.3.5 Multi IHop Routing 
MANET connectivity can be single hop based or multi-hop based depending on the 
distance between source and destination nodes (Brannstrom et al., 2006). Communications 
among nodes in MANET are generally within a short range. Nodes communicate directly 
using a single hop routing algorithm i f they are close to each other. However, because of 
the geographical constraint and distance between source and destination nodes, data will 
usually traverse through the network via one or more intermediate nodes before it reaches 
the destination. In this situation, connectivity between sender and receiver is no longer in a 
single hop mode but now in a multi-hop mode. Figure 2-5 illustrates the difference 
between these two communication scenarios in MANET environments. 
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Single hop routing Mulli hop routing-,,.,-' ' ' 
Figure 2- 5: Single and Mul t i Hop Routing in M A N E T Environments 
2.3.6 Shared Transmission Media 
The transmission medium used in MANET is not as stable as that used in a fixed network. 
Communication in MANET is subjected to noise, interference and even constraint to 
bandwidth limitation (Desilva & Boppana, 2004). Moreover, security requirements are 
usually higher in MANET tlian in the wired network because wireless links, which used 
for communication, are subjected to external attacks such as spoofing, eavesdropping and 
link jamming attacks. 
2.4 MANET Environment 
Various papers have given an example where mobile ad hoc network could be deployed. 
Meetings, conference, emergency, disaster relief, sensor network, wearable computing, and 
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military applications are among the examples given in (CISE Wireless Project, 2002; 
Buttyan & Hubaux, 2003; Albers et al., 2002) to show the various environments where a 
MANET could exist. However, despite the diversity, MANET can be classified into three 
main categories: organised; localised; and open environments (Al-Jaroodi, 2002). 
2.4.1 Organised Environment 
Networks deployed for military in battlefield and disaster relief operation, as illustrated in 
Figure 2-6, are some examples of well-organised MANET. Normally, a well-organised 
MANET is needed to support a very well-defined purpose operation or application. Apart 
from the routing difficulties in this geographically constrained environment, enabling 
security measures in this challenging environment is also not an easy task. One of the 
security challenges in the organised MANET is on how to avoid a node's location from 
being disclosed to other unauthorised parties (e.g. in the military scenarios) (Khan, 2003). 
Military Battlefield Disaster Relief Operations 
Figure 2- 6: Examples of Organised M A N E T Environment 
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2.4.2 Localised Environment 
This type of network is the most common type o f MANET. Ad hoc networks configured in 
conference rooms, lecture halls, and home appliances are examples of a localised network. 
All nodes in this network are in the proximity range thus can be physically contacted to 
establish any security measures. Unlike in organised MANET, where nodes are more 
vulnerable to external attacks, nodes communicate in localised MANET on the other hand 
are more vulnerable to internal attacks. This is because every node that participates in the 
localised network has the privilege to access network resources and secret information, 
which can be exploited once it has been hijacked by the external attackers. Examples o f 
internal attacks in this scenario are password stealing and unauthorised access to secret 
documents. Figure 2-7 illustrates several MANET enabled devices connected to each other 
to create localised MANET environment. 
Figure 2- 7: An Example of a Loealised MANET Environment 
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2.4.3 Open Environment 
Unstructured, vast nodes and the absence of a priori relations are some of the main 
characteristics of this network. The concept of this network is similar to a people in a city 
communicating with each other using personal wireless devices. This situation is quite 
similar to MANET in a localised environment, but the number of nodes participating and 
the coverage area in the open environment is bigger and wider than in the localised 
environment. The wider coverage area makes physical contacts for all the nodes 
inapplicable and thus results in the difficulty to deploy any security measures in an open 
MANET environment. 
2.5 Research Challenges 
Al l of the MANET characteristics discussed in the previous section have introduced many 
research issues in these networks. Some of them are quite similar to the issues faced in 
other networks, but others are more specific to the MANET environment. Figure 2-8 
illustrates the main important issues related to MANET (Chlamtac et al., 2003). 
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Figure 2- 8: Main Research Issues in MANET Networking 
2.5.1 Routing 
Providing a robust and reliable routing mechanism is very important in MANET. Proactive 
and reactive protocols are two approaches considered in uni-cast routing algorithms 
(Clausen, 2003). Both of these protocols have their own advantages and weaknesses, but 
the most important thing is that both rely upon the cooperation of all nodes in the networks. 
Other concerns include multicast routing algorithms and broadcast routing algorithms. 
Because of the random movement of nodes in MANET, providing efficient multicast and 
broadcast routing algorithms becomes more complex and challenging than in a wired 
network. Various protocols have been proposed to solve all the routing complexities and 
challenges (Perkins et al., 2003; Paul & Wcsthoff, 2002). However, despite much effort in 
this area, none of the proposed approaches became a standard protocol for all MANET 
configurations (Albers et al., 2002). 
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2.5.2 Auto-Configuration 
MANET operates in a self-organised manner. Each node in the network is responsible to 
configure itself including all the services and applications required such as routing 
protocols, security mechanisms and IP address allocations. However, this configuration is 
often too complex to be done by end users. Providing auto-configuration mechanisms 
would be very useftjl and may help in attracting more people to use MANET (Clausen, 
2006). 
2.5.3 Resource Management 
Resource management is crucial in MANET. Battery power, bandwidth, CPU processing 
capability and storage capacity are the most important resources, and thus proper 
management of them is required. Al l of these resources are limited because of the devices 
physical constraints. For that reason, communication algorithms as well as services offered 
in a MANET must be optimised to meet the minimum level o f bandwidth usage, CPU 
processing, power utilisation and data storage of the ad hoc network enabled devices 
(Rafique, 2002). 
2.5.4 Quality of Service (QoS) 
QoS is another challenging issue in MANET (Chlamtac et al., 2003). QoS for any network 
is always related to the characteristics of that particular network. Wireless links used for 
communication in MANET have a fluctuating link capacity and connectivity, thus making 
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it more difficult to guarantee the QoS in the network (Jain et al., 2005). In addition, there 
are many other unique characteristics in MANET as described earlier, which add the 
difficulties in providing reliable QoS in such network. 
2.5.5 Security 
Providing a robust and reliable security mechanism in MANET is not an easy task because 
of the unique characteristics described earlier. Although many security mechanisms (e.g. 
public key cryptography and firewalls) are found to work well in wired networks, such 
mechanisms are impractical in MANET because of the infrastructure constraint (Haas et al., 
2002). In MANET, all nodes are expected to operate in a self-organised manner, thus the 
existence of a central authority to manage the public key infrastructure cannot be assumed. 
In addition, the nature of instability in the network connections and unpredictable node 
movements add to the difficulty in differentiating between malicious activities and 
'natural' network problems. 
2.6 MANET Security Requirements 
Open MANET, as well as other MANET environments, has a number o f requirements that 
need to be fulfilled in order to ensure network security and reliability. An overview of the 
security requirements in MANET are described in the following subsections. 
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2.6.1 Authentication 
in MANET, nodes can communicate with each other as long as they are in the 
communication range, and at one moment in time, there is a possibility to have more than 
two nodes in the communication range. For that reason, when two nodes communicate to 
each other there is a need to verify the identities of each other. Authentication can be used 
to provide evidence of own identity and at the same time enable the node to ensure the 
identity of the other nodes it is communicating with. Additionally, authentication can also 
be used to ensure legitimate access to the network (Hafslund & Anderson, 2006). Identity 
verification ensures that an adversary cannot masquerade as a trusted entity thus gaining 
unauthorised access to the network. Authentication can be considered as the most 
important service, because without proper authentication, security services such as 
integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation cannot be maintained. The relationship 
between integrity, confidentiality, non-repudiation, and authentication services has been 
discussed in (Maki, 2000). 
2.6.2 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality in network communications is always related to privacy. Both services 
ensure that certain information is never disclosed to unauthorised users but in a different 
context. Confidentiality ensures the secrecy of data in the network, whilst privacy concerns 
protecting the identity of nodes and sometimes hiding the location o f nodes for security 
reasons. Privacy is a crucial concept in a military environment because an enemy can use 
unprotected information to launch attacks on particular nodes. Data to be secured by the 
confidentiality service can be divided into two categories, namely data forwarded within 
-26 
Chapter 2 : MANET Over\ne\v and Security Issues 
the network and data stored in the ad hoc network enabled devices. Researchers are always 
concemed about the secrecy of data forwarded through the network, but unaware about the 
security of data stored in the devices memory (Oltsik & Biggar, 2006). Routing 
information also must be kept confidential because exposure of such data can lead to many 
routing mechanism attacks. Confidentiality can be achieved by using encryption 
techniques once secure authentication systems have been deployed (Stajano & Anderson, 
1999). 
2.6.3 Integrity 
When transferring data over the network, people want to make sure that the data received 
by the receiver is the same as what they have transferred earlier. Integrity is the security 
service, which can be used to guarantee that a message being transferred is not altered or 
modified by a malicious node. One must take into account that the integrity of message 
transferred can also be affected by benign failure such as radio propagation impairments. 
Ensuring integrity can be as simple as adding hashing functions to the encrypted message 
once the strong authentication mechanism has been deployed. Integrity is not only used to 
ensure that the data exchanged between nodes has not been altered, but also can be used to 
ensure the integrity of the network connection. In this situation, integrity can be used to 
guarantee no messages are removed, replayed or unlawfully inserted during the 
transmission (Rafique, 2002). 
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2.6.4 Non-Repudiation 
Non-repudiation is a security service to ensure that a sender cannot later deny having sent a 
message. This service can be very important especially in the existence of an adversary. 
One way to enable this service is by using a public key cryptography system where a 
receiver can use the sender pubhc key to prove its identity. In addition, the receiver also 
cannot deny the reception o f the sent message since such message can only be decrypted 
using the receiver's private key. By employing this security service, each node in the 
network is enforced to be responsible for its actions. In addition, this service also can be 
very useful for detection and isolation of malicious nodes. Again, this service also seems to 
rely upon the authentication service to maintain the service. Once the authentication 
service takes place, a user can employ suitable cryptography techniques to enable non-
repudiation service. However, i f no authentication schemes exist or weak authentication 
schemes being used, the non-repudiation service cannot be guaranteed to work in a proper 
manner (Al-Jaroodi, 2002). 
2.6.5 Availability 
I f confidentiality is related to privacy, availability on the other hand is related to 
survivability. In a communication, high availability of network resources and services are 
always desirable. Availability means that any nodes can get access to all the services 
provided by the network even in the presence of an adversary. Survivability seems to .be 
always supporting the availability service in the network (Chen et al., 2002). Attacks from 
internal or external nodes are more difficult to detect in an MANET environment. 
Additionally, malflinction of network services can also occur in this unpredictable network 
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topology. Because of that, survivability is needed to effectively return the network services 
to their norma! conditions after such malfunction or attacks against the networks. 
Accompanied by the strong survivability mechanisms, high availability in network services 
can be achieved. Denial of service is an example of attacks that can be launched by 
attackers to bring down the availabihty service. Consequences o f such attacks can lead to 
physical channel interference, disruption of the routing protocol and even total 
disconnection of the entire network. In addition, one must also consider the existence of 
selfish nodes in the networks. Such selfish nodes add the difficulties in ensuring high 
availability and survivability of the ad hoc network (Buttyan & Hubaux, 2003). 
2.6.6 Authorisation 
Authorisation is a security service used to set up rules that define what operations or 
actions each node is or is not allowed to do in the network. These predefined rules can also 
be used to determine which resources or information across the network each node can 
access. Nodes in the network need to be authorised to access the shared resources in the 
network, especially in MANET. Most of the mobile devices carry private and personal 
information that need to be kept secure when communicating with other nodes. Since each 
node in a MANET is mobile and communicates with various types of users, different types 
of restriction are needed for different types of users. For that reason, an authorisation 
service is required and needs to be maintained. In addition to that, as mentioned earlier, 
resource management is among the key issues being researched in an ad hoc network. In 
this case, authorisation can be used to facilitate proper utilisation of network resources to 
29-
Chapter 2 : MANET Overview and Security Issues 
ensure only legitimate users can use such resources based upon the restriction policies that 
are set up (Al-Jaroodi, 2002). 
2.7 Conc lus ion 
Mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is one o f the current emerging technologies in the 
computer industry. Since it is part of the wireless network family, i t inherits all of the 
advantages offered by wireless communications. In addition, with characteristics such as, 
easy set up, infrastructure-independent, scalable, and dynamic topology, MANET has 
become a preferred network to replace an infrastructure network especially in a 
geographically constrained environment such as a military battlefield or a disaster relief 
operation. However, introducing this network to the public is not as easy as its sounds. 
Several issues need to be considered before the deployment o f such network especially 
issues related to the routing and security mechanisms. In the next chapter, a review of 
several common attacks against MANET wil l be presented. The review includes the 
variation of attacks against MANET, their characteristics, and some examples of common 
attacks that threatening such network. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Similar to other networks, MANET is vulnerable to many security attacks. MANET not 
only inherits all the security threats faced in both wired and wireless networks, but it also 
introduces security attacks that are unique to itself (ICarygiannis & Owens, 2002). As 
people will be encouraged to use a secured network, it is important to provide MANET 
with reliable security mechanisms that wil l make this exciting technology become more 
widely used in the next few years. Prior to the development of any measures to secure 
MANET, it is important to study the variety of attacks that might be related to such a 
network. With the knowledge of some common attack issues, researchers wil l have a better 
understanding of how MANET could be threatened and compromised by the attackers, and 
thus should lead to the development of more reliable security measures. 
This chapter presents important issues that related to attacks against MANET. In the first 
place, variations of attacks depending upon in which environment they are launched, what 
communication layer they are targeting, and what type of ad hoc network mechanisms are 
targeted will be detailed. Following that, some of the important characteristics of those 
attacks also will be presented. In this research, special attention has been given to attacks 
that could be launched against MANET routing mechanism. This is because the failure to 
defend such an important mechanism could jeopardise the whole network operations. For 
that reason, this chapter also outlines some examples of attacks falling into this category. 
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3.2 Attack Variat ions 
MANET is threatened by a variety of attacks, which require different protection strategies. 
This variation is as a result of several factors as detailed in the sub-sections that follow. 
3,2.1 Ad Hoc Networks Environments 
Ad hoc network can exist in one of three environments; organised, localised, and open 
environments. Nodes in all of these environments are generally threatened by the same 
security problems. However, there are some security problems that are unique to one 
environment and need more attention in that environment than the others need. Vast 
numbers of unstructured nodes and the absence o f a priori relations are some o f the main 
characteristics of the open environment ad hoc networks. Such networks are quite similar 
to the localised environment networks, but the larger amount of nodes, and the wider 
coverage area, renders nodes in the open environment vulnerable to more sophisticated 
security attacks than the localised networks. For instance, nodes in both open and localised 
environments suffer from the absence of a central authority. However, this is not a big 
issue in a localised environment, because nodes in that environment might have physical 
contact with each other to employ any security measures. Security could also be easily 
enforced in the organised environment because nodes in that environment are usually pre-
employed with appropriate security measures before they participate in any specific tasks 
such as in a military operation. 
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3.2.2 Communication Layers 
Each layer in the ad hoc networks communication protocols has its own vulnerabilities. In 
a physical layer, mobile nodes as well as the communication links are vulnerable to both 
passive and active attacks. Passive eavesdropping, signal jamming, denial of service (DoS) 
attacks, and physical hardware tampering are among the most popular attacks in this layer 
(Maki, 2000). Such attacks could be made less harmful by encrypting the communication 
signal, employing spread-spectrum communication technology, and using tamper-resistant 
hardware. 
Similar link jamming and DoS attacks are also threatening MANET at the data link layer. 
At this layer, adversaries might jam the communication links by sending huge amounts of 
data to the network, or by replaying unnecessary packets to exhaust the networks' 
resources. Complex cryptography algorithms and more sophisticated security measures 
could be very useflil at this layer to protect the networks and to distinguish between valid 
and invalid packets transiting in the networks (Al-Jaroodi, 2002). 
The network layer provides the most critical service in the ad hoc network, which is the 
routing protocol. Several routing protocols have been introduced to provide reliable 
communication among nodes, but less attention to the security aspects when designing 
such protocols has opened many security holes at this layer (Sanzgiri et al., 2002). In 
addition, because o f its important f\jnction, the network layer has always been a target from 
external as well as internal attackers. An external attacker could launch many attacks 
against the routing mechanism such as creating a DoS attack or compromising an internal 
node to capture confidential information of the network. Misbehaving internal nodes on the 
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other hand could jeopardise the network operations when they refuse to cooperate in the 
packet forwarding process to conserve their limited resources. 
Attackers are also threatening MANET at both the transport and the application layers. At 
the transport layer, messages are exchanged on the end-to-end basis using secured routes 
established in the network layer. For that reason, ensuring security at the network layer is 
very important to provide reliable communication at the transport layer. Similar to the 
other types of networks, attackers can always find a loophole in the ad hoc networks' 
applications and might use this vulnerability to launch attacks at the application layer (Al -
Jaroodi, 2002). However, since similar attacks also occur in the other types of networks, 
regular solutions used in wired neuvorks could be reused to defend the ad hoc networks 
against attacks at this layer. 
3.2.3 Attack Level 
There are two main targets of attacks in MANET; attacks targeting at the basic 
mechanisms, and attacks targeting at the security mechanisms (Hubaux et al., 2001). 
MANET has its own unique basic mechanisms, such as the use o f wireless links for 
communications, employing its own routing strategies, and operating in a distributed 
manner. Attackers might launch many attacks against these basic mechanisms. For 
instance, attackers could launch passive eavesdropping attacks against the wireless links, 
drain of f a node's limited resources, and launch active attacks to interrupt the routing 
mechanisms. 
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Responding to the many attacks against the ad hoc networks basic mechanisms, 
researchers have introduced a number of security measures. However, the majority of these 
security measures are also vulnerable to attacks and need to be secured. Examples of 
attacks against MANET security mechanisms are stealing usemames and passwords to 
obtain unauthorised access to the networks, and modifying public key databases to disrupt 
authentication, confidentiality, and integrity services (Hubaux et al., 2001). 
3.3 Attack Character is t ics 
Dynamic topology, distributed operation, and resource constraints are some of the unique 
characteristics that exist in the ad hoc networks, which inevitably increase the vulnerability 
of such networks. Many characteristics might be used to classify attacks against MANET. 
Examples would include looking at the behaviour of the attacks (passive vs. active), the 
source of the attacks (external vs. internal), the processing capability of the attackers 
(mobile vs. wired), and the number of the attackers (single vs. multiple). These are 
considered in the sub-sections that follow. 
3.3.1 Passive vs. Active Attacks 
Passive attacks are launched to steal valuable information in the targeted networks. 
Examples of passive attacks in MANET are eavesdropping and traffic analysis. Detecting 
this kind of attack is difficult because neither the system resources nor the critical network 
functions are physically affected making it problematic to detect (Bouam & Othman, 2003). 
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Whilst passive attacks do not intend to disrupt the network operation, active attacks on the 
other hand actively alter the data with the intention to obstruct the operation of the targeted 
networks. Examples of active attacks comprise of actions such as message modifications, 
message replays, message fabrications, and denial of service attacks. 
3.3.2 External vs. Internal Attacks 
External attacks are attacks launched by adversaries who are not initially authorised to 
participate in the network operations (Yang et al., 2006). These attacks usually aim to 
cause network congestion, denying access to specific network functions or disrupting the 
whole network operations. Bogus packet injection, denial of service, and impersonation are 
some of the attacks that are usually initiated by the external attackers. More severe attacks 
in MANET might come from intemal attacks, which are initiated by authorised nodes in 
the networks. This type of attack might come from both compromised and misbehaving 
nodes. Intemal nodes are identified as compromised nodes i f the external attackers 
hijacked the authorised intemal nodes and are then using them to launch attacks against the 
other nodes in the network (Chan & Perrig, 2003). Security requirements such as 
authentication, confidentiality and integrity are severely vulnerable in ad hoc networks 
with compromised intemal nodes, because communication keys used by these nodes might 
be stolen and passed to the other colluding attackers. 
On the other hand, nodes wi l l be classified as misbehaving i f they are authorised to access 
the system resources, but fail to use these resources in a way they should be (Ghazizadeh et 
al., 2002). Intemal nodes might misbehave to save their limited resources, such as the 
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battery power, the processing capabilities, and the communication bandwidth. Attacks that 
are caused by the misbehaving internal nodes are difficult to detect because to distinguish 
between normal network failures and misbehaviour activities in MANET is not a simple 
task (Contos, 2006). 
3.3.3 Mobile vs. Wired Attackers 
Mobile attackers are attackers that have the same capabilities as the other nodes in the ad 
hoc networks. Since they have the same resource limitations, their capabilities to harm the 
network operations are also limited. For instance, with the limited transmitting capabilities 
and battery power, mobile attackers could only jam the wireless links within their vicinity. 
They are not capable of launching the network jamming attacks that disrupt the whole 
network operation. 
On the other hand, wired attackers are attackers that are capable o f gaining access to 
external resources such as electricity and extra processing power. Since they have more 
resources, they could launch more severe attacks in the networks, such as jamming the 
complete networks or launch a brute force attack to obtain other users' authentication 
credentials. Existence of the wired attackers in MANET (especially in the open 
environment networks) is always possible as long as the wired attackers are able to locate 
themselves in the communication range and have access to the wired infrastructures. 
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3.3.4 Single vs. Multiple Attackers 
Attackers might choose to launch attacks against the ad hoc networks independently or by 
colluding with the other attackers. Single attackers usually generate a moderate traffic load 
as long as they are not capable of reaching any wired facilities. Since they also have 
similar abilities to the other nodes in the networks, their limited resources become their 
weak points (Schafer, 2002). For instance, complex cryptography algorithms could be used 
to help in defending the authentication, integrity, and the confidentiality services from a 
single attacker. As it becomes very expensive for the single attackers to break the 
encrypted messages, nodes in the networks could share the expensive cryptography 
workloads with each others by exploiting the distributed operations and the multiple 
connections they have amongst them. However, i f several attackers are colluding to launch 
attacks, defending the ad hoc networks against them wil l be much harder. 
Colluding attackers could easily shut down any single node in the network and are capable 
of degrading the effectiveness of the network's distributed operations, including the 
security mechanisms. Adding to the severity, colluding attackers could be widely 
distributed or reside at a certain area where they presumed a high communication rate in 
the network exists. I f no suitable security measures are employed, nodes in that targeted 
area are susceptible to any kind of denial of service (DoS) attacks that could be launched 
by the colluding attackers (Gosh et al., 2005). 
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3.4 Attacks against Routing M e s s a g e s 
Routing is one of the most vital mechanisms in MANET. Improper and insecure routing 
mechanisms will not only degrade the performance of the MANET, but will also render 
such networks vulnerable to many security attacks. One of the basic elements in the 
routing mechanism is the routing message, which is used to establish and maintain 
relationships between nodes in the networks. The importance of the routing message has 
made it a principal target for attackers to launch attacks against MANET (Sanzgiri et al., 
2002; Li et al., 2003). 
Attacks against MANET routing messages could be launched in many forms and may 
include all the attacks characteristics described eariier. In this study, attacks against routing 
messages are classified based on the approach suggested by Stallings (Stallings, 1999). In 
such classification, infonnation or messages could be deviated ft-om normal operation fiow 
using modification, interception, interruption or fabrication attacks. In a more severe case, 
attackers might also use any combination of these attacks to disrupt the normal information 
fiow. Examples of attacks against MANET routing messages are discussed in the sub-
sections that follow. 
3.4.1 Modification 
In a message modification attack, adversaries make changes to the routing messages, and 
thus endanger the integrity of the packets in the networks. Since nodes in MANET are free 
to move and self-organise, relationships among nodes at some moments of time might 
include the malicious nodes. These malicious nodes might exploit these sporadic 
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relationships in the network to participate in the packet forwarding process, and later 
launch the message modification attacks. Examples of attacks that can be classified under 
the message modification attacks are packet misrouting, impersonation, and The Sybil 
attacks (Douceur, 2002). 
3.4.1.1 Packet Misrouting Attacks 
Routing protocols are always susceptible to the packet misrouting attacks (Srinivasan et al., 
2003). In this attack, malicious nodes reroute traffic from their original path to make them 
reach the wrong destination. Attackers might launch the packet misrouting attacks to 
achieve several malicious goals. In a general case, attackers might misroute packet to make 
it stay in the network longer than its lifetime and thus cause it to be dropped from the 
network. As a result, the source node needs to retransmit the lost packets and this wi l l 
consume more bandwidth as well as increase the overhead in the networks. Attackers could 
also misroute several packets from several different paths to flood one targeted victim or to 
congest a certain area in the network. Additionally, attackers also might reroute the routing 
packets to another colluding attacker, as described in the wormhole attacks (see section 
3.4.2.1). Figure 3-1 illustrates an example of the packet misrouting attacks in MANET. 
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{1) Source node wishes to send M^\\^\o^s node fonvard 
packets to dest.nat.on node ^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^ destination 
Node 1 Malicious Destination node 
Source node ^ o 
Node 2 
(2) Packets transmitted to several imermediate nodes including Node 3 
one malicious node 
Figure 3- 1: Packet Misrouting Attack 
3.4.1.2 Impersonation Attacks 
Impersonation attacks, also called spoofing attacks, are attacks where the malicious node 
assumes the identity of another node in the network (Burg, 2003). By impersonating 
another node, attackers are able to receive routing messages that are directed to the nodes 
they faked. Impersonation attacks are possible in MANET because most of the current ad 
hoc routing protocols do not authenticate the routing packets (Choi, 2003). As a result, 
malicious nodes might exploit this loophole to masquerade as another node by modifying 
the contents of the packets. Attackers may launch an impersonation attack to achieve 
various malicious goals. Attackers might impersonate as either a sender or a destination 
node to intercept secret information in the networks. Attackers also might launch the 
impersonation attacks against the intermediate nodes to disrupt normal routing operations 
such as to launch packet dropping, black hole, and packet misrouting attacks. Figure 3-2 
illustrates an example of impersonation attacks in MANET. 
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(1)Node 1 search for a 
path to node 3 
Node 2 
(2) Node 2 forwards the request 
packets to node 3 
Node 1 
(4) Node 2 modifies reply 
packet to impersonate as 
node 3 and resend the 
modified packet to node 1 
Node 3 
(3) Node 3 replies to the 
node 1 request packets 
using node 2 as the 
intermediate node 
Figure 3- 2: Impersonation Attack 
3.4.1.3 The Sybil Attacks 
Impersonation attacks might be launched in a more severe way, known as The Sybil 
attacks (named af\er the subject of the book Sybil, a case study of a woman with multiple 
personality disorder), as described in (Douceur, 2002). In such attacks, instead of 
masquerading under the identity of a single node, adversaries launch an impersonation 
attack to masquerade as several nodes' identities in the network. In a route discovery 
process, several different paths from source to the destination node might be revealed. 
These extra paths have been exploited in several routing protocols to mitigate the effects o f 
the impersonation attacks against the ad hoc networks. In such protocols, packets from the 
source node were duplicated and redundantly sent through several different paths to ensure 
their survivability to reach the destination node. However, this strategy is not suitable in 
the presence of the Sybil attackers. Since such attackers are able to masquerade as several 
nodes, they are also capable to compromise several routes in the networks thus degrade the 
effectiveness of the packet redundancy strategy. 
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3.4.2 Interception 
Attackers might launch interception attacks to get unauthorised access to the routing 
messages that are not intentionally sent to them. This kind of attack jeopardises the 
integrity of the packets because such packets might be modified before being forwarded to 
the next hop. Additionally, the intercepted packets might also be analysed before being 
passed to the destination thus violating the confidentiality. Examples o f attacks that can be 
classified under the interception attacks are wormhole attacks, black hole attacks, and 
routing packet analysis attacks. 
3.4.2.1 Wormhole Attacks 
In wormhole attacks, two malicious nodes are colluding to create a shortcut to reach the 
destination node. By creating this shortcut, they could trick the source node and win in the 
route discovery process (Hu et al., 2003). Packets in these two colluding attackers are 
usually transmitted using a wired connection to create the fastest route from source to the 
destination node. Figure 3-3 illustrates how adversaries could launch the wormhole attacks. 
If the wormhole nodes consistently maintain the bogus routes, they could permanently 
deny other routes from being established. As a result, the intermediate nodes reside along 
that denied routes are unable to participate in network operations. 
Wormhole attacks are usually difficult to detect because such attacks actually follow the 
nature of routing mechanisms where the shortest path will always be chosen to forward 
packets from source to the destination node. In addition, detecting wormhole attacks wi l l 
be more difficult i f such attacks are only used to launch passive attacks like traffic analysis 
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or password cracking attacks, rather than any active disrupting attacks such as misrouting 
or deniai of service. At some point, i f the wormhole nodes did not launch any disruptive 
attacks, the shortcut created by them might help in lowering the times to forward packets 
from source to the destination node (Burg, 2003). However, this shortcut wil l confuse the 
connections between nodes in the networks and might damage the routing protocols, 
especially when the wormhole nodes stop their operations. 
Actual Path 
Sourcetjode Node A Node B Destin^on Node 
\ 
\ wired connection 
Node 3 
Attacker 1 Node 2 
(1) Attacker create a shortcut to (2) Colluding attacker might tamper with the 
reach the destination node packets before send them back to ihe network 
Figure 3- 3: Wormhole Attack 
3.4.2.2 Routing Packet Analysis Attacks 
Since no disruptive actions occurred, routing packet analysis could be classified as one of 
the passive attacks against MANET (Qian et al., 2006). One way to launch such an attack 
is by exploiting the promiscuous mode employed in MANET. In promiscuous mode, i f 
node A is the neighbour of node B and node C at a particular time, node A can always hear 
the transmissions between node B and node C. By exploiting this property, node A is able 
to analyse the overheard packets transmitted between node B and node C, More 
explanation regarding the promiscuous mode in MANET could be found in (Marti, 2000). 
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In addition, malicious nodes also could launch this attack by exploiting the nature in a 
multi hop routing. 
In a multi hop routing, packets need to be forwarded through several intermediate nodes 
before they reach the final destination. Malicious nodes might exploit this opportunity by 
locating themselves in any location along the route to participate in the message 
forwarding process and later launch the routing packet analysis attacks. Attackers could 
use this attack as a first step to launch further attacks against MANET, such as to launch 
password cracking and location disclosure attacks. Routing packet analysis is very difficult 
to detect because of the nature of such attack, which does not directly disrupt the normal 
routing behaviour. An example of routing packet analysis attack is as illustrated in Figure 
3-4. 
Source Node f 
Attacker 
Destination Node 
Node 1 
Attacker can hear the transmission between 
source node and intemediate node (node 1) thus 
able to launch route packet analysis attack. 
Figure 3- 4: Routing Packet Analysis Attack 
3.4.2.3 Black Hole Attacks 
In this attack, malicious nodes trick all their neighbouring nodes to attract all the routing 
packets to them. As in the wormhole attacks, malicious nodes could launch the black hole 
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attacks by advertising themselves to the neighbouring nodes as having the optimal route to 
the requested destinations. However, unhke the wormhole attacks where multiple attackers 
colluded to attack one neighbouring node, in the black hole attacks, only one attacker is 
involved and it threatens all its neighbouring nodes (Lundberg, 2000). Figure 3-5 illustrates 
an example of the black hole attacks in MANET. 
Detecting black hole attacks in the network is much easier than detecting the wormhole 
attacks because all the neighbouring nodes could collaborate with each other to report any 
malicious activity done by the black hole node. Attackers could do anything they desire to 
the captured packets. They could route the packets to the wrong destinations, modify the 
packets to interrupt the integrity service in the network or they could launch a denial of 
service attack by maliciously dropping all the packets. The effects of the black hole attacks 
might be more severe when several attackers collude to launch the collaborative black hole 
attacks (Ramaswamy et al., 2003). 
Node 
Node 2 
Node 1 
(1) Atlacker locales itself in a beuer 
location to attract packets from all the 
neighbouring nodes. 
1 t 1 t 
1 — • 
Attacker 
Destination Node 
(2) Once captured, packets 
might be dropped or misrouted 
to wrong destination 
Node 4 
Figure 3- 5: Black Hole Attack 
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3.4.2.4 Grey Hole Attacks 
Similar to the black hole attacks, the grey hole attacks are also launched by rhalicious 
nodes to attract routing messages from all their neighbouring nodes. Therefore, similar 
strategies to attract packets in the black hole attacks might be reused in this attack. As 
mentioned in (Lundberg, 2000), one of the attacks that could be launched by black hole 
attackers is dropping all the intercepted routing messages. However, by consistently 
dropping all the packets, such a black hole node could .be easily detected as being 
malicious to the network. Therefore, in order to make their malicious activity harder to 
detect, attackers in grey hole attack vary the packet dropping strategies like randomly 
dropping the packets or selectively forwarding the packets. Such strategies might confuse 
nodes in the networks to distinguish between the packet dropping attacks and the benign 
failure o f the ad hoc network. Until now, no special attention has been given to overcome 
this attack. The only attempt that further discusses this attack can be found in 
(Ramaswamy et al., 2003). 
3.4.3 Fabrication 
Instead of modifying or interrupting the existing routing packets in the networks, malicious 
nodes could also fabricate their own packets to cause disruption and chaos in the network 
operation. They could launch message fabrication attacks by injecting huge packets into 
the networks such as in the sleep deprivation attacks. However, message fabrication attacks 
are not only launched by the malicious nodes. Such attacks also might come from the 
internal misbehaving nodes such as in route salvaging attacks. 
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3.4.3.1 Sleep Deprivation Attacks 
This kind of attack is actually more specific to the MANET than the other types of network 
(Burg, 2003). The aim of this attack is to drain o f f limited resources in the mobile ad hoc 
nodes (e.g. the battery power), by constantly keeping them busy with processing 
unnecessary packets. In a routing protocol, sleep deprivation attacks might be launched by 
flooding the targeted node with unnecessary routing packets. For instance, attackers could 
flood any node in the network by sending a huge number of route requests, route replies or 
route error packets to the targeted node. As a result, that particular node is unable to 
participate in the routing mechanisms and denied from being reached by other nodes in the 
network. Figure 3-6 illustrates an example of sleep deprivation attack in MANET. 
Node 3 Node 1 
Node 2 
Attacker 
Node 1 and nodeS cannot reach node 2 
because attacker constantly sending 
irrelevant packets to node 2 
Figure 3- 6: Sleep Deprivation Attack 
3.4.3.2 Route Salvaging Attacks 
Internal nodes might not only refuse to cooperate in network operations but they also might 
be greedy in using network resources. In a computer network, there is no guarantee that 
each transmitted packet will successfully reach the desired destination node (Ni et al.. 
-49 
Chapter 3 : Attacks against MANET Routing Protocols 
1999). Packets might not reach the destination node because of natural network failures or 
might be under attack by adversaries. Therefore, to salvage their packets from such failures, 
internal nodes might duplicate and retransmit their packets even when not having received 
error messages. The effects of the route salvaging attacks might be more severe i f there are 
large numbers of greedy nodes in the network. Additionally, it drains o f f more resources in 
intermediate and destination nodes, this attack also might cause the consumption o f 
unnecessary network communication bandwidth. Figure 3-7 illustrates an example of route 
salvaging attack in MANET. 
Node 3 
Node 2 
Original packet 
f^Q^Q 1 messages received from node 2 
^ ^ , , Node 1 duplicates and resends packets to 
Duplicate packet ^^^^ ^ although no sending error 
Figure 3- 7: Route Salvaging Attack 
3.4.4 Interruption 
Interruption attacks are launched to deny routing messages from reaching the destination 
nodes. Adversaries could do this by either attacking the routing messages or attacking the 
mobile nodes in the network. Actually, most of the attacks launched in the modification, 
interception, and fabrication attacks are aimed at interrupting the normal operations of the 
ad hoc network. For instance, adversaries aiming to interrupt the availability service in the 
network might destroy all paths to a particular victim node by using the message 
modification attacks. In a message fabrication attack, adversaries could overload the 
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networks by injecting large numbers of unnecessary packets. Examples of attacks that 
could be classified under the interruption attacks category are packet dropping attacks, 
flooding attacks, and lack of cooperation attacks. 
3.4.4.1 Packet Dropping Attacks 
In a normal packet dropping attack, the adversary collaborates normally in the route 
discovery process and launches the packet dropping attacks i f it is included as one of the 
intermediate nodes. Unlike in the black hole or in the grey hole attacks where packet 
dropping attacks are solely initialed by the malicious nodes, the adversary in the normal 
packet dropping attacks might as well come from the misbehaving internal nodes. Internal 
nodes are discouraged to participate in the packet forwarding process because such process 
will waste some of their own limited resources. Figure 3-8 illustrates an example of packet 
dropping attack in MANET. 
^Q^^A Malicious node 
Malicious node denies connection from ^ [ 
node A to node B by dropping the routing xj <H D 
messages ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Figure 3- 8: Packet Dropping Attack 
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There are four type of packet dropping attacks (Huang et al., 2003b), the explanations of 
which are as follows: 
Constant Packet Dropping Attack 
This is the very basic type of the packet dropping attacks. In this technique, all the 
incoming and outgoing packets from the targeted nodes wil l be dropped from the 
network. 
• Periodic Packet Dropping Attack 
In this attack, adversary might not simply drop all the packets but will occasionally 
drop the packets in a periodic manner to avoid being easily detected. 
• Random Packet Dropping Attack 
This attack is quite similar to the periodic packet dropping attack. However, since 
no specific time intervals used in this attack, the adversary wi l l drop packets in a 
random time fashion. 
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Selective Packet Dropping Attack 
In this kind of attack, the adversary might use certain characteristic to select which 
packet it wants to drop. For instance, the adversary might choose to drop every 
packet destined to a particular node in the network. 
3.4.4.2 Flooding Attacks 
Adversaries also might interrupt the normal operations in the packet forwarding process by 
flooding the targeted destination nodes with large numbers of unnecessary packets. Nodes 
under the flooding attacks are unable to receive or forward any packet thus all the packets 
directed to them will be discarded from the network. An example of a flooding attack in 
MANET is as illustrated in Figure 3-9. 
Malicious node denies connection between 
node A to node C by constantly sending huge 
messages to node C 
^ M * - — Malicious node 
j a [ ' — N o d e C 
Node A 
Figure 3- 9: Flooding Attack 
-53 
Chapter 3 : Attacks against MANET Routing Protocols 
3.4.4.3 Lack of Cooperation Attacks 
The lack of cooperation from the internal nodes to participate in network operations is also 
known as the refusal of service attack. In such attacks, internal nodes are discouraged to 
cooperate in network operations that do not benefit them because participating in such 
operations wil l drain their resources. Internal nodes might use different strategies to save 
their limited resources. They might refuse to forward the other nodes' packets, not send 
back the route error report to the sender when failing to forward packets, or might turn o f f 
their devices when not sending any packets in the networks. It is true that users in the open 
environment ad hoc networks are usually incapable to make their devices less cooperative 
in the network operations. However, this does not mean that this attack is not important in 
such an environment because users can always hire any commercial attacker to configure 
the devices to be less cooperative for them (Forristal et al., 2005). Figure 3-10 illustrates an 
example of lack of cooperation attack in MANET. 
a 
Model . - . " ^ Node 3 
Node 2 refuses to forward packet to node 
3 because it wants to save its own limited 
resources Node 2 
t 
Node 4 Drops packets 
Figure 3- 10: Lack of Cooperation Attack 
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3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has detailed several characteristics of attacks that targeting the ad hoc 
networks. Based on the investigation of the attacks patterns, one can make a conclusion 
that all of these common attacks are actually launched by exploiting the routing messages, 
which have been used for communication among nodes in MANET. Driven by that 
conclusion, fijrther investigation on various techniques that could be used by the attackers 
to exploit the routing messages has been carried out and presented in this chapter. 
Responding to the threats and vulnerabilities, researchers have proposed several security 
measures to protect MANET, as discussed in the next chapter. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Responding to the security threats and vulnerabilities against MANET as detailed in 
previous chapter, researchers have proposed several security measures to protect such a 
network. In general, security measures proposed for MANET can be categorised into two 
groups: prevention and detectioa response mechanisms. Figure 4-1 illustrates briefly how 
these two mechanisms can be used to protect MANET from security threats and 
vulnerabilities. 
Prevention 
Mechanisms 
External 
attackers 
R e s p o n s e 
Detection Mechanisms 
Mechanisms 
Normal user 
Compromised 
lemal nod 
Monitor 
Analyze 
Respond 
Nodes in the networks are 
protected from the unauthorisf 
users using prevention mechanisms 
Alarm 
Detection mechanisms 
are used to detect 
attacks that cannot be 
blocked by the 
prevention mechanisms 
Response mechanisms can be 
anything from sounding an alarm to 
more complicated counter attack 
strategies 
l ijiure 4- 1: Security Solutions for M A N E T 
4.2 Prevention Mechanisms 
Prevention is one of the important phases in a security life cycle (King, 2002). Usually a 
prevention mechanism is deployed to secure network operations from malicious external 
attackers. A very basic way to prevent attacks is by employing an authentication 
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mechanism. In authentication, techniques such as symmetric and public key system have 
been widely used and well operated in wired networks. However, the implementation of 
these techniques in MANET is not as straightforward as in the wired networks. The non-
existence of dedicated nodes or central administrator in MANET to manage the 
authentication service makes the authentication mechanism one of the most challenging 
issues. 
Responding to this problem, researchers have devised several mechanisms that are suited 
to the MANET environment, such as authentication schemes, secure routing protocols, and 
cooperation enforcement mechanisms as initial steps to defend from attacks. Examples of 
such mechanisms are considered in the subsections that follow. 
4.2.1 Authentication 
Authentication is a basic way to defend any network architecture from attacks. This 
mechanism usually needs security keys (private and public keys) to prove a node's identity 
in the network. Enabling this mechanism in MANET is very challenging because such a 
network operates in a self-organised manner with no central authority, which must exist to 
manage and distribute the security keys to all nodes in the network. However, despite the 
challenge, this mechanism is still very important as it can provide the first defensive wall 
to block external attackers from getting unauthorised access to the system (Zhu et al., 
2006). Several techniques to enable authentication in MANET are as follows: 
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4.2.1.1 Self-Authentication / Distributed Authentication 
Since it is unlikely to assume the existence of a Central Authority (CA) in MANET, the 
majority of researchers suggest that the authentication mechanism in such a network 
should be carried out in a distributed fashion. Each node in a MANET is responsible for 
authenticating other nodes in the network, as well as to collaborate in managing the 
authentication infi-astructure. Capkun et al. (2003a) proposed two different self-organised 
authentication schemes for MANET where nodes can independently establish security 
associations amongst themselves in an offline mode. In the first method, each node creates 
its own private and public keys and exchanges the keys with other adjacent nodes through 
secure short-range connectivity channels such as infrared. In a second approach, they 
assume the existence of an offline CA to verify the identity of nodes that wish to 
participate in the network operations. The offline CA is only required at the initial stage 
when nodes wish to join the networks. This is to simplify the establishment of security 
associations among nodes because without the offline CA, each node needs to verify the 
identity of other nodes in the networks by itself before exchanging any public information. 
Both of these methods have the same drawback, which is that the establishment of security 
associations requires some time (nodes need close physical proximity to each other to 
exchange information). However, in their study, they did an experiment to prove that node 
mobility in MANET could help in establishing trust using their proposed methods. 
Baifanz et al. (2002) proposed a two-phase authentication scheme for MANET, where in 
the first phase, each node independently exchanges their public keys by having a physical 
contact with each other. These pre-known public key sets wil l then be used in a second 
phase to authenticate users in a real multi hop ad hoc operations. However, as in (Capkun 
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et a!., 2003a), this approach also requires some time for all nodes in the networks to 
exchange public keys among themselves. 
In another scenario, Kubaux et al. (2001) proposed a self-organised public key 
infrastructure for MANET. Jn their work, each node creates its own public/private key 
pairs and issues its own public certificate to other nodes. To eliminate the existence of CA, 
this work proposed a mechanism to store the public certificates for all nodes in a 
distributed fashion. Each node stores its own certificates as well as several other nodes 
certificates in its own repository. A description on their authentication mechanisms can be 
found in (Capkun et al., 2003b). However, this solution only provides probabilistic 
guarantees and is based on the assumption that all nodes are honest in the certificate 
issuing process. I f any node issues more than one public certificate that corresponds to its 
identity, the integrity of the system will be jeopardised. 
4.2.1,2 Imprinting 
Imprinting is another way to establish secure transient associations among ad hoc network 
nodes in the absence of an online authentication server (Stajano & Anderson, 1999). In this 
approach, each node (slave) will be imprinted with a 'soul' that binds it to the other node 
(master) over a non-wireless channel. Once imprinted with a master soul, a slave node wil l 
only follow instructions that came fi^om the master node throughout its participation in 
network operations. However, slave nodes are imprint-able, which means they can have 
different masters once the relations are revoked or expired. Whilst this approach seems to 
work well in the organised or localised environments, it is unlikely to be deployed in the 
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open MANET environment where each node might have several connections 
simultaneously (not limited to one-to-one master/slave interaction). However, the author 
has proposed an extension of this approach in (Stajano, 2000), which covers the 
relationships between peers in an open environment. In the extension work, a slave node 
can act as a master node to its peer (after gaining permission from its master) so that trust 
chains can be established to support multi hop operations in MANET. However, whilst the 
author latter solution has successfully solved the problem of communications between 
peers, such solution was still not suitable to be used in the open MANET environment due 
to the requirement of master node to manage the slave nodes. 
4.2.1.3 Central Authority (CA) Emulations 
Central authority (CA) is much related to the authentication process. CA is used in the 
infrastructure networks to authenticate users as well as to manage the authentication 
infrastructure. However, in MANET, the existence of CA cannot be assumed. Therefore, 
each node is responsible to carry out the authentication process and to manage the 
authentication infrastructure. Researchers agree about the unsuitability to deploy CA in 
MANET, but they still believe that CA plays a critical role in the authentication process 
and it must be made available to support MANET operations. For that reason, several 
solutions have been proposed to make CA virtually exist in MANET. 
For instance, Zhou and Haas (1999) proposed a security mechanism that emulates the CA 
role in authenticating users in MANET. In their work, ( /+/) nodes from the entire nodes in 
the networks are responsible to authenticate new nodes that wish to participate in the 
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network operations. They introduced the concept o f threshold cryptography to avoid single 
point attacks (which usually happen when employing one node to play the CA roles). (J+l) 
nodes are pre-determined at an initial stage and each of them holds a partial share of the 
system private key. Any new node that wishes to join the network must send request 
packets to all the ( /+/) nodes. Upon received the requests, ( /+/ ) nodes wi l l use their partial 
shares to sign certificate for that new node. They claimed that, for n period times, their 
system is immune to / compromised nodes because to compromise the system, attackers 
must gain all the ( /+/) shares. However, it is possible for the attackers to gradually break 
into all the ( /+/) nodes for a certain n times. To overcome this problem, they proposed a 
share refreshing scheme where ( /+/) wi l l generate new sub shares over time and 
distributed among them through a secured side channel. So that, to compromise the system, 
adversaries need to compromise all the ( /+/ ) nodes before the shares expired. 
Kong et al. (2001) also suggest the same approach. However, they outlined some problems 
i f the static ( /+/ ) nodes are used to hold the system private shares. In open MANET 
environments, a huge number of users can join and leave the networks. As a result, it might 
be difficult or it will take longer for one node to contact all the ( /+ / ) nodes to join the 
networks. To solve this problem, they proposed a solution where ( /+ / ) nodes (which are 
called k nodes in their system) can be replicated depending on the density of the networks. 
Any node that has been authenticated can request to copy the shares and play the same 
roles as the existing k nodes. As a result, the time required for new nodes to collect all the 
system shares is reduced in this system. However, this approach is more vulnerable to 
security attacks than the previous one. Replication of the k nodes makes the chances for 
adversaries to capture the system shares broader. Unlike in (Zhou & Haas, 1999) where 
adversaries need to find all the partial shares in {t+l) before the shares expired, in this 
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system, the time needed wil l be smaller because adversaries have more k nodes as the 
targets. Therefore, a new mechanism has been suggested to overcome this problem, which 
can be found in (Luo et al,, 2002), In that work, the authors suggest to select k nodes in a 
dynamic fashion instead of having fixed k nodes in the system. Since adversaries did not 
know how many shares they must obtain to compromise the system, i t wil l at least make 
the attacking process harder. Another improvement in this expanded version is that k nodes 
can also collaboratively detect the misbehaving nodes in the networks. Any./r node can 
broadcast the misbehaving activities o f a certain user, but reports from all the k nodes'are 
needed before a suspicious node can be penalised. 
Y i and Kravets (2002) also proposed similar dynamic k nodes selection strategies. 
However, instead of randomly choosing the number of dynamic k nodes, they proposed a 
mechanism that will choose an appropriate number of k nodes dynamically depending on 
the density of the nodes in the networks. They also suggested that all the k nodes must be 
appropriately chosen based on the level o f physical security offered by them {k nodes). The 
reason behind this is that they believed the k nodes with a high physical security levels are 
more difficult to be tampered or compromised by the attackers, thus could increase the 
reliability of their authentication mechanism. 
All the solutions by Zhou and Haas (1999), Luo et al. (2002), and Yi and Kravets (2002) 
provide mechanisms to authenticate new users that wish to join the network. However, 
none o f these studies consider appropriately the key distribution issues. Most of them 
assume that each node knows the other nodes' public keys. However, in practice, these 
public keys must be generated and advertised so that every node is aware of other nodes 
public keys. One solution for this problem is to use an ID-based cryptosystem as proposed 
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in (Khalili et al., 2003). In this system, all nodes mutually decide an acceptable set of 
security parameters such as National Insurance number or combination of name and birth 
date to be used as user's public key. Since this public information can be derived from any 
existing database (e.g. advertise in newspaper), the need for public key distribution 
mechanism can be eliminated. 
4.2.1.4 Friends Recommendations 
There are also some efforts from researchers to introduce the concept of fiiends' 
recommendations in establishing trust among nodes in MANET. Weimerskirch and Thonet 
(2001) proposed a mechanism to establish trust based upon human interactions. In their 
solution, they suggest that one can only authenticate other users' identities i f they are 
known to each other. If they have not met each other before, they can ask for 
recommendations from their friends that might know or have had any communication 
experience with the targeted node before. Recommendation also can come from the referee 
provided by the target node. This approach can be used when there is no friend that can 
help to verify the identity of the targeted node. 
The concept of finends also has been introduced as an extension in (Capkun et al., 2003a) 
to speed up the establishment of security associations among nodes. Instead of only 
exchanging personal public information, two communicating nodes also can exchange 
their ftnends' public information over the secure channel (e.g. Infrared) so that many 
security associations can be establish at one time. The proposed IDS framework in this 
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study utilises the same friendship concept, and its implementation is described later in the 
thesis. 
4.2.1.5 Cluster-Based Approach 
The cluster-based approach has been introduced in infrastructure networks to distribute CA 
roles into several cluster head nodes. A similar approach has also been introduced in 
MANET with few adjustments to fit with such networks requirements. Venkatraman and 
Agrawal (2000) proposed a novel authentication scheme, which employs a cluster-based 
approach for MANET. In their work, nodes are divided into several clusters, which were 
controlled by corresponding cluster heads. Each node has its own private key, and shares a 
cluster public key to enable them to authenticate and communicate locally with other nodes 
in the same cluster. Cluster head nodes are responsible to authenticate new nodes that wish 
to join in their own-managed cluster and to establish a cluster-to-cluster communication in 
case any child node wishes to make a cross-cluster communication. 
Lu et al. (2001) also suggest the same approach, but with some improvements. The most 
significant improvement is that their solution supports the mobile nature of the ad hoc 
nodes. Unlike in (Venkatraman & Agrawal, 2000), where each node is assumed to be static 
and under control of one cluster head, this solution allows nodes to move from one cluster 
to another, thus enabling those nodes to communicate with other nodes in a different 
cluster without any help from cluster head. However, in self-organised MANET, the 
suitability of this cluster-based approach cannot be guaranteed because it is very 
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challenging to choose a cluster head node in this autonomous and very dynamic network 
environment. 
4.2.2 Secure Routing 
MANET operates in a different manner from the other types of wireless networks. For 
instance, MANET employs multi hop packet forwarding process, which requires 
participation from all nodes in the networks. Since MANET nodes are autonomous, there 
is always a possibility for the authorised nodes (nodes that have been authenticated to use 
network resources) to misbehave during their participation in network operations. Some o f 
the reasons for nodes misbehaving could be because they want to save some of their 
limited resources or simply because they are actually the adversaries who impersonate 
other nodes to get access to the network resources or secret information. Secure routing is a 
prevention mechanism that has been designed to protect MANET against this type of 
adversary. The sub-sections that follow present some of the secure routing mechanisms 
that have been proposed so far. 
4.2.2.1 Solutions for Proactive Routing 
A proactive routing protocol seems to be less efficient in terms of its perfonmance and the 
ability to adapt to route changes in a highly mobile environment as claimed in (Hu et al., 
2002b). This is because, unlike a reactive routing, where paths from source to destination 
nodes are established on fly, in proactive routing all routes are pre-determined before the 
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packet forwarding process. However, proactive routing has its own advantages. Since 
routing paths are pre-determined and stored in a routing table, this information can be re-
used to send packets to the same destination in future, so that redundant route discovery 
process can be eliminated. In addition, this information also can be used to add some 
security features in the ad hoc routing mechanisms. Hu et al. (2002a) proposed a secure 
routing protocol called SEAD: Secure efficient distance vector routing for N4ANET, which 
provides some security features to the existing DSDV routing protocol using efficient one-
way hash functions. Standard DSDV is vulnerable to packet modification attacks where 
intermediate nodes can tamper with the packet's contents before forwarding it to the next 
intermediate nodes. Modifying the packet's content can cause many security attacks. In 
their work, they suggest using a hash chains method to protect the packets' integrity. In 
every communication hop, intemiediate nodes wil l calculate the hash value of the packets 
and compare it with the hash value given by the previous node to check the integrity. 
However, for the system to work properly, they assume that every node use the same 
algorithm to generate the hash values of the packets, and the existence of a symmetric 
authentication mechanism to authenticate each user in the networks. 
4.2.2.2 Solutions for Reactive Routing 
The dynamic nature of reactive routing not only improves the performance of packet 
forwarding operation but also at the same time makes it more vulnerable to many security 
attacks. As a result, more security solutions have been proposed by researchers to solve 
security issues in reactive routing than those faced in proactive routing. For instance, Hu et 
al. (2002b) try to prevent unauthorised access and illegitimate modification to the routing 
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packets by employing appropriate authentication and hashing mechanisms. Their solution 
called Ariadne (A secure on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks) is actually 
similar to SEAD in (Hu et al., 2002a), which also has been proposed by them: Since both 
SEAD and Ariadne are based on the same idea, their operations are not significantly 
different to each other. 
Sanzgiri et al. (2002) proposed a mechanism called ARAN (A secure routing protocol for 
ad hoc networks) to protect a reactive routing protocol from security attacks. This solution 
employs both end-to-end and hop by hop authentication mechanisms to ftilfil important 
security requirements such as integrity, confidentiality, authentication and non-repudiation 
services. Each message will be encrypted at the source node and can only be decrypted by 
the destination node to protect its integrity as well as its confidentiality. Messages also 
need to be authenticated at every communication hop by intermediate nodes to protect the 
networks against impersonation and message fabrication attacks. However, this solution 
assumes the existence of central server to manage and distribute the authentication keys for 
every user in the network thus limits its operation to the organised or localised MANET. It 
is also important to highlight here that this solution only protects the integrity of the 
messages, but does not protect the routing control information (e.g. hop counts) as has 
been proposed by Zapata and Asokan (2002). 
Similar to (Sanzgiri et al., 2002), the secure routing protocol proposed in (Zapata & Asoka, 
2002) also seems to be suitable for a MANET that operates in an organised environment. 
This is because this solution assumes the existence of a central authority to manage, as well 
as to distribute, the authentication keys to all nodes in the networks. This solution employs 
two mechanisms: a digital signature to authenticate users, and a hash chain to protect 
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AODV routing packets from being modified on route. By employing these two 
mechanisms, their solution is effective in preventing a number of attacks against the ad hoc 
network routing protocols such as an unauthorised access to the system resources, 
impersonation attacks, and message modification attacks. 
Ghazizadeh et al. (2002) also proposed a digital signature authentication mechanism to 
protect routing packets in MANET. Similar to other proposals that employ the same 
technique, this solution also assumes the existence of CA to manage and distribute key 
pairs for every node in the networks. Since routing messages are authenticated at every hop 
from source to the destination nodes, this technique can be very usefrjl to prevent both 
impersonation and fabrication attacks. What makes this solution different from the others 
is that the introduction of the path-rating mechanism to rate every different path from the 
source to the destination. In a path-rating mechanism, the destination node will provide an 
acknowledgment to the source node for every single packet that has been successfijlly 
received. This acknowledgement wil l give an idea to the source node about the 
trustworthiness of the intermediate nodes along the route to reach the destination node. 
Routes with a higher trustworthy value will be chosen to route packets to the destination 
nodes. As a result, routes with lower trustworthy values (usually because one or more 
nodes not operate properly or misbehave) will always being avoided. Since bad nodes are 
avoided from routes, network overhead because of packet loss can be reduced, thus wi l l 
save some of nodes' limited resources. 
Most of the secure routing protocols proposed above follow the standard o f reactive 
routing protocol where every node in the network is responsible to participate in the packet 
forwarding process, however, Y i et al. (2001) proposed a different approach. In their 
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solution, they proposed a mechanism called SAR: A Security-Aware Routing for a 
wireless ad hoc network, which employs two metrics to ensure the security of every packet 
traversing the network. In the first metric, they agree with other researchers in (Hu et al., 
2002b; Zapata & Asokan, 2002; Ghazizadeh et al., 2002; Sanzgiri et al., 2002) that the 
security requirements in the network can be achieved by embedding some security features 
when forwarding the packets such as employing authentication mechanism to authenticate 
users and using a hash chain to protect packets' integrity. In addition to that, they 
suggested that the security of packets in the neKvorks could be enhanced by using a second 
metric that they proposed in their system. They proposed to use a hierarchy system where 
only users with certain privilege or authority level can participate in the packet forwarding 
process. Users will be given a special privilege to participate in the network operations i f 
they can ful f i l a certain security level, which can ensure the security of packets handled by 
them. However, this hierarchical system is only suitable for an organised environment 
where each user in the network is expected to be a member of an organisation. 
4.2.2.3 Genera! Solutions for Both Proactive and Reactive Routing 
All of the secure routing protocols discussed so far were designed to suit either proactive 
or reactive routing protocols. None of them can be used as a generic solution for both 
routing protocols. However, Papadimitratos and Haas (2002) have proposed a secure 
routing protocol that can achieve both of these routing protocol families. In general, their 
solution is quite similar to that proposed by Hu et al. (2002a) where they also employ the 
hashing method to protect packets from being modified. However, instead of only 
protecting the MANET from modification attacks, their work also provides a solution for 
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the message fabrication attacks. In their solution, extra packet header data (containing the 
hash value, the sequence number, and the id of the packet) wil l be appended to the original 
packet. Similar to the solution in (Hu et al., 2002a), the hash value wi l l be used to check 
the integrity of the packet while the unique id wi l l protect the packets from being 
maliciously created. In addition to that, a sequence number can be used to defend packets 
from being copied by adversaries that desire to launch a packet replay attack. Further 
explanation of this secure routing protocol can be found in (Papadimitratos & Haas, 2003). 
4.2.3 Cooperation Enforcement 
As mentioned earlier, MANET operations are much depending on node's willingness to 
cooperate in the network. However, some nodes in the network might refiise to cooperate, 
could be because they want to save their limited resources. To prevent nodes from being 
selfish, several cooperation enforcement mechanisms have been proposed and they are 
outlined in the sections that follow. 
4.2.3.1 Charging and Rewarding Scheme 
Providing incentives to stimulate nodes' cooperation can be used to prevent denial of 
service attacks that might come from the internal users. Zhong et al. (2003) proposed a 
credit-based mechanism to stimulate nodes cooperation in N4ANET operations. In their 
approach, each node has a certain amount o f credit that can be used to send packets in the 
networks. Nodes will loose their credits when sending their own packets, but wil l gain 
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some credits i f forwarding other nodes packets. Nodes wil l not be able to send packets to 
the networks after utilising all their credits. As a result, each node wi l l be self-enforced to 
cooperate in the network operations because in that way they can earn some credits for 
later use. However, this approach assumes the existence of central entity known as Credits 
Clearance System (CCS) to manage the charging and rewarding credits for every node in 
the networks. Each node will get a receipt for every packet that successfully reached the 
destination node. This receipt then needs to be presented to the CCS to claim the credits. 
Nodes with insufficient credits can also buy some credits from the CCS. 
Blazevic et al. (2001) had introduced a virtual currency called 'Nuglet' to stimulate nodes' 
cooperation in MANET. In their approach, each user needs to pay a certain amount of 
'Nuglets' when using network resources, but wil l gain some 'Nuglets' when participating 
in network operations. This concept is quite similar to the credit-based system in (Zhong et 
al., 2003). However, this approach suggests that each node needs to be charged and pay 
different values of 'Nuglet' depending on the cost of sending and forwarding the packets. 
This is because costs of sending and forwarding packets are varied depending upon the 
number of intermediate nodes involved, as well as the amount of resources consumed. The 
packet purse model and packet trade model are two mechanisms that are being used in this 
mechanism to deal with different values of 'Nuglets ' in sending packets. In a packet purse 
model, the source node will estimate the number of "Nuglets' needed to reach the 
destination. However, i f the source node made a wrong estimation, the packet wil l be 
dropped because of insufficient 'Nuglets' to reach the destination. Nodes in the networks 
can use a packet trade model to avoid wrong estimation problem in a packet purse model. 
In a packet trade model, the source node is not charged for sending packets. Intermediate 
nodes wi l l buy the packets using some amount of 'Nuglets' and sell it back to the next hop 
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nodes with higher value until it reaches the destination. As a result, the destination node 
needs to pay the total costs of the packets requested by the last intermediate node. However, 
similar to the packet purse model, the packet trade model also has its own weaknesses. I f 
the packet purse model is unsuitable because of the difficulty to estimate the number of 
'Nuglets' needed to reach the destination node, MANET operations are vulnerable to 
denial of service attack in the packet trade model. This is because, in a packet trade model, 
the source node is not being charged to send packets thus adversaries can launch a denial 
of service attack by injecting bogus packets to the networks. As a result, they proposed a 
hybrid version of a packet purse model and a packet trade model to improve the 
performance. Their later work, as well as the simulation results, can be found in (Buttyan 
&Hubaux, 2001), 
Both 'Nuglet' and credit-based mechanisms seem to be unfair for nodes that are located at 
the edge locations. Nodes located at the centre of the communications will have the 
opportunity to cam more credits because the opportunities to be included in the network 
operations are much greater than the nodes that are located outside the busy region. As a 
result, after utilising all the credits or 'Nuglets', nodes in the edge areas are incapable of 
sending packets in the networks. 
Raghavan and Snoeren (2003) have a solution to this problem. In their work, they proposed 
a mechanism where nodes can choose to either use a policed best-effort method or priced 
priority-forwarding method when cooperating in the network operations. Nodes in the 
centre of the communications, which usually have more credits and have more 
opportunities to be included in the network operations might chose to use the priced 
priority-forwarding where they can earn more credits. In other hand, nodes that located 
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outside the busy region might be interested to use a policed best-effort method where they 
do not need any credit to send packets. However, their activities wi l l be monitored to 
detect any misuse. 
4.2.3.2 Reputation Mechanism 
Another way to prevent denial of service attacks initiated by the legitimate insider nodes is 
by employing a reputation mechanism. In such an approach as suggested by Michiardi and 
Molva (2002), each node has its own reputation rate that can be used by other nodes as 
indicator of its behaviour. Every node will try as hard as it can to avoid any 
communication with a node that has a lower reputation rate. In this approach, the 
reputation of each user is rated based on own experiences as well as reports from other 
nodes. Unlike in a self-observation method, where reputation of the suspicious node can be 
rated as positive or negative depending on the behaviour of that node, only positive 
reputations can be accepted from the other nodes. This is to avoid a denial o f service attack, 
which could happen when the malicious nodes are broadcasting false negative reputations 
for other nodes. Nodes can rate a certain user as misbehaved or not by using a watchdog 
mechanism which is capable of detecting any abnormal activities in a packet forwarding 
process as proposed in (Marti, 2000). 
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4.3 Detection and Response Mechanisms 
As discussed in the previous section, prevention mechanisms can be very usefijl as a first 
defensive wall to protect MANET from many security attacks. Various prevention methods 
have been proposed ranging from simple authentication architectures to more complicated 
secure routing and cooperation enforcement mechanisms. Regardless o f the assumptions 
made, most of these prevention mechanisms seem to work well and can provide some 
levels of security for MANET. However, a prevention mechanism alone is not enough to 
protect MANET from attacks that might come from external and internal attackers. 
Security needs to be addressed as a continuous lifecycle to make it effective in protecting 
any network from attacks (JCing, 2002). A security lifecycle comprises of three elements: 
prevention, detection, and response mechanisms, which depend upon each other to provide 
a reliable security protection. 
Responding to this issue, researchers have proposed several detection and response 
mechanisms to complement the existing prevention mechanisms. Most of the efforts have 
generally attempted to address one of the following vital issues in the intrusion detection 
and response mechanisms: how to collect the audit data; what is the appropriate method to 
detect an intrusion; how to minimise false alarms; and how to respond to the intrusion. The 
next sections will summarise some o f the efforts proposed by researchers in addressing 
these issues. 
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4.3.1 Audit Data Source 
The effectiveness of any intrusion detection scheme is often related to the quality of data, 
which has been collected and used to detect malicious activities in the network. In general, 
data can be gathered from one of these two sources; host-based data sources, which reside 
at each node in the network, and network-based data sources which are usually collected at 
a network concentration point by a dedicated node (Albers et a!., 2002). Both audit data 
sources are important to give a better view o f what is going on in the networks, and thus 
can help to detect any malicious activity. A host-based audit data source is an 
infrastructure-independent audit data source because it can exist in any network 
architecture. However, the same thing does not apply to the network-based audit data 
source. No such concentration point or dedicated node exists in MANET that can be used 
to collect the whole network information like in the wired networks. As a result, most of 
the researchers suggested that the only available data source that can be used in MANET is 
the host-based option. However, since both the host-based and the network-based audit 
data sources are important to detect any intrusion attempt, several strategies have been 
proposed to make the network-based audit data source exist virtually in MANET. Here are 
the examples of the data collection strategies proposed for MANET. 
4.3.1.1 Host-Based Audit Data Collection 
Host-based data collection is a method used to collect users' system behaviours that can be 
monitored by the node itself without the aid of any dedicated devices such as firewalls or 
monitoring servers (Innella & McMillan, 2001). The question here is why each node needs 
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to monitor its own systems but not that of others that might be malicious. The main reason 
is that none of the nodes in the network have the privilege to monitor other nodes' system 
behaviour. In any network architecture, the only person that can be trusted is the node itself, 
thus granting access to an anonymous user to monitor a node's own activities can be very 
harmful. Actually, there is no need to snoop into other users' systems to detect anomalies. 
With an appropriate method, each node can capture its own system behaviours and use that 
information to detect any abnormal activities caused by other nodes in the networks. 
Various ways have been proposed to collect user's activities. 
Albers et al. (2002) suggested that the use of Simple Network Monitoring Protocol 
(SNMP) could be very useful to monitor the status of each node's communication 
activities with other users in the networks. Using the SNMP data, which is located in 
Management Information Base (MIB) as an audit data source, each node can analyze its 
own system's behaviours and detect any deviation from the expected patterns. The same 
concept has also been applied in (Awerbuch et al., 2002) where SNMP is used to log each 
request made and acknowledgement received to detect packet-dropping attacks. SNMP 
usually logs all the standard information of the monitored operations and stores them into 
the database. By analysing the audit data logged in the database, most of the common 
attacks such as packet dropping, message replay, and denial of service attacks can be 
detected. However, this information is not always sufficient in MANET, especially when 
dealing with attacks that violate nodes' multi hops communication, such as the black hole 
and wormhole attacks. For instance, nodes use SNMP log data to detect packet dropping 
attacks launched by an intermediate node that is located one hop away from them but they 
cannot use the same information to detect i f subsequent hops intermediate nodes (e.g. 2 
77 
Chapter 4 : MANET Security Schemes 
hops away intermediate node) dropped the packets. To address this issue, nodes need to 
collect extra information that can complement the SNMP audit source. 
Hu et al. (2003) suggested that by embedding some information into the packets, the 
integrity of the packets when traversed across the networks could be validated. In their 
approach, they used a node's geographical location and packet lifetime to defend against 
the wormhole attacks. Upon receiving packets from the network, embedded information 
will be extracted and used as the audit data to detect any deviation. As mentioned earlier, 
the more audit data that can be collected from the host the more reliable the decision can 
be made in detecting attacks. A good example of research work that addresses this issue 
can be found in (Zhang et al., 2003). In that work, the authors suggested that high false 
alarm rates could be reduced significantly by having multiple audit data sources collected 
at every communication stack layer. Whilst this idea could be very usefril to enrich the 
audit data source with reliable information, the process of collecting this information from 
each layer is not an easy task. There was no specific work addressing this issue so far but 
the idea to use the mobile agents as the data collection tool could be very handy. The 
concept of mobile agent in MANET has been introduced in (Kachirski & Gupta, 2003) 
where three types of mobile agents (monitoring, detection, and response) collaborate in one 
intrusion detection system. 
4.3.1.2 Emulation of the Network-Based Audit Data Collection 
Whilst the host-based audit data source gives an idea about what is going on at every host 
in the network, the network-based audit data source on the other hand can provide each 
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node in the network with useful information about the whole network activities (ISS, 1998). 
in wired networks, audit data from the network-based audit data source are usually 
gathered by deploying a dedicated device such as monitoring server or firewall at a 
strategic location (e.g. network concentration point). However, such server or firewall 
needs to be managed by the system administrator to ensure it operates properly. As a result, 
this approach seems to be infeasible in MANET environment because all the nodes in such 
a network operate autonomously, thus the existence of a system administrator cannot be 
assumed. However, this does not mean that the network information cannot be collected 
from the mobile ad hoc networks. 
Researchers have proposed several mechanisms that emulate the role o f monitoring servers 
and firewalls in collecting MANET network audit data. Listed here are some of the 
examples of such mechanisms. One of the most common assumptions made by researchers 
in their works is that each node in MANET is capable of hearing the transmission in and 
out from other nodes in the networks. This assumption, which known as node in a 
promiscuous mode (SearchSecurity.com, 2003), is also coupled with the assumption that 
each node has a bidirectional link to each other. Researchers claimed that by using this 
assumption, partial or localised network activities can be collected by each node, which 
later can be shared among them as a virtual network-based audit data source. This 
approach seems to be first applied in MANET by Marti (2000), but then has been widely 
used by researchers in (Yang et al., 2002; Stamouli, 2003; Buchegger & Boudec, 2001; 
Paul & Westhoff, 2002) as part of their research strategies or assumptions. 
Whilst a node operating in promiscuous mode seems can provide a reliable network-based 
audit data, there is still another challenge that needs to be addressed, which is how the 
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information can be shared amongst users in the network without being falsified by 
adversaries. Since each node in MANET possibly shares the audit data with the unknown 
users, which could be malicious, each node in MANET must have the capability to 
authenticate each other user's identity. However, the use of any authentication scheme not 
only consumes a node's limited resources, but also requires the existence of a CA, which is 
impractical in MANET operations. To overcome this problem, researchers have introduced 
the concept of friends to share the partial network audit data collected by each node in the 
network (Yang et al., 2002; Buchegger & Boudec, 2001; Paul & Westhofif, 2002). In such 
a concept, network audit data can only be shared i f it comes from a friend that can be 
trusted. Since each node knows its own friends from the beginning, the deployment of any 
authentication scheme can be simplified. Similar works have been proposed by 
Weimerskirch and Thonet (2001) and Capkun et al. (2003a) as discussed in Section 4.2.1.4. 
Another method proposed to share the partial localised network audit data is by using an 
agent technology (Kachirski & Gupta, 2002; Albers et al., 2002). In such an approach, 
each user has its own agent that will travel from one node to another to collect all the 
partial network audit data from each other node. The use of mobile agents in this approach 
can help in minimising the node's limited resources, as well as the network's bandwidth 
usage. However, this approach still requires an appropriate authentication scheme to 
authenticate each other node's mobile agents because it carmot be guaranteed that those 
mobile agents are originated from the legitimate users. 
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4.3.2 Method of Detection 
As in wired networks, one can use either misuse or anomaly detection techniques to detect 
intrusions in MANET (Kazienko & Dorosz, 2004). Anomaly detection is a technique used 
to detect all the intrusive activities that deviate from the normal workflow of the system. It 
is a trainable system where patterns o f the normal activities can be learned from time to 
time, even while the system is running. On the other hand, misuse detection is a technique 
used to detect all the intrusive activities that match to the attack signatures, which are 
stored in the database. However, it is difficult to train the system to detect new kind of 
attacks on its own, thus, the attack signatures need to be updated regularly by the system 
administrator. Anomaly and misuse detection techniques have their own capabilities and 
limitations as summarised in Table 4-1. Further explanation of these detection techniques 
can be found in (Vattikonda et al., 2003). 
Misuse Anomaly 
Fast processing, no complex calculations Requires more processing time 
No training required Requires training 
Difficult to manage attack signatures Requires minimum administrations 
Fewer false alarms High false alarms 
Incapable to detect unknown attacks Able to detect unknown attacks 
Table 4- 1: Misuse vs. Anomaly Detections Capabilities and Limitations 
However, between these two mechanisms, researchers claimed that the anomaly detection 
would perform better than the misuse detection in MANET (Huang et al., 2003b; Zhang et 
al., 2003). This is because MANET technology is still new and in fact until now there is 
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still no standard protocol for a routing mechanism, thus making the process of compiling 
the attack signatures in MANET harder than in a matured technology (e.g. wired networks). 
There is also an issue of updating the attack signatures database. Unlike in an anomaly 
detection where patterns of normal activities can be trained autonomously, attack 
signatures used in a misuse detection mechanism need to be managed and updated by a 
system administrator (Meier, 2003). In addition, MANET also has its own characteristics, 
such as fluctuating link and random network topology that can adversely affect the 
performance of misuse detection mechanism. For instance, link breakage in MANET 
might be because of node's movement from one location to another, and not necessarily 
caused by the attackers. This is only an example of many other unexpected scenarios in 
MANET that can significantly increase the number of false positive alarms i f the misuse 
detection mechanism is employed. However, this does not mean that the misuse detection 
mechanism is completely inappropriate in MANET. As mentioned earlier, both misuse and 
anomaly detection mechanisms have their own advantages and disadvantages, and perhaps 
the combination of these two mechanisms wil l improve the performance of intrusion 
detection mechanism in MANET (Wai et al., 2003; Vattikonda et al., 2003). Listed here 
are some of the detection mechanisms that have been proposed for MANET. 
Zhang et al. (2003) proposed a detection mechanism that employs RIPPER classifiers, 
which are based on an IREP (incremental reduced error pruning) machine leaming 
algorithm, introduced by Cohen (1995) and Light SVM (Support Vector Machine) 
(Joachims, 2004) classifiers to generate normal activity patterns derived from the selected 
audit data source. These auto-generated patterns wil l then be used by the detection engine 
to detect any deviations from normal MANET routing operations. From the experiments, 
the authors found that the Light SVM performed better that the RIPPER in generating 
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normal behaviour patterns. This finding suggested that the traditional classifier such as 
RIPPER is not suitable to be used in MANET because of its inability to cope up with the 
node's high mobility. 
Similar effort also has been undertaken in (Huang et al., 2003b). In that work, the authors 
suggested that in any MANET operation, several features can be extracted, and can then be 
used to generate any unclassified normal activities. For instance, in a packet forwarding 
process, several features can be identified such as (1) Is the destination node reachable? (2) 
Are there any packets successfijlly transmitted to the destination node before? (3) How 
many intermediate nodes are involved in order to reach the destination node? Correlations 
between these features can then be used to generate more normal activity pattems that have 
not been classified yet. The more normal behaviour pattems that can be generated without 
doubt wil l improve the accuracy o f the anomaly detection mechanism (Abad et al., 2003). 
In another effort, Stamouli (2003) has proposed a real time detection strategy to detect 
routing deviations in MANETs. Instead of analysing the whole network process using the 
statistical approach as in (Zhang et al., 2003; Huang et al., 2003b), the author suggested 
that an early detection of abnormal activity could be achieved by monitoring the current 
machine states. For instance, in a packet forwarding process, a machine (mobile node) can 
be in a several different states such as sending a route request packet, receiving an 
acknowledgement from the neighbour nodes, sending data, receiving reply packet from 
destination, etc. The validity of all these states usually can be examined. For instance, 
maximum time and threshold can be set to detect the route request packets that have been 
maliciously dropped. There are many other efforts, which attempt to provide reliable 
detection mechanisms in MANET such as in (Albers et al., 2002; Kachirski & Gupta, 
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2002; Wai et al., 2003; Paul & Westhoff, 2002). However, most of them are still in the 
early stages, thus no details about the detection architectures have yet been released. 
In addition to the general anomaly detection techniques, researchers also have proposed 
several other techniques to detect attacks that are unique to MANET environment. 
Awerbuch et al. (2002) proposed a mechanism to detect the lack of cooperation attack, an 
attack where selfish intermediate nodes dropped all the packets forwarded through them in 
order to save their own limited resources (e.g. bandwidth, battery power). Their detection 
mechanism employs a very basic strategy by checking the acknowledgement packets to 
detect any packet loss. In normal packet send/request operations, the intermediate and 
destination nodes will send an acknowledgement packet for every successftiUy received 
packet. Thus, by monitoring these acknowledgement packets, the sender can immediately 
detect any packet loss caused by the malicious intermediate nodes or broken paths to the 
destination. However, this method cannot guarantee that the packets wi l l go along the path 
and reach the destination node. Intermediate nodes can cheat this method by sending an 
acknowledgement packet to the sender but later drop the packets. This problem has been 
addressed in (Just et al., 2003), where the authors propose a mechanism called a distributed 
probing technique to solve this problem. In their work, they exploit redundant paths 
available in the networks to send probe packets to two hops away intermediate nodes. This 
probing technique can tell the sender node i f the immediate (one hop away) intermediate 
nodes did send the acknowledgement packets but failed to forward packets to the next hop 
node. 
Wormhole is another type of attack, which is unique to the MANET as described in 
previous chapter. Realising the effects that can be caused by this attack, Hu et al. (2003) 
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have proposed a mechanism to defend against it. In their work, they suggest to embed extra 
information (e.g. time and location of node) to the forwarding packets. For instance, a 
maximum time allowed for a packet to travel from one hop to another can be set to detect 
any packet that has travelled between two long distance wormhole nodes. In addition, the 
nodes' geographical location also could be very .usefril to detect any wormhole nodes but 
this requires additional tools (e.g. GPS). 
The problem of black hole attacks also has been addressed in (Ramaswamy et al., 2003). In 
such work, the authors suggested that the black hole nodes in the networks could be 
identified by employing a cross checking strategy. The source node will collect some 
information (routing history, neighbouring nodes, etc) from the immediate intermediate 
node as well as the two hops away intermediate node. This information will be compared 
to each other and i f there is a mismatch, both intermediate nodes (in this case, one hop and 
two hops away intermediate nodes) will be assumed as suspicious nodes. Further 
investigation will be carried out to check which one of these two intermediate nodes is 
malicious by doing the same cross checking procedure to both two hops and three hops 
away intermediate nodes. I f the information received by the source node is still 
mismatched, confirmation can be made that the two hops away intermediate node is a 
black hole node, which falsified the routing information in order to intercept data from the 
source node. On the other hand, i f the information received is matched to each other, the 
conclusion can be made that the one hop away intermediate node is the black hole node. 
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4.3.3 False Alarm Acceptance Level 
False alarms are very common in intrusion detection systems that employ an anomaly 
detection mechanism. They happen when the system misjudges any normal activity as 
being abnormal. It is a very big problem in intrusion detection systems because i f too many 
false alarms triggered in the system, users will start ignoring the alarms, and thus possibly 
oveHook real intrusion attempts (Sekar et al., 2002). This problem becomes more acute in 
MANET because to classify what is normal and what is abnormal activity in such networks 
is not an easy task. Sometimes, nodes failed to forward packets in MANET because of 
natural network failure, not because of any malicious activity occurred in the networks. I f 
detection architecture in MANET is built without considering this issue, there might be a 
lot of false alanns in the system and non-malicious nodes could be wrongly penalised. 
However, this problem is not left unseen. Several mechanisms have been proposed to 
tackle this issue and they are proven can reduce the number of false alarms in MANET 
intrusion detection system. 
The very basic approach to this problem has been proposed in (Yang et al., 2002) where 
the authors employ a threshold mechanism to reduce a number of false alarms. To avoid 
misjudgement, upon detection of any anomaly behaviour, the misbehaving node will not be 
simply penalised. Each node maintains other nodes' bad behaviour table, which has a value 
that will increase every time that particular node misbehaves. When the value reaches the 
threshold, confirmation can be made that the particular node is malicious and will be 
avoided. Similar threshold techniques also have been applied in (Bhargava & Agrawal, 
2001; Huang et al., 2003b). Besides threshold mechanism, a rating scheme also can be 
used to reduce the number of false alarm in the intrusion detection system. Rating scheme 
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can be applied either to rate the reliability of route, or to rate the reputation of nodes to 
forward packets in the networks. 
Ideas to rate the reliability of paths in MANET has been made in (Awerbuch et al., 2002; 
Marti, 2000). The difference between these two efforts is that in (Awerbuch et al., 2002), a 
positive value is used to rate a reliable path, thus when forwarding packets, source node 
will select a route with the highest value. On the other hand, in (Marti, 2000), a negative 
value is given to a path that contains a misbehaving nodes, thus a source node will try to 
avoid using the negative value path when forwarding packets to a destination node. As 
mentioned eariier, rating schemes also can be used to rate the reputation of each node in 
the networks. For instance, in (Buchegger & Boudec, 2002a), the authors proposed a rating 
mechanism called CONFIDANT to detect selfish nodes in MANET. Every node in the 
networks will detect its neighbour's behaviour when participating in a packet forwarding 
process. Nodes will receive a good reputation for every successful forwarded packet and 
on the other hand wil l receive a bad reputation when failed to do so. By maintaining every 
node's reputation rating, selfish nodes that refuse to forward packets in the networks can 
be detected and then further action can be taken, such as eliminating them from the 
networks or simply avoiding them in a future packet forwarding process. More harsh 
actions, like ignoring any packet forwarding requests from the selfish nodes, can also be 
used to motivate them to not being selfish in the networks. 
In IDS, the more information gathered related to nodes activity means that the more 
accurate a conclusion about intrusive activity in the networks can be made. Several 
mechanisms have been proposed to collect observations made by other nodes in 
investigating one suspicious node. However, there is no doubt that the information 
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provided might come from malicious nodes that try to blackmail a well-behaved node in 
the network. With that problem in mind, Zhang et al. (2003) have proposed a voting 
scheme to avoid misjudging a well-behaved node because of false accusations received 
from other nodes. The same voting scheme also has been applied in (Paul & WesthofF, 
2002) where the authors used it to enable collaborative detection o f a selfish node in 
MANET. 
4.3.4 Response Behaviour 
Another important characteristic of IDS is the method of response to the intrusion. Usually 
in wired networks, alarms will be triggered to alert the network administrator about the 
intriisions. Once alerted, the network administrator wi l l take further actions, such as 
disconnecting the vulnerable nodes from the network, or initiate a re-authentication process 
to authenticate every user in the network and discard the intrusive nodes. However, a 
network administrator cannot be assumed to exist in a MANET environment. In MANET, 
each node is responsible to respond to any intrusive behaviour, which makes this issue 
more challenging than in the wired networks. Several response mechanisms have been 
proposed for MANET. A simple way to response to intrusion in MANET is by avoiding 
any communication with the intrusive nodes. 
For instance, in (Awerbuch et al., 2002), malicious nodes are avoided from collaborating in 
a packet forwarding process by choosing a different path to reach the destination. Unlike in 
wired networks where usually one fixed connection is used to transfer data from one 
location to another, in MANET, the existence of redundant paths creates flexibility in 
88 
Chapter 4: MANET Security Schemes 
network communication. Such flexibility allows a source node to choose a reliable path to 
forward packets and avoid using a path that contains malicious nodes in it. This 
mechanism also has been proposed in (Marti, 2000; Ramaswamy et al., 2003; Just et al., 
2003) as a part of their intrusion detection and response mechanisms. 
The main issue in response mechanism for MANET is on how to alert the other users about 
the detected intrusive activities. I f an intrusion is confirmed to have occurred, an alarm can 
be triggered to inform other neighbouring nodes as suggested in (Buchegger & Boudec, 
2001). In addition, the observed intrusive activities can be shared among the neighbouring 
nodes to initiate collaborative detection as in (Zhang et al., 2003; Paul & WesthofF, 2002). 
However, as mentioned in (Bhargava & Agrawal, 2001), this mechanism is vulnerable to 
blackmail attacks where a malicious node can sound a fake alarm to discard an innocent 
node from the networks. Methods that are more aggressive, such as eliminating the 
intrusive nodes from the networks, can also be used to respond to intrusion. This concept 
has been used in (Yang et aL, 2002) where upon detection, malicious nodes are prohibited 
to renew their expired token (token used to join network communication), and thus they 
will be eliminated from the networks. The same elimination process also has been 
suggested in (Paul & WesthofF, 2002; Bhargava & Agrawal, 2001) but in a different 
approach. In such works, voting mechanisms have been used to detect the malicious nodes. 
Upon detection, the intrusive activities wi l l be propagated to other nodes to isolate the 
malicious nodes from the networks. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
It is unlikely for any approach to suit all the security requirements or be able to solve all 
the security problems that exist in MANET. Prevention mechanism can be very usefiil as a 
first defensive wall to guard MANET from external attackers. However, more dangerous 
attacks can come fi-om the intemal nodes (Buchegger & Boudec, 2002b). This is because 
the success of operations in MANET are very much dependent on the cooperation of all 
nodes to participate in the packet forwarding process. Detecting intemal attackers is very 
challenging in MANET because such attackers might come fi-om the outside nodes that 
compromised the intemal nodes, or they also might come from the intemal nodes that 
refijsed to collaborate in the network's operations. Defending MANET from the intemal 
nodes is not as straightforward as defending the networks from the extemal attackers. 
Prevention mechanisms such as authentication and secure routing are not capable of 
defending against the intemal attackers because the compromised intemal nodes usually 
have the secret information or network private keys. The best way to defend against this 
problem is by deploying a detection mechanism. There is no doubt that the detection 
mechanism cannot prevent attacks from being launched, but it is capable o f detecting the 
malicious activities in the networks once the prevention mechanism has been bypassed. 
Several solutions have been proposed to detect intmsions in MANET environment. Some 
of them focused upon the detection method, some of them aimed to solve the problem of 
collecting the audit data source, and some others focused on how to deal with high false 
alarms and techniques to respond to intmsions. Since an IDS for MANETs are still new 
and immature, there are still many issues that need to be addressed and improved. 
Characteristics and strategies of the existing IDS proposed for M ANET as discussed in this 
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chapter have been used as guideline to the design of a novel IDS framework as presented 
in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5: A Two-tier Intrusion Detection Frame-work 
5.1 Introduction 
A two-tier hybrid IDS for MANET is a novel IDS architecture proposed to improve the 
efficiency of existing MANET IDS architectures with the help of friend nodes. The main 
idea of the proposed system is to provide a reliable IDS that can detect any intrusion 
attempts and at the same time reduce the number of false alarms raised in the system. An 
intrusion detection system has been chosen as the basis for the PhD work as it is capable o f 
protecting MANET from both internal and extemal attackers. In addition, research works 
focusing on the detection mechanisms for such networks are also still few and immature 
when compared to the efforts put on the prevention mechanisms. 
5.2 Conceptual Framework 
The proposed IDS framework is designed to help users in detecting most of the active 
attacks that were discussed in Chapter 3, such as the modification, fabrication and 
interruption attacks. As mentioned in (Debar et al., 1998), different types of Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) can be distinguished fi-om each other by looking at their 
characteristics such as the location of the audit data source, the detection method, the 
behaviour on detection (response), and the usage frequency. For instance, an IDS that 
detects intrusions using a host-based detection strategy is different from the one that 
employs a network-based detection strategy, and both of them have their own advantages 
and disadvantages. Choosing the appropriate strategies for all the IDS characteristics is 
very important, especially when dealing with the challenging environment of MANET. A 
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two-tier hybrid IDS for MANET is a novel IDS architecture proposed to improve the 
efficiency of existing N4ANET IDS architectures. The main idea o f the proposed system is 
to provide a reliable intrusion detection mechanism that can detect any intrusion attempts 
and at the same time reduce the number of false alarms raised in the system. With the focus 
to improve the detection strategies, only a simple response mechanism wi l l be deployed in 
the proposed system as a complement to the detection mechanisms. Table 5-1 summarises 
the problems and vulnerabilities of existing IDS that this study are intended to address. 
IDS 
Requirements 
Techniques used 
in existing IDS 
Problems/ 
Vulnerabilities 
Proposed solutions in 
two-tier IDS 
Network-based 
audit data 
sources 
Receive audit 
data gathered by 
other trusted 
nodes 
Information 
might be altered 
by malicious 
nodes 
Self-experience: Capture 
overheard audit data of 
adjacent nodes only 
Mobile agents to 
collect audit data 
for global 
detection 
Mobile agents are 
vulnerable to 
attacks 
Friends-observation: 
Audit data for global 
detection wi l l be captured 
and analysed by friends 
Detection 
methods 
Misuse detection 
Difficult to 
manage/update 
attack signatures 
Signature management: A 
platform for nodes to 
exchange attack signatures 
Unable to detect 
novel attacks 
Hybrid detection: Misuse/ 
anomaly detection 
Anomaly 
detection 
High false alarms 
2"** tier global detection: 
Request further 
investigation and votes 
from trusted friends before 
making any decision 
Global 
detections 
Receive single 
report from 
trusted friends/ 
neighbours 
Vulnerable to 
blackmail attacks Filtered Reports: Accept 
intrusion reports from 
friends and drop reports 
from anonymous users Voting threshold 
for several reports 
received 
Vulnerable to 
colluding 
blackmail 
attackers 
Table 5- 1: Objectives of the Proposed IDS 
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5.3 Architecture Consideration 
This study is not the first attempt to secure MANET operations using intrusion detection 
mechanisms. Several proposals have been made in (Zhang et al., 2003; Rajavaram et al., 
2002; Huang et al., 2003b). The proposed IDS framework, as illustrated in Figure 5-1, has 
been designed after considering several issues identified from the investigation of previous 
proposals. The sections that follow present some of the considerations that have been made 
when designing the proposed IDS framework. 
5.3.1 Two-Tier Detection Architecture 
TTie idea of having two-tier detection architecture is to provide a faster detection 
mechanism that is capable of detecting intrusive activities at their initial stages. Relying 
upon a local-based detection method alone is not sufficient to detect intrusion at its initial 
stage. Since information gathered in a local-based IDS is limited to the local activities, 
each node in the network must have enough experiences before any suspicious activities 
can be confirmed as intrusive or not. This limitation wil l slow down the detection process, 
which can be made faster i f the host-based detection method is combined with the 
network-based detection method. For that reason, a global detection mechanism, which 
emulates the roles of a network-based detection method, has been proposed in this new 
IDS architecture. 
A local-based IDS is located in the first tier and wil l be triggered first to investigate any 
suspicious activity before being passed to the global detection mechanism, which is located 
at the second tier. This is because the information gathered in a local-based IDS is the first 
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hand information collected from a self local audit data source, which can be trusted and 
can be made available in an instant (King et al., 2004). On the other hand, the detection 
process in the global detection mechanism will require more time to be completed because 
the information supplied by the other nodes will require more time to reach the requested 
node and must be validated to ensure the integrity. 
5.3.2 Real Time Audit Data Source 
Two important issues have been considered when deciding appropriate audit data source 
strategies for the proposed architecture. The first one is on the behaviour of the data 
collection strategy, whether to use a real time or a periodic technique. Since the objective 
of the proposed architecture is to detect intrusion at the early stage of its appearance, a real 
time data collection strategy is proposed in the architecture. In addition to that, a periodic 
technique might not be suitable in a high mobility MANET environment as the collected 
information might be valid for a short period only. For instance, the attackers might have 
already left the network when the IDS detects their intrusive activities. Another important 
issue that needs to be considered is the location of the audit data source. Since MANET 
operates in a self-organised manner and the identity of other nodes is difficult to verify 
(because of the absence of a third party authentication server), the only audit data sources 
that can be trusted are the ones that come from nodes self-experience and self-observation. 
Details explanations about these data collection strategies wil l be discussed in section 5.4. 
96 
Chapter 5: A Two-tier Intrusion Detection Framework 
5.3.3 Hybrid Detection Method 
The core element of an intrusion detection system is the detection method, which is used to 
investigate any suspicious activities that have occurred in the network. In general, there are 
two detection methods that can be used and they are misuse detection and anomaly 
detection methods as previously discussed in section 4.2.2. Although researchers have 
made clear the advantages and disadvantages of both detection strategies (Kachirski & 
Gupta, 2002), choosing between the two methods is still not an easy task especially in a 
MANET environment. Misuse signatures are difficult to build in MANET because of its 
immaturity and the unique characteristics (e.g. high mobihty, transient connection, 
fluctuate wireless links) it exhibits. This situation has driven most of the researchers 
working on MANET IDS to choose an anomaly detection method for their proposed 
architectures (Zhang et al., 2003; Rajavaram et al., 2002). However, the capability of a 
misuse detection method cannot be simply ignored. Misuse detection can give results that 
are more accurate in term of detecting true intrusion attempts and therefore able to reduce 
the number of false alarms compare to the anomaly detection method (Kachirski & Gupta, 
2002). Considering both misuse and anomaly detection capabilities, the proposed 
framework tries to combine these two detection methods into a hybrid system with the aim 
to study its performance compared to the most frequently used (an anomaly detection 
strategy), in MANET environment. However, the difficulty to build the attack database is 
not the only reason that makes researchers choose to employ anomaly detection rather than 
a misuse detection method. Another reason is that the absence of a system administrator in 
MANET makes the process of updating the attack database more difficult compared to the 
infrastructure networks. To ease this problem, a signature management mechanism has 
been deployed in the proposed framework. The proposed signature mechanism provides a 
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platform for nodes to exchange their attacks signatures. This, i f not eliminated, could limit 
the involvement of CA in the network. 
5.3.4 Using Friends for Global Detection 
The main issue to clarify here is the reasons of using friends to assist in a global detection 
mechanism. As mentioned earlier, MANET operates in self-organised manner without the 
existence of any authentication server to authorise each user in the network. Without a 
reliable identity verification measure, infomiation about any intrusive activities gathered 
by each node cannot be shared with other nodes as the information might be falsified to 
blackmail other users. Zhang et al. (2003) have proposed a voting mechanism to overcome 
this problem. Similar approaches have also been proposed in (Paul & Westhoff, 2002; 
Bhargava & Agrawal, 2001). Voting mechanisms can be very useful to defend against a 
single blackmail attacker, but it is not immune against multiple colluding blackmail 
attackers. However, this voting mechanism can be improved by filtering the votes. For 
instance, only votes from friends can be counted to judge any intrusive activity. In the 
proposed IDS framework, the concept of fiiendship has been introduced as an alternative 
to the existing voting mechanism. For fijrther explanation of the finendship concept, please 
refer to Chapter 6. 
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5.4 System Components 
As illustrated in Figure 5-1, the proposed IDS framework has seven main modules, 
covering the audit data source to the response mechanism for alerting other nodes. Details 
of each module and their roles are described below. 
5.4.1 Audit Data Source 
This is where the audit data will be gathered for further investigation. In the proposed 
architecture, two audit data sources have been identified as appropriate to help detecting 
intrusive activities in the networks. 
Self-Experience Audit Data 
Any network operation, which has been initiated or having a direct connection with 
the user itself is classified as a self-experience audit data. For instance, in a packet 
forwarding process, the source, destination, and all the intermediate nodes will have 
a direct experience of such process and are capable of logging the related activities 
of the process for ftirther investigation i f something suspicious is detected. 
• Neighbours/Friends Observation Audit Data 
Data are not restricted to be gathered by direct participation nodes (source, 
destination, and all the intermediate nodes). Neighbours that are physically close to 
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the participating nodes are also capable to capture the overheard network activities 
using a promiscuous mode. This kind of audit data is known as the 
neighbours/fiiends observation audit data in the proposed framework and can make 
the detection process faster compared to the intrusion detection system that only 
relies upon the self-experience audit data. 
Details about the type of data being captured and analysed in this study is discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
5.4.2 Misuse Detection Mechanism 
The misuse detection mechanism detects intrusions in the network by comparing the audit 
data with a set of attacks signatures that have been stored in the database. At the initial 
stage, the attack database might only cover a few attack signatures, but as the time goes by, 
with help from friends and the signature management module, the attack signature 
database will reach its maturity level and thus capable to detect more attacks. 
Misuse Detection Engine 
This is where the captured audit data will be compared to the attack signatures 
stored in the signature database. An existing misuse detection engine (e.g. pattern 
matching) will be applied here. 
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• Signature Database 
This is where the set of pre-known attacks against MANET routing protocols are 
stored. The signatures are semi-dynamic, where each node could receive updates 
from its friends, thus eliminates the need of CA to distribute attack signatures 
updates. 
5.4.3 Anomaly Detection Mechanism 
Attacks that cannot be detected by a misuse detection mechanism wi l l be passed to the 
anomaly detection mechanism for further investigation. The failure of detecting the attacks 
could be because of the attack signature database is still immature or could be because of 
the insufficient evidence. The anomaly detection mechanism applied in this study is similar 
to the existing techniques proposed by previous researchers and the main components are 
as follows: 
• Anomaly Detection Engine 
This is where the captured audit data will be compared to the user/network profiles 
stored in the profile database. 
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Profile Database 
This is where the normal profiles of user and network behaviours are stored. It is 
quite difficult to build a complete set of user/network profiles for a MANET, due to 
its unique characteristics. Common practice in a MANET research is to build the 
user/network profiles of a MANET based on certain specification applied in such 
network, such as routing protocol or security mechanism specifications. Similar 
practice is applied in this study. A detail explanation of users/networks behaviour 
profiling is discussed in Chapter 7. 
5.4.4 Friends Detection Mechanism 
The aim of the proposed architecture is to detect attacks at their initial stages so that the 
implications of the attacks can be minimised. For that reason, any suspicious activity that 
has not been detected as intrusive by a local detection mechanism must be sent to the 
global detection module for frirther investigation. This global detection mechanism 
requires cooperation from all nodes in the networks to detect intrusions. However, since 
MANET operates without the aid of a network administrator or third party authentication 
server, not a single node in the network can be trusted except the node itself Receiving 
intnision reports or alerts from anonymous nodes in MANET could expose the entire 
network from the impact of blackmail attackers. For that reason, a friend detection 
mechanism has been proposed to overcome this node's trustworthiness problem. Detailed 
explanations on this concept will be discussed ftirther in Chapter 6, 
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5.4.5 Signature Management 
This module will enable a dynamic update to the misuse detection mechanism of the 
proposed architecture. It might be impossible for each node to create its own attack 
signatures, thus a minor involvement of CA could be expected here. CA could insert new 
attack signatures to several nodes in the networks via a console, and later the updates wil l 
be passed to all nodes via a signature management module. 
5.4.6 Trust Management 
The proposed IDS framework utilises the concept of finendship for global detection and 
response mechanisms. Each node needs to build its own friend lists so that it could be 
included in as many global detection and response action as possible. This module 
provides a platform for each node to build its own trusted friend lists. 
5.4.7 Response Mechanism 
This module is responsible for reacting to any intrusive activity detected by the misuse, 
anomaly, or ftnend detection mechanisms. However, since the focus of the proposed 
architecture is on the detection strategies, only basic response strategies will be deployed 
here. Such strategies are as follow: 
104 
Chapter 5: A Two-tier Intrusion Detection Framework 
• Local Response 
A local response unit in this module wil l add the misbehaving nodes to the bad 
node table for fijrther action. Once identified, several punishment steps could be 
done against the bad nodes such as excluding them from participating in a packet 
forwarding process, or refijsing to forward their packets. 
Global Response 
A global response unit in this module wil l alert other nodes in the network by 
broadcasting the intrusion alarms. Neighbour nodes receiving these alarms will add 
the intrusive nodes to their bad node tables to avoid using them in a ftiture packet-
forwarding process. However, to avoid false accusations, only alarms received 
from friends can be accepted in the proposed framework. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The proposed system is a novel IDS architecture, which aims to detect intrusions in 
MANET at the eariy stages of such intrusive activities, and at the same time to improve the 
detection accuracy by reducing the number of false alarms rate. The system combines 
misuse and anomaly detection methods to provide each node in the network with a better 
local intrusion detection mechanism. This hybrid detection mechanism is supported with 
trust and signature management mechanisms, which are useftil to ease the task of updating 
the attack database. The proposed system is also equipped with a global detection 
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mechanism to increase the chances of detecting attacks at their initial stages. However, as 
mentioned in previous works, global detection and response mechanisms in MANET IDS 
are always vulnerable to false accusation and blackmail attacks. MANET's characteristics 
such as nodes are anonymous to each other, operate in a distributed fashion, and without a 
fixed network topology, are amongst the reasons that caused the problem. A fiiendship 
concept has been proposed in the system to ease this global IDS problem. It is envisaged 
that this concept wil l not only motivate nodes to cooperate in global IDS mechanisms, but 
also ease the problems of false accusations and blackmail attacks in MANET environments. 
The next chapter will discuss the details behind this friendship concept. The discussions 
include the reasons why such a relationship between nodes is important, how it could be 
made available in MANET environments, and how it is being implemented in this study. 
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6.1 Introduction 
As discussed in previous chapters, a MANET has its own characteristics that create more 
challenges during its operations compared to other types of wireless networks (e.g. WLAN, 
and WPAN). Since each node in a MANET is autonomous and has its own interests in the 
network, there is always a possibility that some of the nodes might refuse to cooperate in 
network operations to save their own limited resources. This kind of node misbehaviour, i f 
not mitigated, could jeopardise the whole network operation, which heavily rely upon 
nodes' participations. This chapter discusses how friendship relations could motivate nodes 
to participate in the network operations. This chapter also discusses how the proposed 
friendship mechanism can provide solutions to solve several of MANET's security issues 
as mentioned in the proposed IDS framework. 
6.2. Trust Relationship in MANET Environments 
Having reputation or credit-based mechanisms deployed in a MANET environment as 
proposed in previous works might encourage nodes' cooperation in network operations 
(Michiardi & Molva, 2002). However, similar to other security mechanisms (e.g. 
authentication, secure routing protocols, and intrusion detection systems), these 
cooperative enforcement mechanisms are often proposed with an assumption that there 
also exists some level of mutual trust to ease the problem of node anonymity in the 
network. Without this assumption, the reliability of such security mechanisms could not be 
justified. Mutual trust provides a basis for each node to establish a security association 
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with another node during network operations (Pirzada & McDonald, 2006). For instance, 
two nodes that have established a mutual trust between them in an offline mode (e,g, via 
secure side channel) could agree to become each other's trusted entity when participating 
in MANET operations. The more nodes that have established mutual trust between them in 
an offline mode results in more security associations that could be made available in 
MANET operations. Security associations wil l ensure that only the authorised nodes are 
allowed to participate in network operations, which could minimise the problems o f 
misbehaving nodes. Security association also eliminates the problem of anonymous 
autonomous nodes in the system, thus providing capability to punish any misbehaving 
nodes in the network. 
Building a trust relationship is not a new research field in MANET environments. Several 
solutions (as discussed in Chapter 4) have been proposed to solve this issue. However, 
most of them are associated to the authentication mechanisms, which usually require 
expensive cryptography, an assumption of a Central Authority (CA), and in some cases 
require several nodes to play the administrator roles (Zhou & Haas, 1999; Khalili et al., 
2003; Stajano & Anderson, 1999; Stajano, 2000). In addition, almost all the existing work 
lack one important feature, which is, no collaborative effort among nodes to create a 
trusted community. As mentioned earlier, the creation of a trusted community is important 
to ensure the success of MANET operations. A special mechanism needs to be deployed to 
enable nodes to exchange security associations between them. This study proposes a 
friendship mechanism as an alternative solution to the problem. A pair of friend nodes, 
which are assumed to have a mutual trust between them before joining the network are 
capable of creating a security association between them to participate in MANET 
operations. In addition, the friendship mechanism is able to speed up the creation process 
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of a trusted community in the network. I f each security association that exists in the 
network is exclusively owned by any two nodes that created it, the development pace of 
the trusted community will be very slow. Each node needs to meet and establish mutual 
trust with other nodes, which requires a lot of time and effort. The fiiendship concept 
proposed in this study makes this process simpler and faster by providing a secure platform 
for nodes to exchange their security associations. Tliis ongoing trust exchange process 
between nodes without doubt could lessen the number of anonymous communication, and 
thus lead to the creation of a trusted community in the network. 
Although there are some existing studies suggesting a similar friendship concept, the way 
such a concept is used and interpreted is different from the one suggested in this thesis. For 
instance, Weimerskirch and Thonet (2001) proposed the same concept to authenticate 
anonymous nodes in MANET environments. In their system, two nodes are considered as 
friends to each other i f they have physically met in the real world before participating in 
MANET operations. I f a node, lets say node A, wishes to have a trust relation with node B, 
which it never physically met before, node A needs to have at least one node in node B's 
friends list, lets say node C, to authenticate its identity. If there is no node in B's friend list 
that has physically met node A before, the recommendation request wi l l then be forwarded 
to the next hop in the same manner. Once a node that knows the identity of node A is 
found, the information is sent back to node B to complete the authentication process. 
However, i f no one in the chain knows about node A's identity, node A then must name at 
least one node, lets say node D, that it has met before to act as a reference node. Node B 
then wil l do the same process to authenticate node D's identity. I f the identity of node D is 
known by any of node B's friends in the chains, the identity of node A then is considered 
authenticated. The introduction of referee nodes in their framework is very useful to speed 
-110 
Chapter 6: Friendship and a Trusted Community in a MANET 
up the security association's establishment process especially in a situation where only a 
few trust relationships exist in the system. However, their proposal requires strong 
encryption to be deployed in the system to avoid identity thefts when the recommendation 
packets travel across the networks. Their proposed framework also seems to cause extra 
overhead in the networks because o f the complicated process in searching 
recommendations and referees. 
Capkun et al. (2003a) also proposed the same approach, but they dropped out the reference 
mechanism to minimise overhead caused by their proposed framework. They suggested 
that friendships in the real world could be used to establish trust between two or more 
mobile nodes that have never met each other in MANET environments. They divided the 
process to establish trust relationships in their work into two phases. In a first phase, two 
nodes wil l be friends to each other when they establish mutual trust between themselves by 
providing their personal information via a secure side channel (e.g. Infrared). Those two 
nodes will then exchange appropriate security keys, to enable them to communicate with 
each other using encrypted messages over radio links. With the encryption facility installed, 
those two nodes will be able to recommend their friends to each other via radio 
communication, which will be much faster than communication via a secure side channel 
as they are not required to get close to each other to ensure secure communication. They 
claimed that a mobile characteristic of MANET nodes help in their proposed friendship 
concept, which is important for the overall performance of their authentication mechanism. 
However, there is one thing missing in their proposed friendship concept. TTiere is no 
collaborative effort from each node to create a trusted community in MANET 
environments. Since the recommendation process wil l only take place when there is a need 
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to authenticate an anonymous node, the process of creating a trusted community is a 
responsibility of each node itself 
The trust framework proposed in this research is based on the two earlier works mentioned 
above. It is designed to best suit the MANET environment by considering several aspects 
such as resources constraints, self-organisation, security, scalability, and the simplicity of 
the process. It also provides a platform for nodes to exchange their security associations 
with other trusted nodes in the system, which then leads to the creation of a trusted 
community. The detailed design of the proposed framework is discussed in the next section. 
6.3 Trust Framework 
The main focus of the proposed framework is to provide a platform for nodes to exchange 
their security associations with other trusted nodes in the network. By providing such 
platform, it is hope that more security associations could be established, especially between 
anonymous nodes, which then lead to the creation of a trusted community. Security 
association in autonomous networks such as MANET could be established based upon 
nodes' initial trusts. Initial trusts between nodes exist via several ways, including based on 
the friendships of the bearer (i.e. human) in a real worid, or based on the good reputation of 
other nodes through experiences (Walsh & Sirer, 2006). Each method has its own 
advantages and limitations. For instance, initial trust based on a real world friendship is 
more relevant than that established based on nodes' experiences at the early stages of the 
proposed framework implementation. This is because in such situation, each node is very 
unlikely to have sufficient knowledge/experience about other nodes, thus will not be able 
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to rate other nodes' reputations. Initial trust based on reputation is more suitable at the later 
stages when sufficient experiences have been gathered. Perhaps the combination of the two 
methods could result in a better performance. However, for simplicity, only initial trust 
based on a real world friendship is implemented in this study to show how a trusted 
community could be created in MANET environments. This section discusses how initial 
trust could be exchanged in MANET environment, as well as the important concepts 
behind the proposed friendship framework. 
6.3.1 Initial Trust 
In most existing MANET's trust frameworks, researchers claimed that security 
associations between nodes could be established based on the initial trusts that have been 
setup beforehand. Although they mentioned about how the setup could take place (e.g. via 
a secure side channel when two nodes are adjacent to each other), in most cases they did 
not address what motivates the nodes to create such relationships. The proposed trust 
framework in this research suggests a human (node's bearer) relationship is one of the 
factors that could motivate initial trust establishment between nodes. 
People do not live in this world alone. They socialise, make friends, live in a 
neighbourhood, and have family. Some people find that their family members are the 
group of people that they can trust the most. Some others might think differently. In some 
cases, friends could be the ones that are more trustworthy than a family member. The issue 
of trustworthiness is very subjective and it depends upon how the relationship is developed 
(Castelfranchi & Falcone, 1998). However, the issue of how the trust relationship is being 
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developed between individuals is not the main focus of this study. What needs to be 
highlighted here is that everyone has their own sets of friends. Within a set of friends, there 
might be a few of them that could be trusted, and vice versa. The above statements are 
supported by a series of surveys conducted in 1986 and 1995 by a group of researchers in 
Great Britain (Britsocat, 1995). The surveys, which were conducted for the British Social 
Attitudes Survey Series (Britsocat), revealed that the average Briton has 14 close friends. 
One might thinks that the figure is obsolete because the latest survey was conducted 10 
years ago. However, the number might be slightly higher than 14 as communication 
nowadays are much simpler with e-mail, instant messenger, and mobile phones 
technologies (Frean, 2003). This real world friendship could be a very good basis to setup 
initial trust between nodes. In this study, it is assumed that each mobile node inherits all 
the friendship relations established by its bearer and uses them as a basis to establish initial 
trust with other nodes. Figure 6-1 illustrates how this process could happen in MANET 
environments. 
I h i I stahlish mutual trusi 
between each other 
(c) Devices exchange encr>ption 
intormaiion Ma secure side channel 
(a)Ov^nersof wireless 
devices meet 
(d) Devices can ci>mmunicatc 
wilh each other vMthout ovMier 
participation via wireless links 
Figure 6- 1: Trust Establishment between Nodes Based on Real W orld Friendship 
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In Figure 6-1, it is shown that initial trust is established bidirectionally between two nodes. 
However this docs not always happen in a real world. Initial trust is not always necessarily 
to be established bidirectionally. In some cases, initial trust is established unidirectionally. 
For instance, a person called A might be a friend to a person called B, and vice versa. In a 
unidirectional trust relationship, A might believe that B is trustworthy, but not the other 
way round. This is because trustworthiness is a very subjective issue and it depends upon 
each individual consideration whether to trust or not to trust any other person. This 
subjective trust relationship creates an advantage in the proposed trust framework as it 
increases the number of initial trusts that could exist in the networks. For instance, as 
shown in Table 6-1, node A could establish a unidirectional trust relationship with node B 
without node B's approval, as it is its right to trust node B. However, such a scenario will 
not happen in a bidirectional trust establishment as both node A and node B need to agree 
on the relationship prior to its establishment. 
Nodes 
Two Trusted 
Individuals 
Unidirectional Initial 
Trust 
Bidirectional Initial 
Trust 
A B & C A B, A C A - ^ — • C 
B C & D B C, B D B^^—• D 
C D & A C D, C A • A 
D A & B D A, D B D^^—• B 
Total Relationships 8 4 
Tabic 6- 1: I nidirectional vs. Bidirectional Trust Establishment 
For the case in Table 6-1, each node is assumed to have two initial trusted friends. 
However, in a real MANET implementation, it is difficult to estimate the number of trusted 
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friends owned by each. One of the reasons is because MANET could exist in several 
environments. Each environment has its own characteristics (i.e. different kind of users, 
varies in network's density and coverage), which lead to various number of trusted friends 
each node could have. 
In the proposed framework, it is assumed that this number could vary between 0 and 14 (i.e. 
the average number suggested in Britsocat survey (Britsocat, 1995)) depending upon which 
environment the network is deployed. For instance, users in a university campus 
environment might have more trusted friends than users operating in a city environment 
due to the fact that more friendships could be established between course mates. 
6.3.2 Trust Chain and Recommendation Concepts 
Considering a MANET with 4 nodes and having unidirectional trust relationships as shown 
in Table 6-1, there is a possibility for each node to add another node to its trusted lists. In 
such case, node A could add node D to its trusted lists, node B could add node A, node C 
could add node B, and node D could add node C to its trusted lists. Node A might not 
consider to add node D to its trusted list in the first place because it needs more time to 
ensure node D's trustworthiness. This is a case for 4 nodes, which does not require much 
time and efforts for nodes to build their own trusted lists. However, in a wider and/or 
denser MANET environment, each node might require a little help from other nodes in the 
networks to build its own trusted list. 
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The proposed framework in this research suggests the concept of a trust chain via friends* 
recommendations to help each node build its own trusted list. Based on a scenario as 
illustrated in Table 6-1, with a trust chain concept in place, node A this time could rely on 
a recommendation from node B and/or node C to establish a security association with node 
D. This without doubt could save node A's time and effort in the process of building its 
own trusted list. Table 6-2 shows how more initial trust between nodes could be 
established via the trust chain and recommendation concepts. 
Nodes Two Trusted Individuals 
Unidirectional Initial 
Tnist 
Se l fShared Established Initial 
Trust 
A B & C A B, A C A - ^ B, A - ^ C , A - ^ B / C - > D 
B C & D B C, B D B - ^ C. B - ^ D, B - ^ C / D - ^ A 
C D & A C D, C A C - ^ D, C - ^ A, C - • D / A - • B 
D A & B D A, D B D-*- A, rr^ B , D - > A / B - ^ C 
Total 
Relationships 8 12 
Tabic 6- 2: Trust Sharing between M A N E T Nodes 
The concept of trust sharing in this paper is motivated by a research finding published by 
Milgram (1967). The author introduced a small world phenomenon concept, which 
suggests any two individuals selected randomly from almost anywhere in this world, are 
connected via a chain of no more than six acquaintances (often referred to as six degrees of 
separation (Guare, 1990)). The author brought this concept into a discussion in 1967 with 
an experiment in which he sent 60 letters to various recruits in Wichita, Kansas who were 
asked to forward the letter to the wife of a divinity student living at Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. The letters could only be forwarded by hand to personal acquaintances 
- 117 
Chapter 6: Friendship and a Trusted Community in a MANET 
(directly or through a friend of a friend) who they thought might be able to reach the 
recipient. He claimed that he has proved the concept when 3 out of 60 letters that he sent 
reached the recipients but neglected to say about the low (i.e. 5%) chain completion 
percentage. However, his experiment has motivated other researchers to investigate more 
on this concept, such as in the Internet context, as observed by Adamic (1999). In that 
study, the author suggested that the World Wide Web is a 'small world' in a sense that all 
the sites are highly clustered yet the path length between them is small. 
The concept of small worid phenomenon has been brought into discussion in a wireless 
network by Helmy (2003). His study was based on findings from Watts and Strogatz 
(1998), where the authors proposed that by adding a few random links in the system, the 
average path length between nodes could be reduced dramatically. These few random links 
could be made available in the ad hoc networks by adding a few 'short cut' nodes in the 
system. Simulation results from his study proved this hypothesis. One question emerging 
from this study is how to select the few 'short cut' nodes in an autonomous, fully 
distributed, and self-organised ad hoc network. The author proposed the concept of 
contacts, which will act as short cuts to transform the wireless network into a small world. 
However, the author did not discuss how these contacts can be made available in the 
system, and this problem remains an open issue. That is the reason the friendship concept 
is being introduced in this study. It acts as a usefril contact to create a relationship between 
two or more anonymous nodes, thus enables more interactions/communications in the 
networks. 
The deployment of a friend as a useftil contact is also supported by a research finding in 
(Capkun et al., 2003a), where the authors claimed that a mobility characteristic of MANET 
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could create more interactions between nodes. Table 6-3, 6-4, and Figure 6-2 illustrate an 
example how this could happen in the proposed trust framework. In this example, all nodes 
in the network have a set of initial trust that they have established offline via physical 
meetings. This kind of relationship is known as a direct trust between nodes and the 
relationships are as listed in Table 6.3. 
Nodes Initial Trust / Direct Friend 
A (A-B)and(A-G) 
B (B-F) and (B-D) 
C (C-H) and (C-B) 
D (D-J) and (D-C) 
E (E-G) and (E-H) 
F (F-I) and (F-D) 
G (G-J) and (G-A) 
H (H-C) and (H-I) 
I (I-F) and (I-E) 
J (J-E) and (J-A) 
Tol:il 
Relationships 
20 
Tabic 6- 3: Initial Trust Relationships h c t N N c c i i Nodes 
Each node carries and exchanges its direct friend list between them to create a new set of 
friend list, namely the indirect friend. For instance, with a first nodes' movement as 
illustrated in Figure 6-2(a), the newly created indirect friend list is as illustrated in Table 6-
4(a). 
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H 
Fij»ure 6- 2(a): Node's Locations and Interactions in T' Movement 
Nodes Initial Tru.st 
Additional Trust 
Relationships in 1 
Movement 
Trust Relationships after 
1" Movement 
A (A-B)(A-G) (A-B-F)(A-B-D) (A-B)(A-G)(A-F)(A-D) 
B (B-FKB-D) (B-F)(B-D) 
C (C-H)(C-B) (C-H)(C-B) 
D (D-JKD-C) (D-J)(D-C) 
E (E-G)(E-H) (E-G)(E-H) 
F (F-I)(F-D) (F-D-J)(F-D-C) (F-I)(F-D)(F-J)(F-C) 
G (G-J)(G-A) (G-J-E) (G-J)(G-A)(G-E) 
H (H-C)(H-I) (H-I-F)(H-I-E) (H.C)(H-I)(H-F)(H-E) 
I (I-FKI-E) (I-E-G)(I-E-H) (I-F)(I-E)(I-G)(I-H) 
J (J-EKJ-A) (J.E)(J-A) 
Total 
Relationships 
20 + 9 29 
Table 6- 4(a): I rust Relationships Establishment in First M()\enicnt Scenario 
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The second column in Table 6-4(a) represents the initial trust relationships owned by each 
node at the early stage of the implementation. Nodes in a MANET move randomly and 
communicate with the neighbouring nodes. I f the neighbouring node is one of its direct 
friends, it will receive recommendations from the friends to add other trustworthy nodes to 
its own trustworthy lists. The third column in Table 6-4(a) shows additional trust relations 
(-•-9 from initial 20) that have been established after the first mobility scenario. The number 
of trust relationships between nodes keeps growing (10 more relationships) after the 
second mobility scenario as shown in Figure 6-2(b) and Table 6-4(b). 
R 
Fi'^urc ()- 2(h): Node's Locations and Interactions in 2'"' M<»Nemcnt 
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Nodes 
Trust Relationships 
after 1 ^  Movement 
Additional Trust 
Relationships after 2"** 
Movement 
Trust Relationships after 2^ 
Movement 
A (A-B)(A-G)(A-F)(A-D) (A-B)(A-G)(A-F)(A-D) 
B (B-FKB-D) (B-F-I)(B-F-J)(B-F-C) (B-FKB-D)(B-I)(B-J)(B-C) 
C (C-H)(C-B) (C-B-F)(C-B-D) (C-H)(C-B)(C-F)(C-D) 
D (D-J)(D-C) (D-J)(D-C) 
E (E-G)(E-H) (E-G-J)(E-G-A) (E-GKE-H)(E-J)(E-A) 
F (F-I)(F-D)(F-J)(F-C) (F-I)(F-D)(F-J)(F-C) 
G (G-J)(G-A)(G-E) (G-E-H) (G-J)(G-A)(G-E)(G.H) 
H (H-CKH-I)(H-F)(H-E) ( H - I G ) (H-C)(H-I)(H-F)(H-E)(H-G) 
I (I-F)(I-E)(I-G)(I-H) (I-H-C) (I-F)(I-E)(I-G)(1-H)(I-C) 
J (J-E)(J-A) (J-E)(J-A) 
Total 
Relationships 
29 10 39 
Tabic 6- 4(b): Trust Relationships Establishment in Second Movement Scenario 
6.3.3 Assumptions 
The reliability of the proposed trust framework is based upon the following assumptions. 
• Rearer s Unique ID 
This study assumes that node's bearer has a unique ID, which is used by other 
nodes to identify his/her identity. Such an ID could be in form of a smart card. 
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biometrics devices, or any tamper resistant hardware to minimise the effects of 
identity theft (Hubaux et al., 2001). This study also assumes that an authentication 
mechanism has been deployed in the first place to assist in the authentication 
process. Several authentication mechanisms for MANET environments are 
available to make the above assumptions valid (as reviewed in the earlier chapter). 
One o f the good examples is an ID-based cryptosystem as proposed by Khalili et al. 
(2003), 
Spoof-proofed ID 
This study assumes that the bearer's ID is resistant from being masqueraded or 
impersonated by the attackers. Identity impersonation attack is not a MANET-only 
issue, and several approaches have been proposed to ease the problem in other 
types of wireless networks as well as in wired networks (Huang et al., 2003a; 
Barbeau et al., 2006). In the MANET case, Gwalani et al. (2004) have proposed a 
unique way to detect MAC address spoofing attacks. In this approach, the authors 
suggested that by identifying anomalous changes in the generation of sequence 
numbers for a specific MAC address, it is possible to detect M A C spoofing. IEEE 
802.11 sequence numbers can be modified only by changing the firmware of the 
wireless card, thus making such an approach fairly reliable. I f a unique MAC 
address of the wireless card together with the sequence numbers could be used to 
detect MAC spoofing, a similar approach also could be used to detect bearer's 
identity spoofing as illustrated in Figure 6-3. In such a case, each node records the 
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sequence number and the sender ID pair for every RREQ (Route Request). Any 
significant difference between current and previous pairs wil l trigger an alert. 
(1 )Previous R R E Q (2) Current R R E Q 
© R R E Q (ID=A. , / 0 \ R R E Q (ID=A. , /T^ SeqNo=10. ...) \ ^ SeqNo=50. „.) \ ^ 
© 
Figure 6- 3: ID Spoofing Detection 
6.4 Key Features of the Proposed Framework 
As mentioned earlier, this study is not the first to suggest the concept of friend's 
recommendations to establish trust in a MANET environment. A similar concept has been 
proposed in (Weimerskirch & Thonet, 2001; Capkun et al., 2003a) as discussed earHer in 
this chapter. The aims of this study are to provide solutions to several unaddressed issues 
in previous works, as well as to suggest some enhancements that could be made to provide 
a reliable trust relationship framework for a MANET. 
6.4.1 Lightweight 
One of the main concerns in MANET operations is the node's limited resources (Salem et 
al., 2003). The proposed framework in this study minimises the problem by not 
incorporating heavy computational mechanisms that might increase the network's 
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operational overhead. For instance, friend lists could only be exchanged between nodes in 
a single hop communication, which eliminates the need for complex authentication 
mechanisms i f exchange is permitted over multihop links. Complex authentication 
mechanisms utilise more network resources, especially for computational purposes. In 
another case, although it is true that a reference concept as suggested in (Weimerskirch & 
Thonet, 2001) could speed up the trust establishment process, such a concept is being 
avoided in this study as its complexity would increase the network's operational overhead. 
On the other hand, this study proposes trust chain and recommendation concepts, which it 
is believed could offer a better trade o f f between trust establishment speeds and network 
operational overhead. 
6.4.2 Self-organisation 
Capkun et al. (2003a) used a CA to improve the performance of their trust framework. 
However, as MANET operates in a self-organised manner without any central point to 
perform the administration, it is very useful i f the assumption of CA existence is avoided. 
This study introduces a constant friend recommendations concept, which could lead to a 
trust chain establishment to improve the performance of the proposed trust framework. A 
pair of finend nodes will exchange their trusted friend list whenever they are in range to 
each other (i.e. one hop away). Although this approach could not match the performance of 
a trust framework assisted by a CA, the results from simulations presented later in this 
chapter show that the number of trust relationships could be significantly increased. 
125 
Chapter 6: Friendship and a Trusted Community in a MANET 
6.4.3 Security Issues 
Operating without any CA creates challenges for each node in MANET to deal with 
security issues. Each node is responsible to protect itself from various passive and active 
attacks (Al-Jaroodi, 2002). The trust framework proposed in this study is designed with 
this issue in mind to ease the burden for each node in dealing with security issues. Since 
two nodes are required to have a physical meeting before they could establish trust 
relationships with each other, an issue about identity theft could be eliminated. Another 
important security issue that could be eased by the friend concept introduced in this study 
is the problem of a blackmail attacker. With an assumption that all the trusted nodes are 
behaving properiy, the friendship concept could act as a filter for nodes to avoid receiving 
false accusations from the blackmail attackers. 
6.4.4 Scalable 
Scalability is not an issue in the proposed trust framework. Unlike in (Capkun et al., 
2003a), no meeting point is required in the proposed trust framework. A meeting point 
might boost up the establishment of trust relationships, but with a large size of networks, 
this might cause some problems. For instance, in a large network environment, nodes 
might need to travel a long distance to reach the meeting point, and in a dense environment, 
the meeting point might be crammed full. Besides, a CA also might be required to ensure 
security at the meeting point, which if not taken seriously could be abused by the attackers. 
The proposed friendship concept is expandable to a woddwide scale. For instance, 
considering each node has 50 trusted friends, which were established directly on indirectly 
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via recommendations, as discussed in previous sections. With the concept of six degrees of 
separation as discussed in Section 6.3.2, each node could have up to 15 943 877 550 (i.e. 
50 + 2500 + 125000 + 6250000 + 312500000 + 15625000000) trusted individuals 
worldwide. The relationships are as illustrated in Figure 6-4, 
1st degree 
friends(50) 2nd degree 
friends (2500) 
3rd degree 
friends 
(125000) 
4 m degree 
friends 
(6250000) 
5th degree 
friends 
(312500000)^ 
em degree 
friends 
(15625000000^ 
Figure 6- 4: Virtual Trust Relationships in Six Degrees of Separation Concept for the 
case of 50 Initial Friends 
6.5 Evaluating the Performance of the Proposed Framework 
Evaluating a new MANET theoretical system or framework is not easy. One of the big 
challenges, especially in the case of this study, is to set up a huge amount of mobile nodes 
to represent a standard MANET environment. The applicability of the trust framework 
camiol be seen with the interactions of a small number of mobile nodes. With such 
requirement, although it is always a desire to use an implementation-based approach, a 
simulation-based approach is often more practical. Moreover, a simulation has been chosen 
as a preferred approach by previous researchers as it is useftil to support and demonstrate 
node's mobility patterns in MANET environments (Kurkowski et al., 2005). 
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There is a concern in the research community about the credibility of MANET simulations. 
Andel and Yasinac (2006) brought this issue into a discussion and suggested that errors in 
simulation models or improper data analysis often produce incorrect or misleading results. 
However, this is not a big issue in this study, as no critical simulation attributes (e.g. traffic 
patterns, data transfer rate, or communication disruptions) are directly involved in the 
simulations, which i f not careftilly selected could lead to a misleading result. In fact the 
main reason for using a simulation to evaluate the performance of the proposed framework 
is because it is more practical considering the huge amount of nodes that are involved in 
this study. 
The following sub-sections describe simulation experiments, which aim to evaluate the 
performance of the proposed trust framework in creating a trusted community in MANET 
environments. 
6.5.1 Network Simulator 2 (NS-2) 
There are several simulation tools available to evaluate new MANET theories or 
frameworks (Andel & Yasinac, 2006). One of them is the NS-2, which is used in this study. 
NS-2 is a DARPA-supported discrete event simulator that is suitable for both wired and 
wireless networks. Since its first introduction in 1989, several versions of the software 
have been released, with substantial contributions from the research community. This 
study uses the NS-2 simulator version 2.29, where its core MANET module (i.e. AODV 
routing protocols) has been developed by researchers from Carnegie Mellon University 
(CMU) Monarch project (Monarch Project, 2000). The decision to use. NS-2 as the 
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simulation tool has been made due to the fact that it has become the most popular 
simulation tool within MANET research community (Kurkowski et al., 2005), thus is 
providing an increased level of confidence in the reliability of the simulation results. 
However, this does not mean that other simulation tools (e.g. GloMoSim (Bajaj et al., 
1999) and OPNET (OPNET, 2006)) are not suitable for this study. Simulation metrics 
evaluated in this study are independent from the design of any simulation tools, thus the 
end results from any simulation tool are not expected to differ considerably from one 
another. An overview on NS-2 and its main components can be found in (Chung & 
Claypool, 2005). 
6.5.2 Simulation Setup 
This study investigates the performance of the proposed trust framework in 3 different 
MANET settings, which differ from each other based on the network's density level. The 
differences in network density and coverage provide some means to investigate the 
applicability of the proposed framework in several MANET environments. For better 
understanding, these 3 MANET settings are classified into 2 open MANET environments, 
namely university campus and city network. The first setting, which is the densest setting, 
is represented by the university campus environment. The other 2 settings with 2 times and 
4 times less dense than the first settings are represented by the city-1 and city-2 network 
environments, which usually have a wider network terrain. Example scenarios for both 
environments are as follow. 
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o University Campus 
This setup represents an open MANET environment with high network density 
level within a small coverage area. In this environment, nodes are expected to 
interact more often with each other because of the limited space in the university 
campus. An example of such scenarios is where students carry their laptops to the 
library, lecture halls, or use them in their halls of residence. A high number of 
direct trust relationships are expected in this environment as the students make 
friends with their course mates, trust their lecturers and have contacts with 
university authorities. 
City Network 
This setup represents an open MANET environment with a lesser density level 
within a bigger network coverage area than the university campus. The situation 
can be seen as the city community can communicate with each other when they are 
shopping in the city centre, meeting al coffee shops, having drinks at pubs, or even 
communicating with relatives and neighbours etc. The number o f mobile nodes, as 
well as the direct trust relationships in this environment, could be higher or lower 
than the university environment depending on the real word relationships within the 
community. However, for better comparison, the number of node's relationships 
used in this setup is set as similar as the number being used in the university 
campus setup. Through this setting, the applicability of the proposed framework in 
different network density level could be investigated. 
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The differences in network density level represent one of the factors that might have an 
impact on the proposed framework's overall performance. This factor is combined with the 
other two factors, namely the size of nodes' initial trust relationships and simulation time 
(representing network's age) in two separate simulation setups, as illustrated in Table 6-
5(a) and 6-5(b), to evaluate the overall performance of the proposed trust framework. The 
maximum number of possible initial trust relationships owned by each node in the 
simulation experiments is set to 14, as suggested in the Britsocat survey (Britsocat, 1995). 
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Table 6- 5(a): Simulation Setup A - to Investigate Nodes' Initial Trusts Influence in 
Various Network Density Level 
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Table 6-5(b): Simulation Setup B - to Investigate Net^vork's Age Influence in Various 
Nct>vork Density Level 
Apart from that, both simulation sets also follow general MANET simulation settings, as 
usually found in previous works (Kurkowski et al., 2005; Andel & Yasinac, 2006). Those 
settings are as follows: 
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Mobility Pattern 
Nodes are set to move from one location to another using a random waypoint model 
(Hyytia, 2005) (i.e. generated using setdest node-movement generator, produced by 
CMU research) with JO.O seconds pause time and 30.0 seconds maximum speed. A 
copy of complete nodes' movements can be found in a CD supplied with this thesis. 
• Transmission Range 
Nodes are restricted to share their finendship relations with other nodes within 100 
metres single hop communication range. This could be done by setting up the 
RXThresh_ of each mobile node to l.42681e-08. Steps to change mobile node's 
transmission range can be found in (ICe, 2006). The use of a multi hop trust sharing 
is avoided in the proposed framework to minimise the impact of a man in the 
middle attack (Omaghi & Valleri, 2003). 
• Simulation Runs 
The reliability of the end results is achieved by repeating each simulation set with 5 
different sets of direct friends on each run. These direct friends are equally assigned 
to each node using a random number generator. A complete list of nodes' initial 
relationships for each simulation run can be found on the CD. 
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6.5.3 Simulation Metrics 
The aim of the proposed trust framework is to expand the initial trusts that are owned by 
each node to create a trusted community in MANET environments as soon as possible. 
Whilst moving from one location to another, nodes exchange their initial trust relationships 
with their trusted fiiends, thus creating a set of indirect trust relationships. This study 
investigates how many indirect trust relationships could be established in the proposed 
trust framework whilst taking into account several factors that could affect its performance. 
Such factors include: 
1. The effects of the network's age towards the overall percentage o f the established 
trust relationships. This could be done by investigating the number of established 
indirect trust relationships against various simulation times. 
2. I f different size in nodes' initial trusts wil l have an impact on the trust framework's 
overall performance. 
3. Will the proposed trust framework be suitable for any kind of MANET 
environment, which differ in network density and coverage area? 
All the above factors formed several simulations sets as illustrated in Table 6-5(a) and 6-
5(b), which are then used to measure the overall performance (7) o f the proposed trust 
framework. The overall performance of the proposed framework is based upon the 
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percentage of a trusted community created al the end of each simulation set, which is 
calculated using the following formula: 
Z(A-+y) 
T=— (100%), wherex = direct trust; = indirect trust; n = total nodes 
n(n-\) 
Formula 6- 1: Formula to Calculate the Proposed Trust Framework Performance 
6.5.4 Results 
This section presents the results and observations obtained from the simulation 
experiments, which were carried out to investigate the effects of the following factors 
towards the proposed trust framework's overall performance. 
6.5.4.1 The Effects of Nodes' Initial Friendships 
Figure 6-5 presents the results from simulation experiments conducted to investigate the 
effects of nodes' initial friendships towards the proposed finendship framework's overall 
performance. As described earlier, the result is an average of 5 simulation runs, which 
were conducted to improve the statistical validity o f the experiments (Andel & Yasinac, 
2006). The complete results of each simulation run for this experiment can be found in 
Appendix A. From the results, it can be seen that the number of trust relationships beKveen 
nodes is increased significantly according to the initial ftnends owned by each node. For 
instance, the number of trust relationships established with the help o f 1 initial friend is 
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increased from 100 to 316 in the university campus environment. A similar scenario also 
occurs in the city network environment, where the trust relationships were increased from 
100 to 168 and 100 to 118 in both 2 times and 4 times less dense settings. The significant 
increase of trust relationships in 3, 5, 10 and 14 initial trusts simulation sets confirmed the 
effects nodes' initial friendships towards the overall performance of the proposed 
framework 
l O O O O 
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3 5 10 14 
- • - Direct Friends 100 300 500 1000 1400 
-•-Total Friends (Uni) 316 6928 9417 9896 9899 
-A-Total Friends (Cit\-1) 168 1376 4261 8779 9587 
-A-Total Friends (Cit\-2) 118 487 1085 3583 5597 
Iniliiil Friends 
Figure 6- 5: The Effects of Node's Initial Trust 
Apart from providing a platform for nodes to expand their trust relationships, the proposed 
friendship framework is also capable of virtually creating a trusted community in the 
network as described earlier in this chapter. Results from the experiments justify this claim. 
As illustrated in Figure 6-5, the percentage of a trusted community in the network could be 
increased significantly with the help of friends. For instance, in a case o f 5 initial finends in 
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university environment, the percentage of a trusted community (7) is increased from 5% 
(without help of friends) to 95% (with the help of friends). The results are even better with 
10 and 14 initial friends, where the percentage of a trusted community established in the 
university environment almost reaches the total 9900 trust pairs (i.e. 100%). In the case of 
the city environment, although the number of trust relationships created is not as high as in 
the university environment, the percentage of a trusted community established in both city-
I and city-2 settings are much better than solely depending upon a direct trust 
establishment. 
It is important to mention here that the results in this experiment sets were obtained based 
on a fixed 200.0 seconds simulation time. The results are expected to be better (especially 
in the city environment settings) i f a longer simulation time were used in the experiments. 
The next section discusses this issue. 
6.5.4.2 The Effects of Network's Age (Simulation Time) 
Figure 6-6 justifies that the network's age, which in this study is represented by the 
simulation time, is one of the important factors that could affect the overall performance of 
the proposed trust framework. From the results, it can be seen that the number of trust 
relationships established between nodes were gradually increased over a period of time. By 
using a fixed number of initial friends (i.e. 5), the total trust relationships established in a 
university campus environment were gradually increased from 500 to 9583 initial trusts 
within 250 seconds simulation time - more than 19 times increase. A similar scenario also 
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occurs in the city network environment, where the total trust relationships were increased 
to 5181 and 1269 in both 2 times and 4 times less dense settings. 
In terms of the overall performance (i.e. T % trusted community), results from the 
experiments shown that with a sufficient amount of time, the percentage of a trusted 
community established in the network could be gradually increased towards the 9900 total 
trust relationships. For instance, the percentages of a trusted community created in both 
university and city network environments were increased from 5% (without any help from 
friend) to approximately 96% in university environment, and 52% in city-1 environment 
(with the help of friends) within just 250.0 seconds simulation time, hi addition, a higher 
r% value could be expected i f more initial friendships were used in the experiment sets. 
For instance, 10 initial friends instead of 5 are very likely to increase the percentage of a 
trusted community for both university and city network environments. Similar to the 
previous experiment, results from this experiment is based upon an average of 5 simulation 
runs. The complete results of each simulation run can be found in Appendix B. 
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Figure 6- 6: The Effects of Network's Age 
6.5.4.3 The Effects of Network's Density 
The reason of having three different MANET settings (i.e. represented by a university 
campus and 2 city network environments) in the two previous experiments is to investigate 
i f the proposed trust framework could perform well in various MANET environments. 
Each setup represents a different network density level based on the number of nodes and 
the size of the terrain. The network density level (D) for each environment is obtained 
using the following fomiula: 
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D = — ^ , where n = total nodes; kn? - terrain size 
km 
Formula 6- 2: NetAvork's Density' Level 
Therefore, network's density levels for the university and the 2 city network environments 
are 0.2n/m2, 0.1n/m2 and 0.05n/m2 respectively. Although with such a difference (i.e. 2 
times and 4 times less dense), it can be seen that the total trust relationships between nodes 
in the two city network environments are still much higher than the trust relationships that 
have been established solely on each node's efforts (i.e. direct trust). For instance, in the 
experiment to investigate the effects of nodes' initial trust as discussed in the previous 
section, although the percentage of a trusted community in the city-1 network is 
approximately 40% less than the percentage of a university environment (i.e. in a case of 5 
initial friends), an approximately 40% increase from initial 5% direct trust is still a good 
performance. 
6.5.5 Discussion 
Based on the observations of the simulation results, it is apparent that the proposed 
friendship mechanism is capable to expand node's initial trust towards the creation of a 
trusted community. Although the true potential of the proposed trust framework is 
dependent upon various factors (such as network's age, the number o f nodes' initial trust, 
and network's density level), its performance is still very good in the least optimum 
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scenarios. For instance, although with only a single trusted friend for each node, the 
number of trust relationships in the network still could be increased to at least 18% for the 
case of city-2 environment, (refer to Figure 6-5). Moreover, this 18% is achieved from a 
very immature network (i.e. only 200.0 seconds lifetime) in a less dense environment. The 
percentage is expected to be higher i f the network's lifetime is longer than 200.0 seconds, 
as shown in Figure 6-6. It is important to mention here that the simulation time (e.g. 50.0, 
100.0, 200.0 seconds, etc.) used in the simulation do not represent a real time in real 
MANET implementation. Various simulation times were used in this study to show that a 
longer MANET operational time will have an impact towards the overall performance of 
the proposed framework. 
From the observation, the number of direct friends possessed by each individual node has a 
significant impact towards the overall performance of the proposed trust framework. The 
more direct friends owned by each node means the better the performance of the proposed 
trust framework will be. However, as mentioned earlier, this direct friendship relation is a 
very subjective issue. Some people might have as many as 5, 10, or even more individuals 
or friends that they could trust. On the other hand, some people might only have 1 or no 
friend that they could rely on. However, the later case is almost never true since all people 
in this worid live with friends (Britsocat, 1995), especially with the current advancements 
in todays telecommunication technology (Frean, 2003). 
There is also another important factor that was not investigated in the experiment but has a 
major impact towards the overall performance of the proposed trust framework. Such 
factor is known as the inconsistent value of nodes' initial trust. It is always possible for 
each node to establish a new mutual trust with another node in the network. This situation 
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mimics a real world friendship scenario, in which each person could establish a new 
friendship as he/she desires with any newly met person. Such a situation gives an 
advantage towards the overall performance o f the proposed framework. This factor's 
influence towards the proposed framework's overall performance was not experimentally 
investigated in this study because the nature of direct trust establishment process is very 
subjective. Apart from that, the inclusion of this factor will not decrease any performance 
of the proposed trust framework, but wil l absolutely add to the number of indirect trusts in 
the obtained results. 
Results from the simulations also suggested that the proposed trust framework is applicable 
in various network density levels. Compared with a denser environment (i.e. university 
campus), the trust growths in the city network environments (i.e. 2x and 4x less dense) are 
still significant. This suggests that the proposed trust framework is scalable although with a 
slight decrease on the overall framework performance. 
6.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has discussed the concept behind the proposed friendship mechanism, which 
includes discussion on its background and how it could help in MANET operations, 
particularly in security mechanisms. The applicability of the proposed framework in 
various MANET environments and scenarios is also justified via a set of simulation 
experiments. The main conclusion derived from the experiments is that the maximum 
potential of the proposed trust framework is dependent upon the number of direct friends 
owned by each node. The more direct relationships established in the network the better 
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the performance the proposed friendship mechanism. In addition, this chapter also 
addressed the issue of network maturity and density levels toward the overall performance 
of the proposed trust framework. 
Having justified the applicability of the proposed trust framework in MANET 
environments, the next chapter outlines the detailed architecture of the intrusion detection 
and response mechanisms. This includes the implementation of the proposed friendship 
concept, which aims to assist in the global detection and response mechanisms of the 
proposed two-tier IDS framework. 
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Chapter 7 : Intrusion Detection and Response Mechanisms 
7.1 Introduction 
As presented in Chapter 5, the proposed IDS framework is divided into two tiers of 
detection and response mechanisms. In a first tier, each node independently captures and 
analyses its own audit data to detect any misuses or anomalies in the system. The outputs 
from the first tier detection will determine the next step to be taken in the second tier 
mechanisms. I f an intrusion is successfully detected in a first tier detection, a local 
response as well as the global response mechanisms will be triggered. Otherwise, further 
investigation will be carried out to analyse the suspicious activities, and this time with the 
help of friends via a global detection mechanism. 
This chapter describes a simulation-based implementation of the proposed detection and 
response mechanisms in both tiers. The aims of the simulations are to demonstrate the 
applicability of the friendship concept in global detection and response mechanisms, as 
well as to evaluate the performance of the proposed IDS framework in defending against 
colluding blackmail attackers. The implementations have been undertaken using the NS-2 
simulation tools, as it is the most suitable way to prove the concepts o f the proposed IDS 
framework, in various MANET environments. 
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7.2 Scope of the Implementation 
It is important to mention that this research is not intended to design a comprehensive and 
ftiUy operational misuse and anomaly IDS for MANET. The aim is rather to propose an 
IDS framework to show that a friendship relation between nodes could play a major role in 
improving global detection and response mechanisms for MANET IDS. With that in mind, 
only simple operational misuse and anomaly detection engines based on existing works are 
implemented in this study. 
The capability of the detection and response mechanisms implemented in this study are 
confined within the following boundaries. 
7.2.1 Detection 
Although there are many variations of attacks that could be launched against a MANET as 
discussed in Chapter 3, only attacks that associated with an AODV routing protocol are 
further analysed in this study. The decision was based upon the following reasons: 
• The routing protocol is the most important basic mechanism in a MANET, thus it is 
very important to address its security threats (Hubaux et al., 2001). 
• An AODV is one of the most popular routing protocols in MANET research field 
(Perkins & Royer, 1999). Its architecture is constantly reviewed and updated by 
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researchers with aims to improve its capability in terms of the performance as well 
as the reliability to cope with security issues (Jung et al., 2005b; Zapata & Asokan, 
2002; Bhargava & Agrawal, 2001). However, this does not mean that the proposed 
IDS framework is not suitable for other routing protocols (e.g. DSR, DSDV). This 
is because the reliability of the global detection and response mechanisms (i.e. the 
focus of this study) is independent from the routing protocol implemented in the 
networks. A complete specification o f an AODV routing protocol can be found in 
(Perkins et al., 2003). 
7.2.2 Response 
In the proposed IDS framework, each node responds to intrusions in two steps. At first, 
each node triggers a local response mechanism every time its local detection mechanisms 
detect an intrusion. Consecutively, the local alerts are transmitted to other nodes in the 
networks via a global response mechanism so that they are aware about the existence of an 
intrusive node, and take subsequently necessary actions to deal with it. Responsive 
behaviour of each node in a local response mechanism implemented in this study is set to 
be very minimal. This is because although it is a desire to provide a mechanism for each 
node to punish the misbehaving nodes (e.g. exclude them from participating in networks* 
operations), such an issue is not a main focus of this study. The focus o f this study is on the 
more prominent problem of response mechanisms for MANET IDS, which is to propose a 
reliable method that enables each node to securely share intrusion alerts with other nodes, 
especially in the presence of blackmail attackers. Responsive behaviours implemented in 
this study are carried out in two ways, namely a local response and a global response. 
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o Local Response 
Once received an alert from its local detection mechanisms, each node will add the 
intrusive node to its own set of bad node list. In an ideal situation, nodes are 
supposed to avoid any communication with the bad nodes. This feature wil l be 
addressed in a friture work. 
o Global Response 
Each node shares its own bad node list with its friends. Sharing is only allowed 
within a single hop communication range to avoid the information being modified 
by the malicious intermediate nodes. To prevent false accusations caused by 
blackmail attackers, intrusion alerts are restricted to be shared between friend nodes. 
In addition, not every module o f the proposed IDS framework is ful ly designed and 
implemented in the simulation software. For instance, misuse and anomaly detection 
mechanisms are partly implemented as the architectures of those modules have been 
designed and revised in several existing works. The signature management mechanism 
module on the other hand has not been implemented as the impacts of the proposed 
friendship concept towards the performance of such mechanism are similar with the 
performance of the trust management mechanism module. Figure 7-1 illustrates which 
modules were largely implemented, partly implemented, and which were not. 
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Figure 7- 1: Implementation of the Proposed IDS Framework 
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7.3 Local Detection and Response 
MANET's characteristics demand each node in the network to play its role in detecting 
intrusion attempts. The proposed IDS framework in this study provides a platform for each 
node to ful f i l such needs via the local detection and response mechanisms. This section 
discusses a simulation-based implementation of each module associated with the local 
detection and response mechanisms. 
7.3.1 Audit Data Sources 
Audit data is the first module to be called in the local detection and response mechanisms. 
It is classified into two categories. The first category is real time audit data, which is 
captured promiscuously and used by the misuse detection engine. The second category o f 
the audit data is a set of recorded inbound and outbound packets, which also being 
captured promiscuously but used by the anomaly detection engine. The audit data is pre-
processed into these two categories to suit the needs of both misuse and anomaly detection 
strategies, which will be explained further in the next section. Figure 7-2 illustrates how 
the audit data is promiscuously captured and simultaneously passed to the misuse and 
anomaly detection engines. 
Although the proposed IDS framework categorised the audit data into two categories, both 
of the audit data types are actually coming from the same source. As illustrated in Figure 
7-2, each node logs the overheard inbound/outbound packets of its neighbouring nodes, so 
that the information could be used later by its anomaly detection engine. Simultaneously, 
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the overheard packets are fed into the misuse detection engine to detect any misuse 
activities. 
Buffer 
Misuse Detection 
Engine 
Overheard Inbound/ 
Outbound Packets ^ Pre-process 
Audit Data 
Node A 
Recorded 
Audit Data 
Detection Engine 
Inbound J Outbound 
Packet jj Packet * 
Node B 
I i^ure 7- 2: Audit Data being Captured and Passed to the Detection Engines 
A module called logaodvpacket is added to the NS-2 to capture the real time audit data. It 
captures RREQ and RREP packets that originated and/or are relayed from one hop away 
neighbouring nodes and stores them in a log file. Each raw packet entry is pre-processed 
before recorded in the log file so that it could be used straight away by the misuse and 
anomaly detection mechanisms. A pseudo code as illustrated in Figure 7-3 explains the 
process involved in the logaodvpacket module. An example of log packet entries is as 
illustrated in Table 7-1. 
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(1) If PT AODV 
(2) { 
(3) If AODVTYPE RREQ 
(4) { 
(5) Pre-process RREQ packet: 
(6) } 
(7) Else IF AODVTYPE RREP 
(8) { 
(9) Pre-process RREP packet: 
(10) } 
(11) Else 
(12) ExitO: 
(13) Open Log Fi le: 
(14) Record pktTime. src. dst. prev hop. 
next hop. pktType. pktlD. BcastlD. 
HopCount.SeqNumber: 
(15) Close Log Fi le: 
(16) } 
(17) Else 
(18) ExitO: 
Figure 7- 3: Audit Data Capture Pseudo Code 
Time Prev Next Src Dst Pkt PktID Beast ID Hop Seq 
Hop Hop Type Count No 
10.000000 0 1 0 3 RREQ 0-3-10 1 1 
10.000000 0 2 0 3 RREQ 0-3-10 1 1 
10.000000 1 2 0 3 RREQ 0-3-10 1 2 
10.000000 2 3 0 3 RREQ 0-3-10 1 3 1 
10.500000 3 2 3 0 RREP 0-3-10 -1 1 1 
10.500000 2 1 3 0 RREP 0-3-10 -1 2 
10.500000 1 0 3 0 RREP 0-3-10 -1 3 
Table 7- 1: An Example of Log File Entries 
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7.3.2 Misuse and Anomaly Detection Mechanisms 
As discussed earlier, both misuse and anomaly detection techniques are proposed to be 
used in this study to make the most of the detection capabilities offered by both techniques, 
as well as to counter balance the limitations associated with each approach (Fell, 2002). 
This research utilises a specification based technique for both misuse and anomaly 
detection engines. This research uses an AODV routing protocol as the specification model 
to define normal and abnormal activities in the networks. 
An investigation o f the captured inbound and outbound packets follows the Finite State 
Machine (FSM) technique with extended features, as suggested by Huang and Lee (2004). 
In such work, it is suggested that the FSM could also carry extra attributes or variables 
alongside the state conditions to provide extra inputs for the IDS in the detection process. 
Figure 7-4 illustrates the components of the detection architecture for both misuse and 
anomaly detection mechanisms, as proposed in this study. Several FSM attributes based on 
the AODV specifications have been constructed to be compared with the audit data 
streams. Each time an inbound or outbound packet is overheard from the neighbouring 
node, the detection engines try to find the corresponding state condition in the FSM that 
match the current state of the packet. The detection engines then investigate the logical 
process as well as the attributes of the packet to detect intrusion based on the FSM 
specifications. 
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Figure 7- 4: IDS Detection Engines Architecture 
7.3.2.1 Modelling the Normal AODV Route Discovery Specification 
Normal operations of an AODV routing protocol have been extensively modelled by 
Bhargavan et al. (2002). Their specification includes normal operations in both data and 
routing messages transmissions. This study follows their specification model but set the 
focus on the route discovery operation. This is because a route discovery process involves 
different states and logical processes, thus it is sufficient to design a simple but realistic 
IDS as proposed in this study. 
In a route discovery process, a source node broadcasts route request (RREQ) packets to its 
neighbouring nodes to find a valid route to the destination node. Neighbouring nodes that 
receive the RREQ packets will send back a route reply (RREP) packet i f they have a valid 
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route to the destination node. Otherwise, they wi l l re-broadcast the RREQ packet to the 
next hop nodes where a similar process wil l be repeated until a valid route to the 
destination node is found. In some cases, the RREQ packet wil l reach its time out limit 
without discovering any valid route to the destination node. In such situation, the source 
node will have to re-initiate another route discovery process i f the path to the destination 
node is still required. 
Apart from RREQ and RREP packets, there is another type of routing messages, which is 
called a route error (RERR) packet. The RERR packets are used to maintain the 
availability of the established routes as well as to inform neighbouring nodes about any 
broken links, which often happen in a MANET environment due to the node's mobility. 
However, since the RERR packets are not directly associated with the route discovery 
process, its specification is not included in the FSM specification as discussed in this thesis. 
A complete version of the AODV FSM specification as modelled in (Huang & Lee, 2004) 
can be found in Appendix C. 
Destination 
Source 
Intermediate 
J 
Intermediate 1 
Figure 7- 5: Simplified Route Discovery States 
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State Attributes 
T l RREO(Src,Dst,Hc,BcastID,SeqNo) 
xr RREP(Dst,Src,Hc,SeqNo) 
T2(a) - T2(b) RREQ(Src,Dst,NxtHp,Hc,BcastID,SeqNo) 
T2(b)' - T2(a)' RREP(Dst,Src,NxtHp,Hc,SeqNo) 
T3(a) - T3(b) - T3(c) RREQ(Src,Dst,NxtHp,PrvHp,Hc,BcastID,SeqNo) 
T3(c)' - T3(b)' - T3(a)' RREP(Dst,Src,NxtHp,PrvHp,Hc,SeqNo) 
Tabic 7- 2: Simplified Route l)isco\cr > Altrihutes 
Figure 7-5 and Table 7-2 illustrate 3 seenarios of a simplified A O D V route discovery 
process, along with its associated attributes. States { T l - T T } represent the first scenario, 
which involves only the source and the destination nodes. In such a scenario, a source node 
sends a R R E Q packet, which is received directly by the destination node (i.e. the state 
marked as T l ) . The destination node then replies with a R R E P packet (i.e. marked as T T ) . 
The second scenario is represented by states {T2(a)-T2(b)-T2(b)'-T2(a)' [. In this scenario, 
source and destination nodes are not within each others wireless range, and thus require an 
intermediate node to relay the R R E Q and R R E P packets. In some cases, R R E Q and R R E P 
packets need to be relayed by more than one intermediate node. Such a scenario is 
represented by states {T3(a)-T3(b)-T3(c)-T3(c)*-T3(b)*-T3(a)'}, as shown in Figure 7-5. 
Any missing state or unmatched attributes in those 3 scenarios will be detected by the 
misuse and anomaly detection mechanisms, as discussed in the next sub-sections. 
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7.3.2.2 Misuse Signatures 
Ideally, a misuse signatures database should contain as many attack signatures as possible. 
However, because of time and resource constraints for this research there is sufficient time 
only to prove the concept. As such only a few misuse signatures have been implemented in 
this study. Misuse signatures designed in this study are based on the following attacks 
scenarios. 
Modification Attack: Changes to Hop Count Value 
Each time a node received a R R E Q / R R E P packet, and it is not the destination, it 
needs to forward the packet to the next hop node. There should be no changes to 
the packet apart from the hop count field, which needs to be increased by 1 on each 
hop (please refer to (Perkins et al., 2003) for the A O D V route discovery 
specification). An attacker might change the hop count to the lower value to make 
sure it is included in the packet forwarding process. Once it has direct access to the 
packet, it could launch several kinds of attacks as described in Chapter 3. On the 
other hand, a misbehaving node might change the hop count to the Infinity value to 
avoid being included in the packet forwarding process, as the involvement would 
utilise its limited resources. Figure 7-6 illustrates an example of the scenarios when 
a misbehaving node modifies the hop count value to Infinity. 
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RREP 
RREQ (HopCount = 2) 
Node 0 
Figure 7- 6: Hop Count Modification Attack 
In this example, node 3 is the misbehaving node. Actually, the first discovered 
route from source node 0 to destination node 2 is (0-3-2), as the first R R E P send 
out from node 2 is routed via node 3. This is shown in the log file as illustrated in 
Table 7-3. However, because node 3 has changed the hop count for the path to 
Infinity (i.e. 255), that route has become invalid. As a result, node 2 has to choose 
the next available route, which is (0-1-2). The complete path from node 0 to node 2, 
via node 1 is as shown in Table 7-3 (i.e. highlighted cells). In this scenario, node 3 
has successfnlly excluded itself from the packet forwarding process to save its 
limited resources. 
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Time Prev_ Hop Next_ Hop Src Dst Pkt Type PktiO Hop Count 
?0.000000 0 3 0 2 RREO 0-2-20 1 
20.000000 0 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 1 
^0.000000 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 255 
20.000000 3 0 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 255 
20.000000 3 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 255 
nmm 2 3 2 0 RREP 0-2-20 1 20.000000 1 3 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 2 
20.000000 1 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 2 
20.000000 1 0 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 2 
22.000000 0 3 0 2 RREQ 0-2-22 1 
22.000000 0 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-22 1 
22.000000 1 3 0 2 RREQ 0-2-22 2 
22.000000 1 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-22 2 
22.000000 1 0 0 2 RREQ 0-2-22 2 
22.000000 3 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-22 255 
22.000000 3 0 0 2 RREQ 0-2-22 255 
22.000000 3 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-22 255 
1 22.000000 1 0 22 
Table 7- 3: An Kxample of Log File uith the Hop Count Modification 
• Interception Attack: Modifying Sequence Number to Win the Route Discovery-
Process 
In an A O D V routing, a R R E Q sequence number is used by each node to determine 
the freshness of the request, so that no resources are wasted processing an old or 
identical request. Any request to the same destination node that has a lower 
sequence number than the previous one will be dropped. Attackers might exploit 
this scenario by always advertising fresher route requests so that all the packets will 
be routed via them. Similar to the scenario in a hop count modification attack, once 
the attackers gain a physical access to the packets, they could launch a more severe 
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attack such as drop the packet or analyse the content of the packet. As illustrated in 
Figure 7-7, an attacker (i.e. node 3) constantly adds 10 to the sequence number of 
the victim node's (i.e. node 0) R R E Q . As a result, it will always be selected to route 
node's 0 packets, thus denies other nodes' participation. 
(SeqNo = 
No.;c 0 
V Node 3 
I ijiure 7- 7: Sequence Number Modification Attack 
Log files for nonnal and under attack conditions, as illustrated in Table 7-4 and 7-5, 
show that node 3 is always selected in the route discovery process, when the 
scenario as illustrated in Figure 7-7 is simulated in the NS-2. 
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Time Prev_ Hop Next_ Hop Src Dst Pkt Type Pkt ID Seq No 
20.000000 0 3 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 
20.000000 0 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 4 
20.000000 3 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 4 
20.000000 3 0 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 4 
20.000000 3 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 4 
20.000000 2 3 2 0 RREP 0-2-20 1 
20.000000 1 3 0 2 RREO 0-2-20 4 
20.000000 1 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 4 
20.000000 1 0 0 2 ftftEQ 0-2-20 4 
20.000000 3 0 2 0 RREP 0-2-22 2 
36.000000 0 3 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 6 
36.000000 0 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 6 
36.000000 1 3 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 6 
36.000000 1 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 6 
36.000000 1 0 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 6 
36.000000 3 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 6 
36.000000 3 0 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 6 
36.000000 3 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 6 
000 2 RREP 0-^  
Table 7- 4: An Example of Log File without the Sequence Number Modification 
Attack 
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Time Prev_ Hop Next_ Hop Src Dst Pkt Type PktlD Seq No 
20.000000 0 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 4 
20.000000 0 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 4 
20.000000 3 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 14 
20.000000 3 0 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 14 
20.000000 3 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 14 
20.000000 2 3 2 0 RREP 0-2-20 -1 
20.000000 1 3 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 4 
20.000000 1 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 4 
20.000000 1 0 0 2 0-2-20 4 
20.000000 3 0 2 0 RREP 0-2-22 -1 
36.000000 0 3 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 6 
36.000000 0 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 6 
36.000000 1 3 0 2 km 0-2-36 6 
36.000000 1 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 6 
36.000000 1 0 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 6 
36.000000 3 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 16 
36.000000 3 0 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 16 
36.000000 3 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 16 
36.500000 0 3 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 8 
36.600000 0 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 8 
36.500000 1 3 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 8 
36.500000 1 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 8 
36.600000 1 0 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 8 
36.500000 3 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 18 
36.500000 3 0 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 18 
36.500000 3 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 18 
37.000000 0 3 0 2 RREQ 0-2-37 10 
37.000000 0 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-37 10 
37.000000 3 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-37 20 
37.000000 3 0 0 2 RREQ 0-2-37 20 
37.000000 3 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-37 20 
37.000000 1 3 0 2 RREQ 0-2-37 10 
37.000000 1 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-37 10 
37.000000 1 0 0 2 RREQ 0-2-37 10 
37.000000 2 3 2 0 RREP 0-2-37 -1 
37.000000 3 0 2 0 RREP 0-2-37 -1 
Table 7- 5: An Kxaniple of Log File with the Sequence Number Modification Attack 
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Fabrication Attacks: Selfish Node 
Another kind of attack implemented in this study is a selfish attack, which happens 
when a misbehaving node sends multiple R R E Q packets in an inappropriate way. 
This kind of attack is an example of a route salvaging attack as discussed earlier in 
Chapter 3. The phenomenon of broken links always happens in M A N E T 
environments due to node's mobility and the instability of wireless links. However, 
the A O D V routing protocol provides a mechanism for nodes to recover the lost 
links. When there is a broken link, a source node is permitted to re-initiate a route 
discovery process up to RREQ RETRJES times but must wait until the 
MAX_RREQ_TIMEOUT IS reached before the next try. A selfish node (i.e. a node 
that does not want to wait a little longer to complete its packet transmissions) sends 
multiple R R E Q packets to search and maintain routes to the desired destination. In 
case the current link is lost, the established backup routes will be used to complete 
the packet forwarding process. This kind of behaviour is not fair to other nodes as it 
could rapidly drain off their resources. Such behaviour could also increase network 
activity, which could cause bottlenecks and worsen the packet collision problems 
within the network. An example of audit data when this attack is simulated in the 
NS-2 is as illustrated in Table 7-6. In such example, node 0 sends 2 duplicate 
packets for each of its R R E Q packet and causes more activity in the network. 
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Time Prev_ Hop Next Hop Src Dst Pkt Type PktID BCast ID 
20.000000 0 3 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 1 
20.000000 0 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 1 
JO.000000 0 3 0 2 RREO 0-2-20 2 
20.000000 0 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 2 
20.000000 1 3 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 2 
20.000000 1 2 0 2 RREO 0-2-20 2 
20.000000 1 0 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 2 
20.000000 3 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 1 
20.000000 3 0 0 2 km 0-2-20 1 20.000000 3 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 1 
20.000000 1 3 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 1 
20.000000 1 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 1 
M. 000000 1 0 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 1 
20.000000 2 1 2 0 RREP 0-2-20 -1 
20.000000 3 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 2 
20.000000 3 0 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 2 
20.000000 3 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-20 2 
20.000000 2 3 2 0 RREP 0-2-20 -1 
20.000000 3 0 2 0 RREP 0-2-20 -1 
36.000000 1 0 2 0 m? 0-2-36 -1 
36.000000 0 3 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 3 
36.000000 0 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 3 
36.000000 0 3 0 2 km 0-2-36 4 
36.000000 0 1 0 2 km 0-2-36 4 
36.000000 1 3 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 3 
36.000000 1 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 3 
36.000000 1 0 0 2 RRM 0-2-36 3 
36.000000 3 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 3 
36.000000 3 0 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 3 
36.000000 3 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 3 
36.000000 3 1 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 4 
36.000000 3 0 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 4 
36.000000 3 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 4 
36.000000 2 3 2 0 kklP 0-2-36 -1 
36.000000 3 0 2 0 RREP 0-2-36 -1 
36.000000 1 3 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 4 
36.000000 1 2 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 4 
36.000000 1 0 0 2 RREQ 0-2-36 4 
Table 7- 6: An Example of Selfish Attack Audit Data 
- 164-
Chapter 7 : Intrusion Detection and Response Mechanisms 
7.3.2.3 Normal Profiles 
In an actual system implementation, all the F S M states and attributes as outlined in 
previous sections should be formalised to create a list of normal system and user profiles to 
detect anomalies attacks. However, in this study, only some of the states and attributes are 
formalised to define a set of normal profiles. Those selected states and attributes are 
chosen because they are essential to detect anomalies in the packet forwarding process, as 
designed in this study. One of the good examples to show how the proposed IDS 
framework could benefit from the anomaly detection mechanism is by testing the system 
with a packet dropping attack. Detecting a packet dropping attack in M A N E T 
environments is not a straightforward procedure. This is because it is difficult to 
distinguish between a genuine packet dropping attack and a benign failure (i.e. lost links) 
in ad hoc networks. Deploying a misuse detection mechanism to detect this kind of attack 
could lead to many false alarms. Some of the scenarios that follow are examples where an 
anomaly detection mechanism should be deployed instead of a misuse detection 
mechanism, to avoid producing many false alarms in detecting a packet dropping attack. 
• Collision 
Packet collision is a common problem in a computer network. It happens when two 
or more nodes attempt to transmit a packet across the network at the same time 
(Stathopoulos et al., 2004). In a case of a M A N E T , the packet will be discarded and 
the source nodes need to retransmit the packets. In this case, the receiving node is 
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not intended to drop the packet, thus cannot be punished for not forwarding or 
replying to the packets. 
Wireless Link Failure 
In ad hoc networks, nodes move from one location to another even when they are in 
the middle of a packet forwarding process. As a result, packets are sometime sent 
or forwarded to an unreachable node. As illustrated in Figure 7-8, node I is in 
range when the packet is sent out from the source node. However, before the packet 
arrives, node 1 has moved to a different location, which is out o f the source node's 
communication range. The packet will be discarded and the source node needs to 
establish an alternative route to reach the destination node. Node 1 in this case 
cannot be punished because it has not intended to drop the packet. 
src broadcast R R E Q to 
node 1 (currently in range) 
t>€fore the R R E Q arrives, 
node 1 moves outside src 
communication range and 
c a u s e s the packet to be 
dropped 
Figure 7- 8: Wireless L i n k Failure in M A N E T Environments 
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A pseudo code for the neighbouring nodes to detect a packet dropping attack is as 
presented in Figure 7-9. It consists of 3 parts as different code is needed to analyse the 
source, intermediate, and destination nodes behaviour. However, relying solely on this 
analysis is not sufficient as it could lead to many false alarms. The analysis needs to be 
accompanied with a set of tests (i.e. cross-feature test) to confirm the attack, as discussed 
in Section 7.3.2.5. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
For each neighbouring node { 
I f ((neighbour == source) && (pktType == RREQ)) 
{ 
No action: 
} 
Else i f ((neighbour != source) && (pktType == RREQ)) 
{ 
I f (Idestination) 
{ 
f ((RREQ. RREQ')==1) 
Log as normal: 
Else 
Go to test sets: 
se i f (destination) 
f ((RREQ. RREP)==1) 
Log as normal: 
Else 
Go to test sets: 
} 
} } 
Figure 7- 9: Pseudo Code to Detect Packet Dropping Attack 
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7.3.2.4 Misuse Detection Engine 
The misuse detection engine implemented in this study follows a pattern matching 
technique. As illustrated in Figure 7-10, the engine compares real time audit data with the 
misuse signatures, which have been extracted from the normal A O D V route discovery 
FSM attributes. Each time the audit data matches one of the misuse signatures in the 
database, a local response, followed by a global response mechanism will be triggered. 
Audit 
Data 
A O D V 
Specification 
Misuse Detection 
Engine 
Output 
F S M 
Attributes 
(ft ZJ 
Figure 7- 10: Misuse Detection Mechanism 
As for the purpose of proving the concept, only a few attacks signatures/rules have been 
implemented in this study. Those rules are designed to detect all the attacks scenarios as 
described in section 7.3.2.2. A pseudo code as illustrated in Figure 7-11 describes the 
procedure to detect misuse activities in the network. 
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(1) For each current pre-processed packet 
(2) { 
(3) For each attack signature 
(4) { 
(5) Check curr_packet state: 
(6) Read prev_packet state: 
(7) I f (curr packet state != 
state) 
prev packet 
(8) { 
(9) I f (match signature) 
(10) { 
(11) Trigger local response: 
(12) Trigger global response: 
(13) } 
(14) } 
(15) Check curr_packet attributes: 
(16) Read prev_packet attributes: 
(17) I f (curr packet attributes != 
attributes) 
prev packet 
(18) { 
(19) I f (match signature) 
(20) { 
(21) Trigger local response: 
(22) Trigger global response: 
(23) } 
(24) ) 
(25) } 
(26) } 
Figure 7- 11: Pscudo Code to Detect Misuse Activity' in the Net>vork 
7.3.2.5 Anomaly Detection Engine 
As discussed in previous chapters, the process to detect anomaly attacks in M A N E T 
environments is not as straightforward as in a wired network. In some cases, attacks might 
be conftjsed with benign failures, which always occur in N4ANET environments. For that 
reason, in addition to the pattern matching, as implemented in the misuse detection engine, 
the anomaly detection engine in this study also applies a cross-feature test to reduce the 
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number of false alarms triggered in the network. The components of the anomaly detection 
mechanism are as illustrated in Figure 7-12. 
A O D V 
Specification 
F S M 
Attributes 
Audit 
Data 
Anomaly 
Detection Engine 
1 s 
2 a 
Output 
Figure 7- 12: Anomaly Detection Mechanism 
The anomaly detection engine in this study is designed to detect attacks scenarios 
discussed in section 7.3.2.3. A pseudo code that explains procedures of the anomaly 
detection engine is as illustrated in Figure 7-13. 
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(1) For each current pre-processed packet 
(2) { 
(3) For each normal pro f i l e 
(4) { 
(5) Check curr_packet state/attribute: 
(6) Read prev_packet s tate /attr ibute: 
(7) I f (curr_packet state/attr1bute 
prev packet s tate /attr ibute) 
(8) { 
(9) I f (match pro f i l e ) 
(10) { 
(11) No action; 
(12) } 
(13) Else i f not (match prof i l e ) 
(14) { 
(15) Cross_Feature_Test_l(source. 
suspect): 
(16) Cross_Feature_Test_2(source. 
suspect): 
(17) } 
(18) } 
(19) } 
(20) } 
(15a) Cross Feature Test K i n t source, int 
suspect) 
(15b) { 
(15c) I f (forward packet == yes) 
(15cl) { 
(15e) Suspect node not malicious: 
(15f) Halt Al l Test: 
(15g) } 
(15h) Else 
(15i) { 
(15j) Continue next test: 
(15k) } 
(151) } 
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(16a) Cross_Feature_Test_2(1nt source. 1nt 
suspect) 
(16b) { 
(16c) I f (dropped packets >= threshold) 
(16d) { 
(16e) Suspect node malicious: 
(16f) Halt Al l Test: 
(16g) } 
(16h) Else 
(16i) { 
(16j) Send global investigation request; 
(16k) } 
(161) } 
Figure 7- 13: Pseudo Code to Detect Anomalies in the Net\vork 
7.3.3 Response Mechanism 
A local response mechanism is triggered each time a misuse or an anomaly detection 
mechanism detected an intrusion. As mentioned earher, it is not an interest of this study to 
focus on the local response mechanism, thus only a simple responsive behaviour is 
implemented to complete the IDS cycle. In the proposed IDS framework, each node reacts 
to an intrusion by adding the malicious node's identity into its own bad nodes table. Figure 
7-14 illustrates a pseudo code of the local response module. 
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(1) For each detected attack 
(2) { 
(3) Display a l er t on screen: 
(4) Open BadNode f i l e 
(5) Add malicious node to BadNode 
f i l e : 
(6) Record time of the malicious 
act iv i ty : 
(7) Close BadNode f i l e 
(8) } 
Figure 7- 14: Local Response Pseudo Code 
An example of on screen alert is as illustrated in Figure 7-15. 
Node 1 detects node 51 sent a fake RREQ packet at time 
22.000000 
Figure 7- 15: An Example of On Screen Alert 
Node Bad Node Time 
1 50 22.000000 
1 2 40.000000 
3 10 10.000000 
5 50 40.000000 
7 2 40.000000 
7 10 20.000000 
7 50 30.000000 
Table 7- 7: An Example of BadNode File Entries 
173 
Chapter 7 : Intrusion Detection and Response Mechanisms 
Each node maintains its own bad nodes table. For instance, as illustrated in Table 7-7, node 
1 has 2 entries in its BadNode table (i.e. node 50 and 2). Later, these lists will be shared 
between friends via the global response mechanism, when they meet each other. The next 
section explains how this could be done. 
7.4 Global Detection and Response 
Information sharing between nodes is very useful as it could benefit an IDS in many ways. 
For instance, nodes are able to gather more evidence i f they share their audit data sources 
with other nodes in the network. More information/evidence in the audit data sources could 
improve the accuracy of the detection results. Information sharing also is very useful to 
alert other nodes about the existence of an intrusive node in the network. However, without 
a proper implementation, information sharing might be exploited by the attackers to launch 
several attacks against a MANET (refer to Chapter 3 for the list o f attacks). This section 
presents the implementation of the global detection and response mechanisms of the 
proposed IDS, and explains how they could minimise the risk o f receiving false 
information/alerts from the attackers. 
7.4.1 Audit Data Source 
Although it is mentioned earlier that the accuracy of the detection results could be 
improved by sharing each node's audit data, the proposed IDS framework in this study did 
not utilise such technique. This is because of the following reasons: 
» 
- 174-
Chapter 7 : Intrusion Detection and Response Mechanisms 
• The integrity of the audit data that traversed multi hop from source to destination 
nodes is vulnerable to modification, interruption, and interception attacks. 
• MaHcious nodes might fabricate fake audit data to poison other nodes audit data 
sources. 
• Audit data sharing might utiHse a lot of the network's bandwidth, as well as 
increasing the nodes' activity. High utiHsation of network's bandwidth might cause 
bottlenecks in communication, whilst an increase in nodes' activities does not help 
in preserving their limited resources. 
As an alternative, this study proposes that the audit data sources are only to be used by the 
nodes that own them. Each node investigates its own audit data and simply presents the 
results to the friend nodes when needed in the global detection mechanisms. The next sub-
sections explain this in more detail. 
7.4.2 Friend Detection Mechanism 
A friend detection mechanism is proposed in this study to speed up the detection process as 
well as to reduce the number of false alarms that usually occurs in an anomaly IDS. Each 
time a local anomaly detection mechanism suspects an intrusion with a lower confidence 
level (i.e. without concrete evidence) a collaborative friend detection mechanism will be 
triggered to support the IDS decision. The process involved in this mechanism is somewhat 
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similar to the traditional voting mechanism, where the source node (i.e. node that detects 
the suspicious activity) requests its neighbouring nodes votes/opinions regarding the 
suspicious activity. Having collected the votes, the source node wil l make a decision and 
inform the participated neighbouring nodes about the voting results. Although the 
traditional voting mechanism is proven to speed up the detection process, as discussed in 
(Zhang et al., 2003; Kachirski & Gupta, 2002), such a collaborative mechanism is exposed 
to a colluding blackmail attack. 
Blackmail attack occurs when a malicious node sends a false accusation/bad vote to make 
the victim node look bad in the eyes o f other nodes. A traditional voting mechanism is able 
to protect the network against such attack as long as the number of blackmailer nodes that 
present in the network is less than the value of the voting threshold. For instance, a voting 
mechanism with the voting threshold value set to 3 is reliable against a single blackmail 
attacker. Such situation is illustrated in Figure 7-16. 
(1) src node requests vote 
from neighbouring 
nodes 
node 1 node 2 
(2) blackmail node sends 
false accusation about the 
blackmail node / suspicious node 
(3) blackmail attack could be denied if the voting threshold is set 
higher than the number of blackmailer nodes exist in the netv/ork 
Figure 7- 16: False Accusation from a single blackmail attacker 
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However, the reliability of the voting mechanism could be jeopardised in the presence o f 
colluding blackmail attackers. In such a scenario, several blackmail attackers work 
together to blackmail the victim node. This kind of attack is very difficult to defend 
because of the following reasons: 
o It is difficult to know the actual number of the colluding blackmail attackers that 
are present in the network. Without such information, the number of votes required 
to make the voting threshold immune against the colluding blackmailer, need to be 
guessed. This without doubt affects the reliability of the voting mechanism. The 
blackmail attackers could also always add new nodes to their blackmailing team to 
match the minimum voting threshold value preset in the network. 
o It is true that by setting the minimum vote's value to the higher number will lessen 
the effects of the colluding blackmail attackers. However, such action could also 
affect the performance of the voting mechanism. More votes are required to reach 
the minimum votes count, thus requires a longer time for the source node to collect 
all the votes to make a decision about any suspicious activity. 
A friend detection mechanism proposed in this study is designed to provide an alternative 
solution for the above issues. The problem in the voting mechanism is that there is no 
method for the source node to distinguish beUveen votes that come from legitimate users 
and false votes that come from the attackers. Mutual trust between friends as discussed 
earlier in Chapter 6 could eliminate this node's anonymity problem. By filtering all the 
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incoming votes using the established mutual trusts, the source node would be able to avoid 
receiving votes from the colluding blackmail attackers, and thus the reliability of the 
collaborative detection mechanism is ensured. 
(1) For each neighbouring node 
(2) { 
(3) I f (adjacent node == friend) 
(4) { 
(5) While (!feof(FRequest) 
(6) { 
(7) Request friend detection: 
(8) I f (Test l ) 
(9) { 
(10) Suspicious node = Malicous: 
(11) Add to MalNode table: 
(12) Break: 
(13) } 
(14) I f (Test2) 
(15) { 
(16) Suspicious node = Good: 
(17) Add to GoodNode table: 
(18) Break: 
(19) } 
(20) } 
(21) } 
(22) Else 
(23) { 
(24) Continue: 
(25) } 
(26) } 
(8a) Testl ( ) 
(8b) { 
(8c) While (!feof(MalNode)) 
(8d) { 
(8e) I f ((suspicious.malnode)==l)) 
(8f) Return 1: 
(8g) Else 
(8h) Return 0: 
(8 i ) } 
(8 j ) } 
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(14a) TestZO 
(14b) { 
(14c) While (!feof(GoodNode)) 
(14d) { 
(14e) I f ((suspicious.goodnode)==l)) 
(14f) Return 1: 
(14g) Else 
(14h) Return 0: 
(14i) } 
(14 j ) } 
Figure 7- 17: Pseudo Code for Friend Detection Mechanism 
The pseudo code in Figure 7-17 explains the process of a collaborative friend detection 
mechanism as implemented in this study. The process begins when a source node sends a 
request to its neighbouring friends to investigate i f the suspicious node is malicious or not 
is based upon their own audit data sources and local detection mechanisms. Results from 
the friends' detection mechanisms are classified into 3 categories, namely malicious, good, 
and neutral. I f there is enough evidence, friend nodes will be able to suggest whether the 
suspicious node is malicious or a good node based on their packet forwarding histories. On 
the other hand, a neutral result will be returned to the source node i f the friend nodes could 
not decide whether the suspicious node is malicious or not. This situation happens when 
the friend nodes do not have enough experience communicating with the suspicious node, 
thus wil l not be able to gather sufficient evidence to make a concrete decision. Each 
request returned with a neutral result will be investigated by other friends when they meet 
the source node in the fiiture. 
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The time needed for a source node to receive confirmation from friends whether the 
suspicious nodes in the request table are malicious or not depends upon several factors, 
such as the initial number of friend relationships established between the source nodes and 
other nodes in the network, the density of the network, and the node's mobility patterns. 
The next chapter evaluates the performances of the proposed friend detection mechanism 
and compares the results with the performance of the traditional voting mechanism in the 
presence of colluding blackmail attackers. 
7.4.3 Global Response Mechanism 
Apart from ensuring the reliability of the global detection mechanism, the proposed 
friendship concept also plays an important role in facilitating the secured global response 
mechanism of the proposed IDS framework. A global response mechanism could 
significantly improve the performance of an IDS by informing other nodes about the 
malicious nodes that they have yet to encounter. By receiving such alerts, intrusive nodes 
could be identified at the early stages of their existence. In addition, a lot of time and 
node's limited resources could be saved. However, without a proper implementation, the 
global response mechanism is vulnerable to attack, and thus could jeopardise the reliability 
of an IDS. The problems become worse in MANET environments due to the node's 
anonymity issue, which could be exploited by the malicious nodes to launch a blackmail 
attack, as discussed in the previous sections. 
In the proposed IDS framework, a friend node is used as a filter to help the receiving node 
to distinguish between genuine and fake alerts. Each alert received by the fiiend nodes wil l 
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be accepted and shared with other friends, whilst intrusion alerts received from other 
anonymous nodes will be dropped as their reliability could not be ensured. With an 
assumption that all the friend nodes are behaving correctly, and none o f them have been 
compromised by the attackers, the problem of blackmail attacks could be eliminated. A 
pseudo code of the global response mechanism as implemented in this study is presented in 
Figure 7-18. 
(1) For each neighbouring node 
(2) { 
(3) I f (adjacent node == friend) 
(4) { 
(5) Exchange L o c a l O : 
(6) Exchange GlobaU): 
(7) } 
(8) Else 
{ 
(9) Continue: 
} 
(10) } 
(5a) Exchange Local ( ) 
(5b) { 
(5c) While (!feof(Mai Node) 
(5d) { 
(5e) I f ((MalNode.Local) != l ) ) / / n o t exist 
(5f) { 
(5g) Copy (Local.Mai Node)//copy entry 
local l i s t 
to 
(5h) } 
(5 i ) Else 
(5 j ) { 
(5k) Duplicate entry: //not copy 
(51) } 
(5ni) } 
(5n) } 
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(6a) Exchange Global() 
(6b) { 
(6c) While (!feof(MaiNode) 
(6d) { 
(6e) I f ((MalNode.Global) != l ) ) / / n o t 
exist 
(6f) { 
(6g) " Copy (Global.MalNode)//copy entry to 
global l i s t 
(6h) } 
(6 i ) Else 
(6 j ) { 
(6k) Duplicate entry: //not copy 
(61) } 
(6m) } 
(6n) } 
Figure 7- 18: Pseudo Code of the Global Response Mechanism 
7.5 Trust Management 
The proposed IDS framework also includes a trust management mechanism for nodes to 
manage their ftiend lists. This mechanism is executed each time two friend nodes are 
adjacent to each other. Each node maintains two sets of friend lists, namely direct fiiends 
and indirect ftiends. Every time a node meets its ftiend, both of them wil l exchange their 
direct and indirect friend lists. A pseudo code as illustrated in Figure 7-14 describes the 
process in trust management mechanism. The implementation of this mechanism in the 
simulation package is as described eariier in Chapter 6. Programming codes for this 
module, as well as other important modules of the proposed IDS framework as discussed 
earlier, can be found in Appendix D. 
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(1) I f (Nodel adjacent to Node2) 
(2) { 
(3) I f (Node 2 i s a friend to Node 1) 
(4) { 
(5) Copy (Node 1 indirect friends 
direct fr iends): 
<- Node 2 
(6) Copy (Node 1 indirect friends 
Indirect fr iends) : 
<- Node 2 
(7) } 
(8) Else 
(9) Proceed with intrusion detection: 
(10) I f (Node 1 i s a friend to Node 2) 
(11) { 
(12) Copy (Node 2 indirect friends 
direct fr iends): 
<- Node 1 
(13) Copy (Node 2 indirect friends 
indirect fr iends) : 
<- Node 1 
(14) } 
(15) Else 
(16) Proceed with intrusion detection: 
(17) } 
Figure 7- 19: Pseudo Code for Friends Exchange betAvcen Two Nodes 
7,6 Signature Management 
As mentioned earlier, one of the misuse detection mechanism limitations is that the process 
to create attack/misuse signatures requires a lot of time and effort. This is because attackers 
could launch attacks in many ways (refer to Chapter 3) and always find new techniques to 
breach security holes. The process to create the attack signatures also usually carried out 
by an expert or a trusted third party, because average users do not have sufficient 
knowledge to do so. 
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In general, the problems of maintaining attack signatures for misuse IDS can be classified 
into 2 categories, as follow: 
• Creating new attack signatures based on the pre-known attacks 
As mentioned above, this problem is quite difficult to address, especially in 
MANET environments. Since N4ANET nodes are anonymous, one might have a 
problem to add new attack signatures that have been created by other nodes 
because of the accuracy issue. Adding an attack signature that has been created by 
another user without a confimiation from a trusted third party or a CA might cause 
ah inaccurate detection result, which then could lead to many false alarms triggered 
in the network. 
Advertising/updating attack signature database for ali nodes in the networks 
Another problem faced by MANET nodes is a difficulty to reach the trusted third 
party to get its own attack signatures updated. Since MANET nodes move from one 
location to another and sometimes station in an area that is unreachable by the third 
party, their attack signature database might not be able to protect them against the 
most recent threats. 
Solving the first problem (i.e. enabling nodes to create an accurate attack signature) is not 
of interest to this study, and could be a possible extension for ftiture work. On the other 
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hand, this study proposes a solution for the latter problem, which is to enable remote nodes 
to obtain their updated attack signatures. In addition, by using the friendship mechanism as 
proposed in this study, the remote nodes also could be protected by obtaining false updates 
from malicious nodes. A pseudo code that illustrates the process to exchange attack 
signatures is shown in Figure 7-20. 
(1) I f (Nodel adjacent to Node2) 
(2) { 
(3) I f (Node 2 i s a friend to Node 1) 
(4) { 
(5) Copy (Node 1 attack signatures <-
attack signatures): 
Node 2 
(6) } 
(7) Else 
(8) Proceed with intrusion detection: 
(9) I f (Node 1 i s a friend to Node 2) 
(10) { 
(11) Copy (Node 2 attack signatures <-
attack signatures): 
Node 1 
(12) } 
(13) Else 
(14) Proceed with intrusion detection: 
(15) } 
Figure 7- 20: Pseudo Code for Nodes to Exchange Attack Signatures 
However, this mechanism has not been implemented in this study. This is because the 
effects of friendship concept towards the performance of this mechanism should not be 
different from the results obtained from the trust management evaluation, as the procedures 
in both mechanisms are similar. Please refer to Chapter 6 for the results of trust 
management mechanism evaluation. 
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7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has extensively presented the concept behind the simulation design of the 
proposed IDS framework. The design has been made using the NS-2 network simulation 
tools because of the hardware limitation, as well as because it is the most appropriate way 
to show the applicability of the proposed IDS framework in various MANET environments. 
Since the purpose of the simulations is to prove that the friendship concept is capable o f 
facilitating the global detection and response mechanisms, only some o f the IDS modules 
have been ftjlly implemented. Apart from the IDS modules, several attack scenarios have 
also been designed to emulate malicious nodes activity in the network. 
The next chapter investigates the performances of the proposed IDS framework in various 
MANET settings. The investigation focuses on the global detection and response 
mechanisms to evaluate the capabilities of the proposed friendship concept. For the 
comparison purposes (e.g. number of false alarms, number of detected malicious nodes), 
performance of an IDS without the proposed friendship concept also has been investigated. 
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8.1 introduction 
The novelty of this study is on the introduction of the friendship concept to provide rehable 
global detection and response mechanisms for MANET IDS, especially in the presence o f 
blackmail attackers. Having presented the conceptual design as well as the implementation 
of the proposed IDS framework in previous chapters, this chapter presents results from a 
series of simulation experiments, carried out to evaluate the performances of the proposed 
global detection and response mechanisms in several MANET environments. 
8.2 Simulation Setup 
Similar to the experiments carried out in Chapter 6, the proposed global detection and 
response mechanisms also have been evaluated in several MANET environments to 
investigate the effects of node's initial friendships, simulation times, and network's density 
towards the overall performance of the proposed IDS framework. Details on each 
environment (i.e. university campus, city network-1 and city network-2) can be found in 
Chapter 6. In addition, several bad nodes have been added into the system to emulate the 
malicious nodes activities. Such malicious activities are as discussed in Chapter 7. Table 8-
1 lists all the bad nodes that have been added into the system along with their associated 
malicious activities. 
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Simulation 
Experiment Bad Node 
Attack Type Malicious Activity 
Global 
Detection 96 
Interruption 
Drop every packet that 
does not destined to or 
sourced from itself 
Global 
Response 
97 Modification 
Modify the hop count 
value of every packet that 
does not destined to or 
sourced from itself 
98 Interception 
Advertise packet with 
lower sequence number so 
that it is included in the 
packet forwarding process 
to gain access to the packet 
99 Fabrication 
Fabricate duplicate packets 
to ensure stability of own 
route 
Tabic 8- 1: Bad Nodes and their associated Malicious Activities in Global Detection 
and Response Mechanisms Simulations 
The bad nodes are assumed to not have any trust relationships with other nodes in the 
network to ensure the reliability o f friends' detection reports/alarms. For simplicity, only 
one attack scenario is simulated in each simulation run. For instance, in an experiment to 
investigate the performance of the global detection mechanism, only the packet dropping 
attack is added into the system. This is because, by having several attack scenarios inserted 
into the system at one simulation run, the malicious node's activities will become too 
apparent, thus could demote the impact that could be brought by the global detection and 
response mechanisms towards the overall performance of the proposed IDS framework. 
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8.3 Global Detection Performance 
Having a global detection mechanism in the proposed IDS framework has its own 
advantages and drawbacks. One of the advantages is that it provides a platform for nodes 
to share their intrusion detection results to help other nodes in making a decision regarding 
any suspicious activities. As a result, such intrusive activity could be detected and 
advertised to as many nodes as possible in its early appearance. However, without an 
appropriate security measure, malicious nodes could exploit the global detection 
mechanism to launch a blackmail attack against the other well-behaved nodes in the 
network. The following sub-sections discuss this issue by presenting the performance 
comparison between an IDS that utilises a global detection mechanism and an IDS that 
relies solely on the self-detection (i.e. local) mechanism. Results from the simulations 
should provide evidence that the overall performance of an IDS could be improved by 
implementing a global detection mechanism. The effects of blackmail attackers in the 
system also will be discussed in this section. First, results from experiments will be 
presented to show how a voting mechanism could be very usefril to defend an IDS from an 
independent blackmail attacker. Following that, a result from an experiment that has been 
carried out to show how such a voting mechanism is vulnerable to a colluding blackmail 
attacker, will be presented. Finally, the performance of the proposed friend-assisted global 
detection mechanism will be presented to prove that such a mechanism is capable to 
minimise the problem of the colluding blackmail attacker, as faced in the voting 
mechanism. 
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8.3.1 Unfiltered Global Detection vs. Self-Detection 
This section presents the results and observations obtained from the simulation 
experiments, which were carried out to investigate the performance comparison between 
an unfiltered global detection mechanism and an IDS that relies solely upon a self-
detection mechanism. Unfiltered global detection mechanism here means every node could 
participate in the global detection mechanism and no voting mechanism is deployed to 
reduce the risk of a blackmail attacker. Results from the simulations are as illustrated in 
Figure 8-1. 
100 
95 
90 
85 
80 
75 
8- g g 
50.0s 100.0s 150.0s 200.0s 250.0s 
• Self Detection 84 84 84 84 84 
• Global Detection 
(Uni) 
100 100 100 100 100 
—*—Global Detection 
(City-I) 
99 99 100 100 100 
—^— Global Detection 
(City-2) 
96 99 99 99 99 
Simularlon Time (Seconds) 
Self Detection 
••—Global Detection 
(Uni) 
Global Deieciion 
(City-1) 
-X— Global Detection 
(Ciiy-2) 
Figure 8- 1: Performance Comparisons between Unfiltcred Global Detection and Self-
Detection Mechanisms 
- 191 
Chapter 8: Evaluating the Proposed Two-tier IDS Framework Performance 
From the simulation results as presented in Figure 8-1, it can be seen that the percentage of 
resolved intrusion alerts in an IDS that utilises a global detection mechanism is higher than 
the percentage of a resolved intrusion alerts in an IDS that solely relies on the self-
detection mechanism. More decisions can be made about the suspicious activities in an 
IDS that employs a global detection mechanism because more evidence can be shared 
between nodes. In a self-detection mechanism, each node is responsible for analysing all 
the suspicious activities that have been detected by its own local detection mechanism and 
make a decision whether the suspicious activity is malicious or not. The analysis is based 
upon each node's self experience, which is gathered during its participation in the packet 
forwarding process. A lack of experience prohibits each node to make a prompt decision 
about the suspicious activities, and thus leaves the detection mechanism with many 
unresolved suspicious activities. Until sufficient experiences (i.e. evidence) are gathered, 
the status of the suspicious activities will remain unknown. The waiting time to make a 
decision regarding the suspicious'activities can be shortened by deploying a global 
detection mechanism. As illustrated in Figure 8-1, the numbers of the resolved suspicious 
activities in all three different MANET environments (i.e. university, city-1 and city-2 
environments) that utilise a global detection mechanism have increased significantly from 
their initial value in the self-detection mechanism. For instance, within a same simulation 
time (i.e. 50 seconds) in the city-2 environment, the percentage of a resolved intrusion alert 
have increased to 96% by utilising the unfiltered global detection mechanism from its 
initial percentage (i.e. 84%) in the self-detection mechanism, A better result can be seen in 
the university environment, where in such a dense network, an unfiltered global detection 
mechanism was able to help nodes in making decision regarding all the unresolved 
suspicious activities that have been detected by their local detection engines. 
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The formula used to calculate the percentage of a resolved intrusion alert is as presented 
below: 
P = "^'^ ^ (100%), where m = resolved malicious node, g = resolved good node, 
s 
s = suspicious activity 
Formula 8- 1: Percentage of Intrusion Alerts 
Another observation that can be made is that the unfiltered global detection mechanism is 
capable to assist nodes in sharing their detection intrusion analysis with others in a very 
short time. Since there is no threshold value that needs to be matched, as required in a 
voting mechanism, the process of intrusion information sharing could be achieved in no 
time. Each node requests evidence or results from other nodes about a particular suspicious 
activity and gets instantaneous results from the neighbouring nodes. The percentage of 
resolved intrusion alerts in the university environment is higher than the percentages in the 
two city network environments because more interactions amongst nodes are expected in 
such a dense environment. However, despite the high detection rate, the unfiltered global 
detection mechanism is vulnerable to blackmail attackers, a similar problem that also 
happens in the global response mechanism. The next subsection discusses this issue. 
The TCP transmissions used in the simulations have been generated using an automated 
script (i.e. cbrgen.tcl), which is included in the NS-2 package. A copy of the script as well 
as the examples of TCP connections used in the simulation can be found in Appendix E. 
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8.3.2 Unfiltered Global Detection vs. Vote-filtered Global Detection 
This subsection presents a result from simulation experiments carried out to investigate the 
performance comparison between unfiltered and vote-filtered global detection mechanisms. 
In the previous subsection, it can be seen that the unfiltered global detection mechanism 
could provide a platform for nodes to share their intrusion evidence and help others in 
making a decision about any suspicious activities. The results were very good, as almost all 
the suspicious activities could be resolved at the early stage of their appearance. However, 
one significant problem with such a mechanism is that it is vulnerable to a blackmail attack. 
Since report or evidence of intrusions can be received fi-om any nodes, there is a possibility 
that the reports were received from a blackmail attacker, who aims to falsely accuse other 
well-behaved nodes in the network. Deploying a voting threshold could minimise the 
impact of such a problem. In the vote-filtered global detection mechanism, any intrusion 
reports/evidence fi-om anonymous nodes wil l not be considered as genuine until sufficient 
numbers of votes (i.e. the voting threshold) are gathered. As a result, any fake intrusion 
reports/evidence from independent blackmail attackers will be denied. However, since 
each node needs to gather sufficient reports ft-om other nodes about the suspicious 
activities, it is expected that the performance of the vote-filtered global detection 
mechanism will be affected. Figure 8-2 illustrates results ft*om simulation experiment 
which has been carried out to investigate the performance of the vote-filtered detection 
mechanism in various MANET settings. 
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Figure 8- 2: Performance of the Vote-filtered Global Detection Mechanism in Various 
MANET Environments 
From the simulation results, it can be seen that the performance of the vote-filtered global 
detection mechanism is slightly lower at the beginning of the simulation compared to the 
unfiltered global detection mechanism (refer to Figure 8-1) especially in the city-2 
environment. This situation happens because in the vote-filtered detection mechanism, 
each node requires extra time to reach any conclusion regarding the suspicious activities. 
However, despite the longer detection time, the vote-filtered detection mechanism was still 
able to match the performance of the unfiltered global detection mechanism as the 
simulation progressed. For instance, as illustrated in Figure 8-2, the performance of the 
vote-filtered global detection mechanism in the city-2 environment for 50 seconds 
simulation time is decreased by 7% compared to the unfiltered global detection. However, 
as the experiment progressed, and more votes have been gathered by nodes in the network, 
195 
Chapter 8: Evaluating the Proposed Two-tier IDS Framework Performance 
the vote-filtered global detection mechanism was able to match the performance of the 
unfiltered global detection mechanism. 
For the purpose of investigating the effect of a blackmail attack, several nodes have been 
selected to play the role of the blackmail attackers in the simulation setups. Those nodes 
are as illustrated in Table 8-2. There are two types of blackmail attacker, namely an 
independent blackmail attacker and a colluding blackmail attacker. An independent 
blackmail attacker does not cooperate with other blackmail attackers in sending false 
accusations about other well-behaved nodes in the network. Malicious activity from this 
kind of blackmail attacker could be easily denied by the voting mechanism. 
Blackmailer Node Type of Attack 
90 Independent 
91 Independent 
92 Colluding 
93 Colluding 
94 Colluding 
95 Colluding 
Table 8- 2: Blackmail Attackers 
The second type of the blackmail attacker, the colluding blackmail attacker, is more 
difficult to defend against because the attackers are capable of matching the threshold 
value of the voting mechanism by cooperating with other blackmail attackers. In this 
subsection, only the effect of an independent blackmail attacker is being investigated. The 
effect of a colluding blackmail attacker wil l be investigated and discussed in the next 
subsection. 
196-
Chapter 8: Evaluating the Proposed Two-tier IDS Framework Performance 
250 
200 
150 
100 
50 
Unfiliered Global 
Detection (Uni) 
Unfiltered Global 
Detection (City-1) 
X 
50.0s 
140 
59 
100.0s 
196 
130 
150.0s 
210 
156 
200.0s 
210 
169 
250.0s 
210 
175 
Unfiltered Global 
Detection (Uni) 
•A—Unfiltered Global 
Detection (City-
I ) 
- X — Unfiltered Global 
Detection (City-
2) 
• ^ V o t e - f i l t e r e d 
Global Detection 
(Uni ,City- l ,City-
2) 
Unfiltered Global 
Detection (City-2) 
15 39 43 46 59 
Vote-filtered 
Global Detection 
Simulation Time (Seconds) 
Figure 8- 3: The Effect of an Independent Blackmail Attacker in an Unfiltcrcd and 
Vote-filtered Global Detection Mechanisms 
As illustrated in Figure 8-3, many false alarms have been triggered as a result of false 
accusations fi-om the blackmail attackers. Within 50.0 seconds simulation time, 15 false 
alerts have been triggered in the city-2 unfiltered detection mechanism as a result of 
blackmail attackers' actions, and the number continues to increase as the simulation 
progressed. The situation is even worse in the denser environments (i.e. city-1 and 
university campus environments) as more interactions between nodes provide more 
opportunities for the blackmail attackers to advertise their false alerts. This is not the case 
in the vote-filtered detection mechanism. In the simulation experiment, as illustrated in 
Figure 8-3, the voting threshold value has been set to 3, which is higher than the number of 
independent blackmail attackers that exist in the network (i.e. 2 blackmail nodes). Since 
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the threshold value for nodes to accept any intrusion reports/evidence is higher than the 
number of independent blackmail attackers, the vote-filtered global detection mechanism is 
immune against such an attack. However, there is another problem that could jeopardise 
the reliability of the vote-filtered global detection mechanism. Such problem is that the 
vote-filtered global detection mechanism is not immune against the second type of the 
blackmail attacker, which is the colluding blackmail attacker. The next subsection 
discusses this issue. 
8.3.3 Vote-filtered Global Detection vs. Friend-filtered Global Detection 
Having presented the potential of global detection mechanism and discussed the capability 
of the voting mechanism in defending against an independent blackmail attacker, this 
subsection discusses how the proposed friend-filtered global detection mechanism could 
minimise the effect of the second type of the blackmail attacker, which is the colluding 
blackmail attacker. As mentioned eariier, a voting mechanism is capable of denying false 
accusation attacks from an independent blackmail attacker, but is not immune against the 
colluding blackmail attacker. The immunity of the voting mechanism is dependent upon 2 
factors, namely the voting threshold value, and the number of colluding blackmail 
attackers in the network. I f the number of colluding blackmail attacker is less than the 
value of the voting threshold, then the voting mechanism is immune against such attack. 
On the other hand, i f the number of colluding blackmail attackers that exist in the network 
is equal to or more than the number set for the voting threshold, then the reliability of the 
vote-filtered global detection mechanism is in jeopardy. The higher the threshold value 
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means the global detection mechanism is more resistant against the colluding blackmail 
attackers. Figure 8-4 and 8-5 illustrate this situation. 
Voting Threshold 
Figure 8- 4: Relation bct>vccn Voting Threshold Value and the Risk of Colluding 
Blackmail Attackers 
However, i f the value of the voting threshold is set too high, the efficiency of the global 
detection mechanism could decrease significantly. This relationship is represented in 
Figure 8-5. 
la 
o « 
01 
Q . 
Voting Threshold 
Figure 8- 5: Relation between Voting Threshold Value and the Performance of the 
Vote-filtered Global Detection Mechanism 
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Friend-filtered global detection mechanism could solve the problem of determining a 
suitable voting threshold value as discussed above. Instead of using a voting threshold to 
minimise the effect of false accusations from anonymous nodes in the network, a ftnend-
filtered detection mechanism could distinguish between genuine and fake intrusion reports 
based upon the trust relationships that have been established between nodes. However, as 
mentioned eariier, the reliability of this mechanism could only be ensured with an 
assumption that each node does not have a relationship with the blackmail attackers. 
Detailed discussion on the ftiendship and trust relations issues can be found in Chapter 6. 
The performance of the fiiend-filtered global detection mechanisms is as illustrated in 
Figure 8-6. 
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Figure 8- 6: Performance of the Friend-fiitcrcd Global Detection Mechanism 
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The performance has been measured based upon one-to-five friend relationships. That 
means each node is assumed to have 5 initial trusted friends. There is no specific reason of 
choosing 5 initial trusted friends in the simulation as different number of initial trust 
relationships between nodes (i.e. 1, 3, 7, 10, 14, etc) also could be used to prove the 
concept proposed in this study. The effect of various initial friendships towards the overall 
performance of the detection mechanism wil l not be discussed here as the results are 
identical as those presented in Chapter 6. 
As illustrated in Figure 8-6, the performance of the fiiend-filtered global detection 
mechanism is lower than the perfomiance of the vote-filtered global detection mechanism 
in terms of its effectiveness in helping other nodes to distinguish between normal and 
anomaly activities. However, this situation only occurs at the early stages of the simulation. 
For instance, the performance o f the ftiend-filtered global detection mechanism almost 
matches the performance of the vote-filtered global detection mechanism in both university 
and city-1 environments at the final stage of the simulation. The result is expected to be 
much higher i f longer simulation times are used in the simulation. Additionally, the 
number of initial trust relationships (i.e. 5) that has been used in the experiment also had an 
impact towards the overall results. As proved in Chapter 6, when higher node's initial 
relationships is being used in the simulation, more interactions between fiiends can be 
expected, which could lead to more information about intrusions being shared between 
themselves. 
Another advantage of using a fiiend-filtered global detecfion mechanism (although with a 
slight decrease in performance than the vote-filtered global detection mechanism) is that 
such a mechanism is capable o f protecting the network against the colluding blackmail 
201 
Chapter 8: Evaluating the Proposed Two-tier IDS Framework Performance 
attacker, a kind of blackmail attack that could not be defended by the vote-filtered global 
detection mechanism. Figure 8-7 illustrates the problem of a colluding blackmail attacker 
in the vote-filtered global detection mechanism and shows how the friend-filtered 
mechanism is immune against such attack. 
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Figure 8- 7: The Effect of a Colluding Blackmail Attacker in the Vote-filtered and 
Friend-filtered Global Detection Mechanisms 
The result illustrated in Figure 8-7 suggests that the problem of a colluding blackmail 
attacker in the vote-filtered global detection mechanism is not too apparent in a less dense 
MANET environment (i.e. city-2 environment) as node's interactions in such an 
environment are not as many as in the denser environment. However, as the simulation 
progressed, more and more false alarms as a result of a colluding blackmail attack are 
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detected in the network. On the other hand, the problem of a colluding blackmail attack in 
the denser environment (i.e. university and city-1 environments) can be seen from the very 
beginning of the simulation. This is because the blackmail attackers do not have to travel a 
far distance in such environments to advertise their false alarms to other nodes. The result 
in Figure 8-7 also shows that the problem of a colluding blackmail attacker does not exist 
in the ftiend-filtered global detection mechanism, assuming that no friendship has been 
established with the blackmail attackers. This result shows that although with a slight 
decrease in node's performance to globally detect an intrusion, a ftiend-filtered global 
detection mechanism is very useful to defend the network against a colluding blackmail 
attack. 
8.4 Global Response Performance 
The global response mechanism receives alerts ft-om a local response mechanism and tries 
to inform as many nodes as possible about the existence of a malicious node in the network. 
By doing so, more nodes will become aware about the existence of the intrusive nodes, 
even i f they have no experience communicating with those malicious nodes. This section 
presents results from a series of simulation experiments, which have been carried out to 
evaluate the performance of the global response mechanism in terms of its efficiency in 
advertising intrusion alerts to all nodes in the network. Apart fi-om that the existing global 
response mechanism (i.e. unfiltered and vote-filtered global response mechanisms) as well 
as the proposed friend-filtered global response mechanism will be evaluated to investigate 
each of the mechanism's immunity against independent and colluding blackmail attackers. 
Simulation setups for all the experiments carried out in this section are similar to the one 
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that have been used in the simulations to investigate the performance of the global 
detection mechanism as in section 8.3. 
8.4.1 Unfiltered vs. Vote-filtered Global Response Mechanisms (in the 
Presence of a Single Blackmail Attacker) 
The easiest way to enable global response is by allowing any nodes to broadcast their 
intrusion alerts to all nodes in the network. By doing so, more nodes could be made aware 
about the existence of an intrusive node in the network, thus necessary actions could be 
taken against the malicious nodes. However, similar to the scenario in the global detection 
mechanism, deploying an unfiltered global response mechanism could expose the network 
to the blackmail attackers, thus could jeopardise the reliability of the whole intrusion 
detection system. The most popular method to filter alerts that come from other 
anonymous nodes in the global response mechanism is by deploying a voting mechanism 
(Zhang et al., 2003; Rajavaram et al., 2002). By doing so, the problem of false alerts by 
blackmail attackers could be minimised whilst at the same time still maintain the high 
responsive rate of the response mechanism. 
This section presents results from simulation experiments carried out to investigate the 
performance comparison between the global response mechanism that does not apply any 
filtering mechanism and the global response mechanism that apply a voting mechanism in 
defending against the blackmail attackers. Several nodes have been selected to play the 
role of the blackmail attackers, as illustrated in Table 8-2. Intrusion alerts advertised by 
nodes in this simulation have came from the'list of alerts triggered by the local anomaly 
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detection, as discussed in the previous section. An example of local anomaly detection 
intrusion alerts is as illustrated in Table 8-3. 
Time Detected Node Malicious Node 
20.0 79 96 
40.0 66 96 
40.0 86 96 
40.0 56 96 
40.0 49 96 
40.0 67 96 
40.0 36 96 
40.0 37 96 
50.0 4 96 
50.0 28 96 
50.0 24 96 
50.0 91 96 
50.0 83 96 
Tabic 8- 3: Intrusion Alerts f rom the Local Anomaly Detection Mechanism 
Figure 8-8 and 8-9 illustrate the performance comparison between unfiltered and vote-
filtered global response mechanisms in terms of their effectiveness in advertising intrusion 
alerts. 
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As expected, there was a slight drop in the performance of the vote-filtered global response 
mechanism compared to the unfiltered global response mechanism, especially in the early 
stages of the simulation. The main reason for this is because as in the global detection 
mechanism, nodes in the vote-filtered global response mechanism need to gather enough 
votes from other nodes before accepting any intrusion alert that being sent to them. 
However, as the simulation progressed, the vote-filtered global response mechanism seems 
able to match the performance of the unfiltered global response mechanism especially in 
the denser MANET environment (i.e. university and city-1 environments). For the case of 
a less dense environment (i.e. city-2) although the performance of the vote-filtered global 
response mechanism seems dropped almost 50% the performance of the unfiltered global 
response mechanism, the total number of nodes that are aware about the intrusive node in 
the network is still much higher than the initial number of nodes that are aware about the 
intrusion when only a local response mechanism is being deployed. Moreover, the vote-
filtered global response mechanism has an advantage over the unfiltered global response 
mechanism, which is its ability to defend the network against an independent blackmail 
attacker. Figure 8-10 summarises results from simulation experiments that support this 
statement. 
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Figure 8- 10: The Effect of Independent Blackmail Attackers in the Unfiltcrcd and 
Vote-filtered Global Response Mechanisms 
It is true that in the unfiltered global response mechanism, any intrusion alert that has been 
triggered by the local misuse or anomaly detection mechanism could be sent across the 
network in a very quick time especially in an environment where nodes are located close to 
each other (e.g. university environment). However, as shown in Figure 8-10, such an 
advantage could bring a serious problem in the network. In the simulation experiment, two 
independent blackmail nodes (i.e. nodes 90 and 91) constantly send false alerts to the 
neighbouring nodes claiming that node 0 is malicious based upon their own local 
anomaly/misuse detection engine. Since there is no mechanism to distinguish between a 
genuine and a false alert, the fake alerts that have been advertised by those blackmail nodes 
are being sent across the network, thus more and more nodes are receiving and re-
advertising the false alerts. As can be seen in Figure 8-10, the problem becomes worse and 
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uncontrollable as the simulation progressed in all three MANET environments. Such a 
problem can be eased by having some sort of filtering mechanism that could help nodes to 
distinguish between fake and genuine alerts. The next subsection discusses this issue. 
8.4.2 Vote-filtered vs. Friend-filtered Global Response Mechanisms (in the 
Presence of a Colluding Blackmail Attacker) 
This subsection presents result from simulation experiments that have been carried out to 
investigate the effectiveness of a friend mechanism in preventing nodes from receiving 
false alerts in the global response mechanism. The simulation results also should provide 
an indication whether the introduction of such a filtering mechanism has an impact towards 
the overall performance of the global response mechanism (i.e. the percentage of nodes 
that aware about the existence of a malicious node). 
As illustrated in Figure 8-11, the number of nodes that can be made aware about the 
existence of the malicious nodes in the ftnend-filtered global response mechanism is not 
much different from the vote-filtered global response mechanism. Although there was a 
slight decrease in all three simulated environments, the results were obtained with an 
assumption that each node has 5 initial trusted friends. The result is expected to be better i f 
higher number of initial trusted friends is being used in the simulation sets. For the 
discussion on the effects of various numbers of initial trusted friends, please refer to 
Chapter 6. 
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Figure 8-11: Performance of the Friend-filtered Global Response Mechanism 
Another significant advantage of having a friend-filtered instead of a vote-filtered global 
response incchanisni is that it is capable to defend the network viganist a eolludinu 
blackmail attack. Figure 8-12 illustrates how serious the problem of a colluding blackmail 
attack could be in the vote-filtered global response mechanism. The trend of the graph 
shows that in all three simulated MANET environments, the problem of a colluding 
blackmail attacker is increasing over a period of time. The problem might not seem as a 
big issue in city-2 environment, especially at the early stages of the simulation. This is 
because, in such a less dense environment, the colluding blackmail attackers need to travel 
longer distances to collaboratively advertise their false alerts. In addition, large distances 
between nodes also lessen the chances of nodes exchanging false alerts between them. 
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However, in the denser MANET environments, such as in the university and city-1 
environments, the effect of a colluding blackmail attacker can be seen problematic from 
the beginning of the simulations. For instance, in the university environment, more than 
half nodes in the network have received false alerts either directly from the colluding 
blackmail attackers or indirectly through the intrusion alerts exchange process with the 
neighbouring nodes. The problem becomes more evident as the simulation progressed as 
more and more nodes in the network receive the false alerts. 
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Figure 8- 12: I hc F.ffcct of a Colluding Blackmail Attacker in the \ ote-filtercd and 
Friend-filtered Global Response Mechanisms 
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The problem of a colluding blackmail attack is not an issue in the friend-filtered global 
response mechanism. Instead of accepting all the alerts that have been advertised by the 
neighbouring nodes, nodes in the fnend-filtered global response mechanism only accept 
alerts that have been broadcasted by the trusted friends. However, this mechanism relies 
upon one assumption, which is all the trusted friend nodes are well behaved and not 
malicious. Figure 8-12 shows that the problem of a colluding blackmail attacker could be 
eliminated with the introduction of a friend-filtered mechanism in the network. 
8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented results from simulation experiments carried out to evaluate the 
performance of the proposed friend-filtered global detection and response mechanisms. 
Three MANET settings which differ from each other based on the network density level 
have been used to investigate i f the proposed mechanism is suitable to be used in various 
MANET environments. The main objective of the simulation experiments is to show how 
such a friendship mechanism as proposed in Chapter 6, coupled with suitable intrusion 
detection mechanisms as presented in Chapter 7 could solve many issues faced by the 
MANET IDS. This study focuses on the node's anonymity problem faced by MANET IDS, 
which should be the main reason that causes a colluding blackmail attack to occur in the 
network. For a better understanding of the problem, this chapter has presented the 
performance comparisons between the proposed friend-filtered global detection/response 
mechanisms and other global detection/response techniques. 
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The first performance comparison has been made between unfiltered and vote-filtered 
global detection mechanisms. From this set of experiments, several observations have been 
made. Firstly, results fi-om the experiment suggested that a global detection mechanism is 
indeed able to speed up the decision making process of the suspicious activity, which 
sometimes could not be decided by the local detection engine. The second observation is 
that a global detection mechanism without a proper filtering mechanism to differentiate 
between genuine and fake neighbouring nodes' opinions about the suspicious activities 
could lead to many false alarms being triggered by the global detection mechanism. This 
study refers this kind of problem as an independent blackmail attack, and the impact could 
be minimised by implementing a voting mechanism. 
The second performance comparison has been made between the vote-filtered and fiiend-
filtered global detection mechanisms. This experiment was carried out to show that 
although the vote-filtered global detection mechanism is able to minimise the impact of an 
independent blackmail attacker, such a mechanism is not immune against a colluding 
blackmail attacker. Once the number of the colluding blackmail nodes that exist in the 
network is equal or more than the value set for the voting threshold, the reliability of the 
vote-filtered global detection mechanism is in jeopardy. Results ft^om the simulations in 
this experiment set proved that the fiiend-filtered global detection mechanism is capable to 
solve such a problem, whilst at the same time maintaining the high detection rate of the 
global detection mechanism as achieved in the vote-filtered detection mechanism. In 
addition, similar experiments also have been carried out to evaluate the performance of the 
global response mechanism, and as expected the results are not much different fi-om the 
global detection mechanism. 
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The next chapter summarises the research that has been conducted in this study and 
discusses the achievements as well as the limitations of the proposed IDS framework. 
Unaddressed important issues and suggestions for fijture work extensions are also outlined. 
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Chapter 9 : Conclusions and Future Work 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the thesis by first highlighting the contributions and achievements 
that have been made in this study. This is followed by a discussion of the limitations and 
challenges experienced throughout the process of completing the study. Finally, the 
chapter outlines some suggestions for ftiture development to extend the research areas as 
well as presenting the directions of the study. 
9.2 Achievements 
The aim of this research was to propose a novel IDS framework that is suitable for 
MANET environments and capable of protecting such a network against security threats. 
In the process of realising the idea, several achievements have been made that contribute to 
the area of the study. Specifically, these achievements are as follows: 
In depth investigation of MANET characteristics that distinguish such a network 
from other wireless networks 
Investigation of MANET characteristics provides useful information on how such a 
network operates, which is important to help in designing reliable security 
measures that are suitable for such a network. By identifying the characteristics as 
well as understanding the nature of its operations, knowledge of how such a 
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network might be threatened by attackers were established. Such information is 
necessary to be ftilly understood in order to come out with a reliable security 
measure for a MANET. 
A detailed investigation and analysis of attacks that could be launched against 
MANETs 
Attacks that could be launched against MANET have been identified, which 
include attacks that are unique in such a network environment, as well as attacks 
that were inherited from other types of wireless networks. Knowledge of the 
attacking scenarios and strategies in MANET environments is essential because it 
could help in determining the appropriate and efficient strategies to secure such a 
network. Information gathered in this investigation includes different kind of 
attackers that exist in a MANET environment, as well as their strategies in 
launching attacks. Additionally, the investigation has also identified the most 
important feature of MANET that need to be secured, which is the routing 
mechanism. 
A comprehensive evaluation of the existing security measures proposed for MANET 
A thorough investigation on existing security measures proposed for MANET have 
been carried out to give an idea on what have been done and what still needs to be 
done to secure such a network from security threats. The investigation covers the 
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whole of the computer security lifecycle as suggested by King (2002), which 
includes prevention, detection and response mechanisms. Such an investigation 
provides useful information in designing a novel security scheme for MANET that 
aims to improve deficiencies as well as to suggest solutions for unaddressed issues 
in the existing techniques. 
The design of a novel IDS framework 
A novel IDS framework that aims to improve the deficiencies o f existing solutions 
has been designed. The novelty of the framework is the introduction of a friendship 
concept to deny false information from being traversed across the network in the 
global detection and response mechanisms. In addition, the proposed framework 
also provides alternative solutions in enabling dynamic update to a misuse 
signature database via the trust and signature management mechanisms. 
The evaluation of the proposed IDS framework through a series of simulation 
experiments 
The proposed IDS framework has been evaluated through a series of simulation 
experiments to establish its performance. Results from simulations suggested that 
the proposed IDS framework is capable of protecting nodes in the network from 
receiving false information/alerts that have been a major problem in global 
detection and response mechanisms. More importantly, the overall performance of 
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the proposed IDS framework in speeding up the detection and response process has 
not been compromised as a result of the introduction of the fiiendship mechanism 
to filter the false information/alerts. 
9.3 Limitations 
There are several limitations and challenges that have been faced throughout the process of 
completing this study, and they are as follows: 
Difficulty in assigning initial trusted friends for each MANET node 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the trust relationship between nodes is a subjective issue. 
Some individuals might have many people that they trust, whilst others might just 
have a few on their list. Trust relationships are created and tom down based on 
many reasons. For instance, it could be based on experience, or recommendation 
from other people. Since this study is carried out in a simulation manner, it is 
impossible to get an exact number of trust relationships possessed by each node. As 
a result, the number of initial trusted friends for each node has to be estimated to 
match as close as possible the real worid relationships. This study follows the 
finding from the Britsocat survey (Britsocat, 1995), which suggested that on 
average a person has 14 close friends that they could trust. Throughout the 
simulations, various numbers of initial fiiends possessed by each node (i.e. between 
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1 and 14) have been used to see the impact of such a variant relationships towards 
the overall performance of the proposed IDS framework. 
Simple operational misuse and anomaly detection engines 
The implementation of high performance misuse and anomaly detection engines is 
not the main focus of this study. A focus of this study is to prove that the friendship 
concept is capable to eliminate false accusations/alerts problem in the IDS global 
detection and response mechanisms. Misuse and anomaly detection engines are 
responsible to provide inputs that will trigger the global detection and response 
mechanisms. In a real world implementation, it is always a desire to have complete 
and efficient local misuse and anomaly detection engines that will provide better 
input to the global detection and response mechanisms. However, since the focus is 
not on this matter, simple operational misuse and anomaly detection engines are 
adequate in this study. 
Limited selections of misuse signatures and normal network behaviour profiles 
Apart from having a simple operational local detection engine, this study also 
utilises a limited selection of misuse signatures and normal network behaviour 
profiles. This limitation is because of several reasons, outlined as follows: 
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Research on a MANET misuse detection engine is still immature and 
researchers admitted that the process of creating the attack signatures is not 
an easy task due to MANET's unique characteristics. 
Similar to misuse detection engine, preparing a list o f normal network 
behaviour for a MANET is not easy. The network behaves differently based 
upon the type of routing protocol being used. As a result, most researchers 
proposed that the network's normal behaviour profiles should be designed 
based upon the protocol being deployed in the system. 
A complete list of misuse signatures and normal network profiles is not 
essential in this study, as the use of only a few of them is adequate to prove 
the proposed friendship concept. 
Difficulty in modelling general MANET environments 
MANET could exist in many forms. It does not have a fixed network topology 
where nodes can join and leave the network anytime and anywhere. Apart from that, 
there is also no fixed network boundary where nodes can communicate to each 
other miles away via multi hop communications. Network density is varying 
depending on how nodes are located. Al l the aforementioned situations have an 
impact upon how nodes communicate in the network and thus have an impact on 
the overall performance of the proposed IDS framework. It is impossible to 
evaluate the performance of the proposed IDS framework in all possible MANET 
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environments. However, for better simulation results, the evaluation process in this 
study has been made in three predetermined MANET environments (i.e. university 
campus, city-1, and city-2) that represent different network density levels. 
Limited evaluation of the proposed IDS framework 
The evaluation process of the proposed IDS framework has been made through a 
series of simulation experiments. There is a debate that questions the reliability of 
the simulation results compared to the physical implementation. However, the 
practicability of simulation techniques, especially in evaluating a new concept, 
should not be put aside. Moreover, conducting a physical evaluation in this study 
would not be practical considering the amount of physical MANET nodes that need 
to be made available. 
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9.4 Future Work 
A number of suggestions for fliture work outside the scope o f this study have been 
identified and they are as follows: 
Implementation of fully dynamic real time trust relationship between nodes 
In this study, trust relationships between nodes are based upon the number of initial 
direct friends preset for all nodes at the beginning of the simulation. The initial 
direct trusts are allowed to be shared between the direct friends to create a new set 
of a trusted friend, namely the indirect friend. This study has successfully proved 
that with an adequate number of initial direct friends, trust relationships between 
nodes could be expanded across the network to create a trusted community (as 
detailed in Chapter 6), which then could be used to solve many trust-related issues 
in MANET environments. However, the friendship concept introduced in this study 
did not take into consideration the dynamic nature of the trust relationships (i.e. the 
direct trust could be established and ended anytime). For instance, a new trust 
relationship could be established when there are a lot positive recommendations 
from others about the particular node. In another scenario, the existing trust could 
be ended when there are a lot negative opinions/feedbacks about the particular 
friend. This dynamic trust issue might have an impact towards the overall 
performance of the proposed framework, thus investigation on this matter in a 
future work is another possible contribution to MANET security research field. 
However, although this study did not include an observation on this dynamic 
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relationship issue, the results obtained from the simulation experiments still could 
be considered valid. This is because neither new direct trusts nor the revoked 
friendships have been introduced in the system that could create bias to the end 
results. 
• Prototype implementation of the proposed IDS framework 
The proposed IDS framework in this study has been developed in simulation 
software (i.e. the NS-2) to prove the applicability of its concepts. The decision of 
having a simulation implementation was made because it is an inexpensive way in 
terms of money, time, and manpower compared to a physical testbed 
implementation to prove a new research idea that could not guarantee any 
promising result. In addition, the simulation has also been chosen to overcome the 
difficulties in preparing sufficient number of physical mobile nodes, as well as for 
simplicity to simulate the random movements of the mobile nodes. Since results 
obtained from the simulations have proved the applicability of the proposed 
friendship concept, the next step of the research is to develop a prototype of the 
proposed IDS framework and to ftirther investigate its performances. 
Real world evahiation via a case study 
Results from the simulation experiments carried out in this study suggested that the 
friendship concept is very practical to assist in the global detection and response 
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mechanisms, especially in the presence of the colluding blackmail attackers. 
However, as claimed in (Andel & Yasinac, 2006), in most cases, results from 
simulation experiments are questionable as the controlled environment/attributes 
preset in the simulation are often different from the expected situation as it should 
be in a physical implementation. It might be difficult to make available 100 mobile 
nodes and investigate how the proposed IDS framework will perform in a physical 
implementation i f the research has to be carried out in a laboratory with limited 
space and manpower (to create node's mobility scenario). A more practical solution 
is to select a group of students in a university campus to play the roles of the 
mobile nodes, which not only could solve the problems of limited manpower and 
space but also could bring real dynamic trust relationships into the system that they 
established between themselves. Carrying out this investigation is another potential 
extension for ftiture work. 
9.5 Conclusions 
This study has presented a novel IDS framework that focuses upon the global detection and 
response mechanisms to minimise the effects of false accusations caused by the blackmail 
attackers. The important concept behind the proposed framework is the introduction of a 
trust chain, which could be established in the network through a friendship relation. Such a 
chain of trust created a trusted community in a network that not only could ensure a secure 
operation of the global detection and response mechanisms as proposed in this study, but 
also could solve many other trust-related issues in MANET environments. 
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The proposed IDS framework has been developed and evaluated in the NS-2 simulation 
software to prove its concepts as well as to investigate its performance, compared to the 
existing approaches. It utilises a simple operational misuse and anomaly detection 
techniques that have been proposed by previous researchers as the local detection 
mechanism is not the focus of the study. Besides such simple local misuse and anomaly 
detection engines also are sufficient to provide inputs for the global detection and response 
mechanisms. 
Results from the simulation experiments in Chapter 6 proved that the proposed direct and 
indirect fiiendship concepts are capable to expand the limited trust relationships that 
initially exist in the network. With more and more trust relationships being established, the 
deployment of security measures that depend heavily on this relationship becomes more 
practical. Results from simulation experiments in Chapter 8 provide evidence on this 
matter as the proposed IDS framework that has been designed based upon the friendship 
concept performed very well. 
Completing this study is just the beginning of more research studies focusing on MANET 
related issues, which will not be limited to the security issues. As emphasised at the 
beginning of the thesis, research studies on MANET-related issues are still few and 
immature, similar to the immaturity of the network itself (at least for the case of an open 
MANET). With more researchers working in addressing MANET-related issues it is hoped 
that this new exciting technology could become more popular and play an important role in 
supporting daily communication needs. 
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1 100 1 2km^ 200.0s 100 18 118 
Set 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends s 2 100 3 2km^ 200.0s 300 202 502 
tw
or
l<
 
Set 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Fnencte 
Total 
Friends 
z 3 100 5 2km^ 200.0s 500 549 1049 
C
ity
 
Set 
4 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 10 2km^ 200.0s 1000 2527 3527 
Set 
5 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 14 2km^ 200.0s 1400 4 3 9 7 5797 
Simulation A (Run = 2. Random seed = 2) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 1 2km^ 200.0s 100 16 116 
Set 
2 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 3 2km^ 200.0s 300 159 459 
itw
or
k 
Set 
3 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 2km^ 200.0s 500 662 1162 
o Set 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friertds 
Total 
Friends 
4 100 10 2km^ 200.0s 1000 2662 3662 
Set 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friertds 
Total 
Friends 
5 100 14 2km^ 200.0s 1400 3954 5354 
Simulation A (Run = 3, Random seed = 3) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Frier)ds 
Indirect 
FrierKts 
Total 
Friends 
100 1 2km^ 200.0s 100 26 126 
Set 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
2 100 3 2km^ 200.0s 300 199 499 
tw
or
k 
Set 
3 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
z 100 5 2km^ 200.0s 500 582 1082 
C
ity
 
Set 
4 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
Size 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 10 2km^ 200.0s 1000 2584 3584 
Set 
5 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 14 2km^ 200.0s 1400 4188 5588 
Simulation A (Run = 4. Random seed = 4) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 1 2km^ 200.0s 100 14 114 
Set 
2 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
eg 
100 3 2km^ 200.0s 300 179 479 
itw
or
k 
Set 
3 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
w 
z 100 5 2km^ 200.0s 500 550 1050 
C
ity
 
Set 
4 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Frier}ds 
Total 
Friends 
100 10 2km^ 200.0s 1000 2583 3583 
Set 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Frier}ds 
Total 
Friends 
O 
100 14 2km^ 200.0s 1400 4291 5691 
Simulation A (Run = 5. Random seed = 5) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 1 2km^ 200.0s 100 16 116 
Set 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
T e n a i n 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
2 100 3 2km^ 200.0s 300 196 496 
itw
or
l* 
Set 
3 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 2km^ 200.0s 500 583 1083 
b Set 
4 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Tena in 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 10 2km^ 200.0s 1000 2559 3559 
Set 
c 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
5 100 14 2km^ 200.0s 1400 4158 5558 
Simulat ion A (Average) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
FriervJs 
Total 
Friends 
100 1 0.5km^ 200.0s 100 216 316 
Set 
2 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
—J Q. 
E 
100 3 _ 0 5km^ 200.0s 300 6628 6298 
jr
si
ty
 C
ai
 
Set 
3 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
jr
si
ty
 C
ai
 
100 5 0 5km^ 200.0s 500 8917 9417 
> 
c Set 
4 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 10 0.5km^ 200.0s 1000 8896 9896 
Set 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
5 100 14 0.5km^ 200.0s 1400 8499 9899 
Simulat ion A (Average) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 1 Ikm^ 200.0s 100 68 168 
Set 
2 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 3 Ikm^ 200.0s 300 1076 1376 
Set 
3 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 Ikm^ 200.0s 500 3761 4261 
Set 
4 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 10 Ikm^ 200.0s 1000 7779 8779 
Set 
5 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 14 Ikm^ 200.0s 1400 8187 9587 
a: 
o 
Simulat ion A (Average) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 1 2km^ 200.0s 100 18 118 
Set 
2 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 3 2km^ 200.0s 300 187 487 
i f 
1 Set 
3 
Total 
Nodes 
InKial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
z 100 5 2km^ 200 .0s 500 585 1085 
b Set 
4 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 10 2km^ 200.0s 1000 2583 3583 
Set 
5 
Total 
Nodes 
initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 14 2km^ 200.0s 1400 4197 5597 
Appendix B 
The Effects of Network's Age 
Simulation B (Run = 1. Random s e e d = 1) 
Set 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
1 100 5 0.5km^ 50.0s 500 4607 5107 
Set 
2 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
E 100 5 0.5km^ 100.0s 500 7580 8080 CD 
o Set 
3 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
U
ni
ve
rs
il 
100 5 0.5km^ 150.0s 500 8 3 9 5 8895 
U
ni
ve
rs
il 
Set 
4 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 0.5km^ 200.0s 500 8898 9398 
Set 
c 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
5 100 5 0.5km^ 250.0s 500 9092 9582 
Simulation B (Run = 2. Random s e e d = 2) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
T ime 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 0.5km^ 50.0s 500 4 6 9 9 5199 
3 
Set 
2 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
Q. 
E 100 5 0.5km^ 100.0s 500 7849 8349 
jr
si
ty
 C
ai
 
Set 
3 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
jr
si
ty
 C
ai
 
100 5 0.5km^ 150.0s 500 8 6 6 5 9165 
U
ni
vc
 
Set 
4 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 0.5km^ 200.0s 500 9060 9560 
Set 
5 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 0.5km^ 250 Os 500 9 2 1 7 9717 
Simulation B (Run = 3. Random seed = 3) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 0.5km^ 50.0s 500 4122 4622 
0) Set 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
D. 
E 
Z 100 5 0.5km^ 100.0s 500 7378 7878 
jr
si
ty
 C
ai
 
Set 
3 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
jr
si
ty
 C
ai
 
100 5 0.5km^ 150.0s 500 8234 8734 
U
ni
v(
 
Set 
4 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
T ime 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 0.5km^ 200.0s 500 8726 9226 
Set 
c 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
T ime 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
0 
100 5 0.5km^ 250.0s 500 8917 9417 
Simulation B (Run = 4. Random seed = 4) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 0.5km^ 50.0s 500 4131 4631 
(A Set 
2 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
T ime 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
Q. 
E 100 5 0.5km^ 100.0s 500 7601 8101 
05 
O 
>> 
Set 
3 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
(1) 100 5 0.5km^ 150.0s 500 8412 8912 > 
C Set 
4 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 0.5km^ 200.0s 500 8897 9397 
Set 
5 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
T ime 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 0.5km^ 250.0s 500 9046 9546 
Simulation B (Run = 5. Random s e e d = 5) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
Size 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 0.5km^ 50.0s 500 4611 5111 
3 
Set 
2 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
T ime 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
Q. 
E 100 5 0.5km^ 100.0s 500 7721 8221 nj 
O Set 
3 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 0.5km^ 150.0s 500 8591 9091 
> 
c Set 
4 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
Size 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 0 5km^ 200 .0s 500 9004 9504 
Set 
5 
Total 
Nodes 
initial 
Fnends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 0.5km^ 250 .0s 500 9147 9647 
Simulation B (Run = 1, Random s e e d = 1) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
Size 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 Ikm^ 50.0s 500 6 9 6 1196 
Set 
2 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
Size 
Simulation 
T ime 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 Ikm^ 100.0s 500 1656 2156 
Jt
w
or
l 
Set 
3 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
Size 
Simulation 
T ime 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
z 100 5 Ikm^ 150.0s 500 2 5 6 6 3066 
o Set 
4 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 Ikm^ 200 .0s 500 3537 4037 
Set 
5 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
Size 
Simulation 
T ime 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 Ikm^ 250 .0s 500 4 5 2 6 5026 
Simulation B (Run = 2. Random s e e d = 2) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 1km^ 50.0s 500 7 8 4 1284 
Set 
2 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
T ime 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 1km^ 100.0s 500 1894 2394 
itw
or
l' 
Se t 
o 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
. Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
O 
100 5 1km^ 150.0s 500 2811 3311 
•>. 
O Set 
4 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
• Friends 
100 5 1km^ 200.0s 500 3832 4332 
Set 
c 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
5 100 5 1km^ 250.0s 500 4657 5157 
Simulation B (Run = 3, Random s e e d = 3) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 1km^ 50.0s 500 6 7 7 1177 
Set 
2 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 1km^ 100.0s 500 1641 2141 
itw
or
l-
Se t 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct . 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
3 100 5 Ikm^ 150.0s 500 2648 3148 
>t 
b Set 
4 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
T ime 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 1km^ 200.0s 500 3838 4338 
S e t 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation' 
Time 
'Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
5 100 5 1km^ 250.0s 500 4754 5254 
Simulation B (Run = 4, Random s e e d = 4) 
Set 
1 
Total . 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
T i m e . 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 Ikm^ 50 .0s 500 6 3 9 1139 
Set 
o 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total. 
Friends 
£. 
100 5 Ikm^ 100.0s 500 1622 2122 
!tw
or
l<
 
Set 
3 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
w 
. Z 100 5 Ikm^ 150.0s 500 2652 3152 
b . Set 
A 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
T ime 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
4 100 5 Ikm^ 200.0s 500 3763 4263 
Set 
5 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
T ime 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 Ikm^ 250 .0s 500 4697 5197 
Simulation B (Run = 5, Random seed = 5) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 Ikm^ 50.0s 500 6 4 5 1145 
Set 
2 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
T ime 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 Ikm^ 100.0s 500 1704 2204 
itw
or
l"
 
Set 
3 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
S ize -
Simulation 
T ime . 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
2 100 5 Ikm^ 150.0s 500 2 7 7 0 3270 
b Set 
4 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
T ime 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 Ikm^ 200.0s 500 3838 4338 
•Set /— 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
T ime . 
" Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Totar 
Friends 
5 100 5 Ikm^ 250 .0s 500 4771 5271 
Simulation B (Run = 1. Random seed = 1) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 2km^ 50.0s 500 126 626 
Set 
2 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Tinie 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 2km^ 100.0s 500 2 9 3 793 
itw
or
h 
Se t 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
T ime 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
Z 3 100 5 2km^ 150.0s 500 4 2 7 927 
b Set 
4 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
T ime 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 2km^ 200 .0s 500 5 4 9 1049 
Set 
#-
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
T ime 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
5 100 5 2km^ 250 .0s 500 7 7 4 1274 
Simulation B (Run = 2, Random s e e d = 2) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 2km^ 50.0s 500 166 666 
Set 
2 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 2km^ 100.0s 500 3 2 8 828 
ttw
or
l^
 
Se t 
3 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends. 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 2km^ 150.0s 500 4 7 5 975 
C
ity
 
Se t 
A 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
4 100 5 2km^ 200.0s 500 6 6 2 1162 
Set 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
5 100 5 2km^ 250.0s 500 8 3 0 1330 
Simulation B (Run = 3, Random seed = 3) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
T ime 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 2km^ 50 .0s 500 127 627 
Set 
2 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 2km^ 100.0s 500 2 5 8 758 
itw
or
lt 
Se t 
3 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
2 100 5 2km^ 150.0s 500 4 0 7 907 
>. 
O Set 
4 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 2km^ 200 .0s 500 582 1082 
Set 
c 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
5 100 5 2km^ 250.0s 500 740 1240 
Simulation B (Run = 4, Random seed = 4) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 2km^ 50.0s 500 9 4 594 
Set 
2 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
T ime 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 2km^ 100.0s 500 2 4 9 749 
(tw
or
l* 
Se t 
3 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
T ime 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
- Total 
Friends 
100 5 2km^ 150.0s 500 3 8 9 889 
>t 
O Set 
4 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
'Total 
Friends 
100 5 2km^ 200.0s 500 550 1050 
S e t 
r~ 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct . 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
5 100 5 2km^ 250.0s 500 7 6 5 1265 
Simulation B (Run = 5, Random s e e d = 5) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 2km^ 50.0s 500 9 2 592 
Set 
2 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 2km^ 100.0s 500 2 9 6 796 
1 Set 3 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 2km^ 150.0s 500 4 2 7 927 
o Set 
4 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 2km^ 200.0s 500 5 8 3 1083 
Set 
5 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 2 k m ' 250.0s 500 7 3 9 1239 
Simulat ion B (Average) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 0 .5km' 50.0s 500 4434 4934 
Set 
2 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 0 .5km' 100.0s 500 7 6 2 5 8125 
Set 
3 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 0 .5km' 150.0s 500 8 4 5 9 8959 
Set 
4 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 0 .5km' 200.0s 500 8 9 1 7 9417 
Set 
5 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 0 .5km' 250.0s 500 9 0 8 3 9583 
(0 
3 
a. 
E 
CO 
O 
0) 
> 
c 
=) 
Simulat ion B (Average) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 Ikm^ 50.0s 500 6 8 8 1188 
Set 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
2 100 5 1km^ 100.0s 500 1703 2203 
itw
or
l<
 
Set 
3 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
T ime 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
z 100 5 1km^ 150.0s 500 2689 3189 
o Set 
4 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 Ikm^ 200.0s 500 3761 4261 
Set 
5 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 Ikm^ 250.0s 500 4681 5181 
S imulat ion B (Average) 
Set 
1 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 2km^ 50.0s 500 121 621 
Set 
2 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
CN 
100 5 2km^ 100.0s 500 2 8 4 784 
O Set 
3 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Friends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
z 100 5 2km^ 150.0s 500 4 2 5 925 
^' 
b Set 
A 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
S i z e 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
4 100 5 2km^ 200.0s 500 5 8 5 1085 
Set 
5 
Total 
Nodes 
Initial 
Fr iends 
Terrain 
S ize 
Simulation 
Time 
Direct 
Friends 
Indirect 
Friends 
Total 
Friends 
100 5 2km^ 250 .0s 500 769 1269 
Appendix C 
AODV Finite State Machine Specification 
3 g ^  a 
HI I 
F i g . 1. A O D V Extended Fin i te State machine (06): In NorniaJ Use 
F i g . 2. A O D V Extended Kiiiilc State machine (06): After Reboot 
Appendix D 
Partial Programming Codes for the Proposed IDS Framework 
Modules 
File: /media/FIRELITE/temp thesis/...amming code/logaodvpacket.txt Page 1 of 3 
// Added t o NS-2 to Capture Audit Data 
void 
AODV::logaodvpacket(Packet *p) 
{ 
s t r u c t hdr_cmn *ch = HDR_CMN(p); 
s t r u c t hdr_ip * i h = HDR_IP(p); 
s t r u c t hdr_raac802_U *rah = HDR_MAC802_ll(p) ; 
s t r u c t hdr_aodv *ah; 
s t r u c t hdr_aodv_request * r q ; 
s t r u c t hdr_aodv_reply * r p ; 
s t r u c t hdr_aodv_error * r e ; 
char pktType[10]; 
char p k t I D [ 2 0 ] ; 
char pktT[20); 
f l o a t timest; 
char op = 'D'; 
i n t bcastid = 0; 
i n t hopcount; 
i n t rpdst_seqno; 
i n t rqsrc_seqno; 
i n t rqdst_seqno; 
i n t dstseqno; 
i n t srcseqno; 
nsaddr_t neighbour, sender, src, dst, prevh; 
FILE *FLogAlla; 
FILE *FLogAllb: 
i f (ch->ptype()==PT_AODV) 
{ 
ah = HDR_AODV(p); 
switch(ah->ah_type) 
{ 
case AODVTYPE_RREQ: 
rq = HDR_AODV_REQUEST(p); 
sender = ih->saddr(); 
neighbour = index; 
src = rq->rq_src; 
dst = rq->rq_dst; 
hopcount = rq->rq_hop_count; 
srcseqno = rq->rq_src_seqno; 
dstseqno = rq->rq_dst_seqno; 
strcpyCpktType. "RREQ"); 
timest = rq->rq_timestanip; 
s p r i n t f (pktT, "96d".src) ; 
strcpy(pktID,pktT); 
s t r c a t ( p k t I D , " - " ) ; 
sprintf(pktT,"96d".dst): 
s t r c a t ( p k t I D , p k t T ) ; 
s t r c a t C p k t l D . " - " ) : 
s p r i n t f ( p k t T , " % . O f " . t i m e s t ) : 
s t r c a t ( p k t I D , p k t T ) ; 
bcastid = rq->rq_bcast_id; 
break; 
case AODVTYPE_RREP: 
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rp = HDR_AODV_REPLY(p); 
sender = rp->rp_src; 
neighbour = index 
src = ih->saddr() 
dst = ih->daddr() 
hopcount = rp->rp_hop_count; 
dstseqno = rp->rp_dst_seqno; 
srcseqno = - 1 ; 
strcpy(pktType. "RREP"); 
timest = rp->rp_timestamp; 
s p r i n t f (pktT, "96d" ,dst) ; 
strcpy(pktID,pktT); 
s t r c a t ( p k t I D , " - " ) ; 
s p r i n t f (pktT,"96d", s r c ) ; 
s t r c a t ( p k t I D , p k t T ) ; 
s t r c a t ( p k t I D , " - " ) ; 
s p r i n t f ( p k t T , " % . O f " . t i m e s t ) ; 
strcatCpktlD.pktT); 
bcastid = - 1 ; 
break; 
case AODVTYPE_RERR: 
neighbour = index; 
sender = ih->saddr(); 
src = 1; 
dst = 1; 
hopcount = 1; 
dstseqno = 1; 
srcseqno = 1; 
strcpyCpktType, "RERR"); 
tiniest = CURRENT.TIME; 
s p r i n t f ( p k t T . " % d " . d s t ) ; 
s trcpy(pktID,pktT); 
s t r c a t C p k t l D , " - " ) ; 
s p r i n t f (pktT. "96d" . src) ; 
StrcatCpktlD.pktT); 
StrcatCpktlD,*"-"); 
s p r i n t f CpktT, "96.Of",timest) ; 
StrcatCpktlD.pktT); 
bcastid = 1; 
break; 
} 
i f (FLogAlla = fo p e n ( " / r o o t / t e s t i n g / L o g A l l a . t x t " . " a + " ) ) 
{ 
f p r i n t f (FLogAlla, "%d % . 6 f %d %d %d %6 %s %s %d %d %6 %d\n", 123. ti m e s t , \ • 
sender, neighbour, src, dst, pktType, pktID, b c a s t i d . hopcount. srcseqno. dstseqno) 
} 
else 
p r i n t f ( " e r r o r opening LogAlla f i l e \ n " ) ; 
i f (FLogAllb = fo p e n ( " / r o o t / t e s t i n g / L o g A l l b . t x t " . " a + " ) ) 
{ 
f p r i n t f (FLogAllb, "96d %.6{ %d %d %d %d %s %s %d %d %d %d\n'\ 123, ti m e s t , \ 
sender, neighbour, src, dst, pktType. pk t l D , b c a s t i d , hopcount, srcseqno, dstseqno) 
} 
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else 
p r i n t f ( " e r r o r opening LogAllb f i l e \ n " ) ; 
} 
fclose(FLogAlla); 
fclose(FLogAllb); 
} 
End o f F i l e ***************************/ 
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// Misuse Detection Attacks Scenarios 
void 
AODV::rt_resolve(Packet *p) 
{ 
s t r u c t hdr_cmn *ch = HDR_CMN(p); 
s t r u c t hdr_ip * i h = HDR_IP(p); 
s t r u c t hdr_aodv_request *rq = HDR_AODV_REQUEST(p); 
aodv_rt_entry * r t ; 
/* 
* Set the transmit f a i l u r e callback. That 
* won't change. 
V 
ch-> x m i t _ f a i l u r e _ = a o d v _ r t _ f a i l e d _ c a l l b a c k ; 
ch->xmit_failure_data_ = (void*) t h i s ; 
r t = r t a b l e . r t _ l o o k u p ( i h - > d a d d r ( ) ) ; 
i f ( r t == 0) 
{ 
r t = r t a b l e . r t _ a d d ( i h - > d a d d r ( ) ) ; 
} 
/* 
* I f the route i s up, forward the packet 
V 
i f ( r t - > r t _ f l a g s == RTF_UP) 
{ 
ass e r t ( r t - > r t _ h o p s != INFINITY2); 
f o r w a r d ( r t . p, NO_DELAY); 
} 
//SELFISH ATTACK 
else i f ( ( i h - > s a d d r ( ) == index) && (ih->saddr() == ATTACKER)) 
{ 
i n t cntduplxcate; 
rqueue.enque(p); 
fo r ( c n t d u p l i c a t e = l ; cntduplicate<=2; cntduplicate++) 
{ 
sendRequestFlood(rt->rt_dst); 
} 
} 
//FLOODING ATTACK 
else i f ( ( i h - > s a d d r ( ) = index) && (ih->saddr() == ATTACKER) \ 
&& (CURRENT.TIME == 20.0)) 
{ 
i n t c n t f l o o d ; 
i n t fakesrc; 
i n t dst; 
s r a n d ( l ) ; 
fakesrc = VICTIM; 
dst = 2; 
rqueue.enque(p); 
f o r ( c n t f l o o d = l ; cntflood<=10; cntflood++) 
{ 
sendRequestFlood2(fakesrc,rt->rt_dst); , 
} } 
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//FAKE RREQ ATTACK . 
else i f ( ( i h - > s a d d r ( ) = index) && (ih->saddr() == ATTACKER) \ 
&& (CURRENT.TIME == 20.0)) 
{ 
i n t index2; 
index2.= FAKE-DST; 
rqueue.enque(p); 
sendRequestFake(FAKE-SRC,index2); 
} 
/* 
* i f I am the source of the packet, then do a Route Request. 
V 
else i f ( i h - > s a d d r ( ) = index) 
{ 
rqueue.enque(p); 
sendRequest(rt->rt_dst); 
} 
/* 
* A l o c a l r e p a i r i s i n progress. Buff e r the packet. 
V 
else i f ( r t - > r t _ f l a g s == RTF_IN_REPAIR) 
{ 
rqueue.enque(p); 
} 
/* 
* I am t r y i n g t o forward a packet f o r someone else to ivhich 
* I don't have a route. 
V 
else 
{ 
Packet * r e r r = Packet::alloc(); 
s t r u c t hdr_aodv_error *re = HDR_AODV_ERROR(rerr); 
/* 
* For now, drop the packet and send e r r o r upstream. 
* Now the route e r r o r s are broadcast t o upstream 
* neighbors - Mahesh 09/11/99 
V 
assert ( r t - > r t _ f l a g s == RTF_DO;VN); 
re->DestCount = 0; 
re->unreachable_dst[re->DestCount] = r t - > r t _ d s t ; 
re->unreachable_dst_seqno[re->DestCount] = rt->r t _ s e q n o ; 
re->DestCount += 1; 
# i f d e f DEBUG 
f p r i n t f ( s t d e r r , "96s: sending RERR...\n", FUNCTION_) ; 
#endif 
sendError(rerr, f a l s e ) ; 
dropCp, DROP_RTR_NO_ROUTE); 
} 
} 
void 
AODV::sendRequestFake(nsaddr_t dst, nsaddr.t index2) 
{ 
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// A l l o c a t e a RREQ packet 
Packet *p = Pack e t : : a l l o c ( ) ; 
s t r u c t hdr_cmn *ch = HDR_CMN(p); 
s t r u c t h d r _ i p * i h = HDR_IP(p); 
s t r u c t hdr_aodv_request * r q = HDR_AODV_REQUEST(p); 
aodv_rt_entry * r t = r t a b l e . r t _ l o o k u p ( d s t ) ; 
a s s e r t ( r t ) ; 
/* 
* Rate l i m i t sending o f Route Requests. We are very conservative 
* about sending out route requests. BUT NOT IN THIS ATFACK 
*/ 
i f ( r t - > r t _ f l a g s == RTF_UP) { 
ass e r t ( r t - > r t _ h o p s != INFINITY2); 
Packet::free((Packet * ) p ) ; 
r e t u r n ; 
} 
i f ( r t - > r t _ r e q _ t i m e o u t > CURRENT_TIME) { 
Packet::free((Packet * ) p ) ; 
r e t u r n ; 
} 
// r t _ r e q _ c n t i s the no. of times we d i d network-wide broadcast 
// RREQ_RETRIES i s the maximum number we w i l l allow before 
// going to a long timeout. 
i f ( r t - > r t ^ e q _ c n t > RRE(i_RETRIES) 
{ 
rt - > r t _ r e q _ t i m e o u t = CURRENT_TIME + MAX_RREQ_TIMEOUT; 
r t - > r t _ r e q _ c n t = 0; 
Packet *buf_pkt; 
while ( ( b u f _ p k t = rqueue.deque(rt->rt_dst))) 
.{ 
drop(buf_pkt, DROP_RTR_NO_ROUTE); 
} 
Packet::free((Packet * ) p ) ; 
r e t u r n ; 
} 
# i f d e f DEBUG 
f p r i n t f C s t d e r r . "(%2d) - %2d sending Route Request, dst: %d\n", 
++route_request, index, r t - > r t _ d s t ) ; 
#endif // DEBUG 
// Determine the TTL to be used t h i s time. 
// Dynamic TTL evaluation - SRD 
r t - > r t _ r e q _ l a s t _ t t l = m a x ( r t - > r t _ r e q _ l a s t _ t t l , r t - > r t _ l a s t _ h o p _ c o u n t ) ; 
i f (0 == r t - > r t _ r e q _ l a s t _ t t l ) 
{ 
// f i r s t time query broadcast 
i h - > t t l _ = TTL_START; 
} 
else 
{ 
// Expanding r i n g search. 
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i f ( r t - > r t _ r e q _ l a s t _ t t l < TrL_THRESHOLD) 
i h - > t t l _ = r t - > r t _ r e q _ l a s t _ t t l + rrL_INCREMENT; 
else 
{ 
// network-wide broadcast 
i h - > t t l _ = NETWORKJ)IAMETER; 
r t - > r t _ r e q _ c n t += 1; 
} 
} 
// remember the TTL used f o r the next time 
r t - > r t _ r e q _ l a s t _ t t l = i h - > t t l _ ; 
// PerHopTime i s the ro u n d t r i p time per hop f o r route requests. 
// The f a c t o r 2.0 i s j u s t to be safe .. SRD 5/22/99 
// Also note that we are making timeouts to be l a r g e r i f we have 
// done network wide broadcast before. 
r t - > r t _ r e q _ t i m e o u t = 2.0 * (double) i h - > t t l _ * PerHopTime(rt); 
i f ( r t - > r t _ r e q _ c n t > 0) 
rt - > r t _ r e q _ t i m e o u t *= r t - > r t _ r e q _ c n t ; 
r t - > r t _ r e q _ t i m e o u t += CURRENT_TIME; 
// Don't l e t the timeout t o be too larg e , however .. SRD 6/8/99 
i f ( r t - > r t j : e q _ t i m e o u t > CURRENT.TIME + MAX_RRECLTIMEOUT) 
rt- > r t _ r e q _ t i m e o u t = CURRENT.TIME + MA)C_RREQ_TIMEOUT; 
r t - > r t _ e x p i r e = 0; 
# i f d e f DEBUG 
f p r i n t f ( s t d e r r , "C%2d) - 962d sending Route Request, dst: %d, tout %f ms\n". 
++route_request. 
index, r t - > r t _ d s t , 
r t - > r t _ r e q _ t i m e o u t - CURRENT_TIME); 
#endif // DEBUG 
// F i l l out the RREQ packet 
// ch->uid() = 0; 
ch->ptype() = PT^ODV; 
ch->size() = IP_HDR_LEN + rq->sizeC); 
ch->ifaceC) = -2; 
ch->errorC) = 0; 
ch->addr_type() = NS_AF_NONE; 
ch->prev_hop_ = index; // AODV hack 
ih->saddrC) = index; 
ih->daddrC) = IPJROADCAST; 
ih->sportC) = RT_PORT; 
ih->dportC) = RT.PORT; 
// F i l l up some more f i e l d s . 
rq->rq_type = AODVTYPE_RREQ; 
rq->rq_hop_count = 2; 
rq->rq_bcast_id = bid++; 
rq->rq_dst = dst; 
rq->rq_dst_seqno = ( r t ? rt->rt_seqno : 0 ) ; 
rq->rq_src = index2; 
seqno += 2; 
assert CCseqno962) == 0 ) ; 
rq->rq_src_seqno = seqno; 
rq->rq_timestamp = CURRENT_TIME; 
Scheduler:rinstanceC).scheduleCtarget_, p, 0.); 
} 
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void 
AODV::sendRequestFlood(nsaddr_t dst) 
{ 
// A l l o c a t e a RREQ packet 
Packet *p = Packe t : : a l l o c ( ) ; 
s t r u c t hdr_cmn *ch = HDR_CMN(p); 
s t r u c t hdr_ip * i h = HDR_IP(p); 
s t r u c t hdr_aodv_request * r q = HDR_AODV_REQUEST(p); 
aodv_rt_entry * r t = r t a b l e . r t _ l o o k u p ( d s t ) ; 
a s s e r t ( r t ) ; 
# i f d e f DEBUG 
f p r i n t f C s t d e r r , "(%2d) - 562d sending Route Request, dst: %d\n". 
++route_request, index, r t - > r t _ d s t ) ; 
#endif // DEBUG 
// Determine the TTL to be used t h i s time. 
// Dynamic TTL evaluation - SRD 
r t - > r t _ x e q _ l a s t _ t t l = m a x ( r t - > r t _ r e q _ l a s t _ t t l , r t - > r t _ l a s t _ h o p _ c o u n t ) ; 
i f (0 = r t - > r t _ r e q _ l a s t _ t t l ) { 
// f i r s t time query broadcast 
i h - > t t l _ = TTI^START; 
} 
else 
{ 
// Expanding r i n g search. 
i f ( r t - > r t _ r e q _ l a s t _ t t l < TTL_THRESH0LD) 
i h - > t t l _ = r t - > r t _ r e q _ l a s t _ t t l + TTLINCREMENT; 
else 
{ 
// network-wide broadcast 
i h - > t t l _ = NETOORK.DIAMETER; 
r t - > r t _ r e q _ c n t += 1; 
} 
} 
// remember the TTL used f o r the next time 
r t - > r t _ r e q _ l a s t _ t t l = i h - > t t l _ ; 
// PerHopTime i s the ro u n d t r i p time per hop f o r route requests. 
// The f a c t o r 2.0 i s j u s t to be safe .. SRD 5/22/99 
// Also note that we are making timeouts to be l a r g e r i f we have 
// done network ivide broadcast before. 
rt - > r t _ r e q _ t i m e o u t = 2.0 * (double) i h - > t t l _ * PerHopTime(rt); 
i f ( r t - > r t _ r e q _ c n t > 0) 
rt- > r t _ r e q _ t i m e o u t *= r t - > r t _ r e q _ c n t ; 
r t - > r t _ r e q _ t i m e o u t += CURRENT_TIME; 
// Don't l e t the timeout to be too lar g e , however SRD 6/8/99 
i f ( r t - > r t _ r e q _ t i r a e o u t > CURREhfT.TIME + MAX_RRE(J_TIMEOUT) 
rt- > r t _ r e q _ t i m e o u t = CURRENT.TIME + MAX_RRE(J_TIMEOUT; 
r t - > r t _ e x p i r e = 0; 
# i f d e f DEBUG 
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f p r i n t f C s t d e r r , "(%2d) - %2d sending Route Request, dst: %d, tout %f ms\n", 
++route_request. 
index, r t - > r t _ d s t , 
r t - > r t _ r e q _ t i r a e o u t - CURRENT_TIME); 
#endif // DEBUG 
// F i l l out the RREQ packet 
// ch->uid() = 0; 
ch->ptype() = PT_A0DV; 
ch->size() = IP_HDR_LEN + r q - > s i z e ( ) ; 
ch->iface() = -2; 
ch->error() = 0; 
ch->addr_type() = NS_AF_NONE; 
ch->prev_hop_ = index; // AODV hack 
ih->saddr() = index; 
ih->daddr() = IP_BROADCAST; 
ih- > s p o r t ( ) = RT_PORT; 
ih->dpor t ( ) = RT_PORT; 
// F i l l up some more f i e l d s . 
rq->rq_type = AODVTYPE_RREQ; 
rq->rq_hop_count = 1; 
rq->rq_bcast_id = bid++; 
rq->rq_dst = dst; 
rq->rq_dst_seqno = ( r t ? rt->rt_seqno : 0 ) ; 
rq->rq_src = index; 
seqno += 2; 
assert ((seqno%2) == 0 ) ; 
rq->rq_src_seqno = seqno; 
rq->rq_timestamp = CURRENT_TIME; 
Scheduler::instanceO.schedule(target_, p, 0.); 
} 
void 
AODV::sendRequestFlood2(nsaddr_t fakesrc, nsaddr_t d s t ) 
{ 
// Allocate a RREQ packet 
Packet *p = Packet::alloc(); 
s t r u c t hdr_cmn *ch = HDR_CMN(p); 
s t r u c t hdr_ip * i h = HDR_IP(p); 
s t r u c t hdr_aodv_request * r q = HDR_AODV_REQUEST(p); 
aodv_rt_entry * r t = r t a b l e . r t _ l o o k u p ( d s t ) ; 
a s s e r t ( r t ) ; 
# i f d e f DEBUG 
f p r i n t f C s t d e r r , "(962d) - %2d sending Route Request, dst: 96d\n", 
++route_request, index, r t - > r t _ d s t ) ; 
#endif // DEBUG 
// Determine the TTL to be used t h i s time. 
// Dynamic TTL evaluation - SRD 
r t - > r t _ r e q _ l a s t _ t t l = m a x ( r t - > r t _ r e q _ l a s t _ t t l , r t - > r t _ l a s t _ h o p _ c o u n t ) ; 
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i f (0 == r t - > r t _ r e q _ l a s t _ t t l ) 
{ 
// f i r s t time query broadcast 
i h - > t t l _ = TTL_START; 
} 
else 
{ 
// Expanding r i n g search. 
i f ( r t - > r t _ r e q _ l a s t _ t t l < TTl^THRESHOLD) 
i h - > t t l _ = r t - > r t _ r e q _ l a s t _ t t l + TTLINCREMENT; 
else 
{ 
// network-wide broadcast 
i h - > t t l _ = NE™RK_DIAMETER; 
r t - > r t _ r e q _ c n t += 1; 
} 
} 
// remember the TTL used f o r the next time 
r t - > r t _ r e q _ l a s t _ t t l = i h - > t t l _ ; 
// PerHopTime i s the r o u n d t r i p time per hop f o r route requests. 
// The f a c t o r 2.0 i s j u s t t o be safe .. SRD 5/22/99 
// Also note that we are making timeouts to be l a r g e r i f we have 
// done network wide broadcast before. 
r t - > r t _ r e q _ t i m e o u t = 2.0 * (double) i h - > t t l _ * PerHopTime(rt); 
i f ( r t - > r t _ r e q _ c n t > 0) 
r t - > r t _ r e q _ t i m e o u t *= r t - > r t _ r e q _ c n t ; 
r t - > r t _ r e q _ t i m e o u t += CURRENT.TIME; 
// Don't l e t the timeout to be too l a r g e , however SRD 6/8/99 
i f ( r t - > r t _ r e q _ t i m e o u t > CURRENT_TIME + MAX_RRE(}_TIMEOUT) 
rt - > r t _ r e q _ t i m e o u t = CURRENT.TIME + MAX_RREQ_TIMEOUT; 
r t - > r t _ e x p i r e = 0; 
# i f d e f DEBUG 
f p r i n t f ( s t d e r r , "(962d) - %2d sending Route Request, dst: 96d, t o u t %f ms\n", 
++route_request, 
index, r t - > r t _ d s t , 
r t - > r t _ r e q _ t i m e o u t - CURRENT_TIME); 
#endif // DEBUG 
// F i l l out the RREQ packet 
// ch->uid() = 0; 
ch->ptype() = PT_AODV; 
ch->size() = IP_HDR_LEN + r q - > s i z e ( ) ; 
ch->iface() = -2; 
ch->error() = 0 ; » 
ch->addr_type() = NS_AF_N0NE; 
ch->prev_hop_ = index; // AODV hack 
ih->saddr() = index; 
ih->daddr() = IPJROADCAST; 
ih - > s p o r t ( ) = RT_PORT; 
ih->dpor t ( ) = RT_PORT; 
// F i l l up some more f i e l d s . 
File: /media/FIRELITE/temp thesis/...mming code/misuse attacks.txt Page 8 of 8 
rq->rq_type = A0DVTYPE_RREQ; 
rq->rq_hop_count = 2; 
rq->rq_bcast_id = bid++; 
rq->rq_dst = dst; 
rq->rq_dst_seqno = ( r t ? rt->rt_seqno : 0 ) ; 
rq->rq_src = fakesrc; 
seqno += 2; 
assert CCseqno%2) == 0 ) ; 
rq->rq_src_seqno = seqno; 
rq->rq_timestarap = CURRENT_TIME; 
Scheduler::instanceC).scheduleCtarget_, p, 0.); 
} 
void 
AODV::recvRequestCPacket *p) 
{ 
s t r u c t hdr_ip * i h = HDR_IP(p); 
s t r u c t hdr_cmn *ch = HDR_(>lN(p); 
s t r u c t hdr_aodv_request * r q = HDR_AODV_REQUEST(p); 
aodv_rt_entry * r t ; 
i n t bad; 
i n t tempn; 
//Modification A t t a c k # l : Hop Count 
i f (index == ATTACKER) 
{ 
rq->rq_hop_count = INFINITY2; 
ih->saddr() = index; 
ih->daddr() = IP.BROADCAST; 
rq->rq_hop_count = INFINITY2; 
i f ( r t ) rq->rq_dst_seqno = max(rt->rt_seqno. rq->rq_dst_seqno); 
forward((aodv_rt_entry*) 0, p, DELAY); 
} 
//Modification Attack#2: Seq No 
i f (index == ATTACKER) 
{ 
rq->rq_src_seqno += 10; 
} 
} 
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v o i d 
AODV::recvRequest(Packet *p) 
{ 
s t r u c t hdr_ip * i h = HDR_IP(p); 
s t r u c t hdr_cmn *ch = HDR_CMN(p); 
s t r u c t hdr_aodv_request * r q = HDR_AODV_REQUEST(p); 
aodv_rt_entry * r t ; 
i f (index == ATTACKER) 
{ 
printfC'Node %d dropped packet\n".index); 
r e t u r n ; 
} 
} 
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// Local Misuse Detection and Response 
void 
AODV::DetectMisRREQ(Packet *p) 
{ 
struct hdr_cran *ch = HDR_CMN(p); 
struct hdr_ip * i h = HDR_IP(p); 
struct hdr_aodv *ah = HDR_AODV(p); 
struct hdr_aodv_request *rq; 
struct hdr_aodv_reply *rp; 
int bad; 
char cha; 
int hopcount; 
int bcastid; 
int srcseqno; 
char pktTypeilOl; 
char pktID[20]; . 
char pktTypeM[10]; 
char pktIDM[20]; 
char pktT[20]; 
char pktTypetemp[10]; 
char pktIDtemp[20]; 
float timest, timesttemp, timestM; 
int i s . t r u e l , is_true2, is_true3, is_true4; 
int tempx, tempx2, tempx3; 
int idtemp, bcastidtemp, hcounttemp, srcseqtemp, dstseqtemp; 
nsaddr_t neighbour, sender, src, dst, prevh, sendertemp, receivertemp, srctemp, dsttemp; 
FILE *FLogAlla; 
FILE *FMalNode; 
assert(HDR_IP (p)->sport() == RT.PORT); 
assert(HDR_lP (p)->dport() == RT.PORT); 
i f (ch->ptype()==PT_AODV) 
{ 
ah = HDR_AODV(p); 
switch(ah->ah_type) 
{ 
case AODVTYPE_RREQ: 
rq = HDR_AODV_REQUEST(p); 
sender = ih->saddr(); 
neighbour = index; 
src = rq->rq_src; 
dst = rq->rq_dst; 
hopcount = rq->rq_hop_count; 
bcastid = rq->rq_bcast_id; 
srcseqno = rq->rq_src_seqno; 
timest = rq->rq_timestanip; 
sprintf(pktT,"96d".src); 
strcpy(pktID,pktT); 
strcatCpktID, • • - " ) ; 
sprintf(pktT,"%d".dst); 
StrcatCpktID,pktT); 
strcat(pktID,"-"); 
sprintf (pktT, "96.0f " , timest); 
StrcatCpktID,pktT); 
break; 
case AODVTYPE_RREP: 
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rp = HDR_AODV_REPLY(p); 
sender = rp->rp_src; 
neighbour = index: 
src = ih->saddr() 
dst = ih->daddr() 
hopcount = rp->rp_hop_count; 
timest = rp->rp_timestamp; 
bcastid = - 1 ; 
strcpy(pktType, "RREP"); 
sprintf(pktT."%d",dst); 
strcpy(pktID,pktT); 
strcat(pktID,"-"); 
sprintf(pktT."9fid".src): 
strcat(pktID,pktT); 
strcat(pktID."-"); 
sprintf (pktT, "96.Of", timest): 
strcat(pktID,pktT); 
break: 
} 
} 
i f (sender != src) 
{ 
FLogAlla = fopen('7root/testing/LogAlla.txt","r+"): 
FMalNode = fopen("/root/testing/MalNode.txt","a+"); 
i s _ t r u e l = 0: 
is_true2 = 1; 
while { ((cha = getc(FLogAlla)) != EOF) ) 
{ 
fscanf(FLogAlla,"%d %f %6 %d %d %6 %s %s %6 %6 %d %d 
",&idterap,&timesttemp,fisendertemp,&receivertemp, \ 
&srctemp,&dsttemp,fipktTypetemp,fipktlDtemp,fibcastidtemp, fihcounttemp, fisrcseqtemp 
&dstseqtemp); 
//Rule 1: Detecting RREQ Hop Count Modification 
i f ((receivertemp == sender) && (strcmp(pktTypetemp,"RRE(J") == 0) && (strcmp 
(pktlDtemp.pktID) == 0) \ 
&& (timesttemp == timest)) 
{ 
i f (hopcount == (hcounttemp + 1 ) ) 
{ 
i s _ t r u e l = 1: 
} 
} 
//Rule 2: Detecting RREQ Sequence Number Modification 
i f ((receivertemp == sender) && (strcmp{pktTypeternp,"RREQ") == 0) && (strcmp 
(pktIDtemp,pktID) == 0) \ 
&& ((hopcount - hcounttemp) == 1) && (timesttemp == timest)) 
{ 
i f (srcseqno != srcseqtemp) 
{ 
is_true2 = 2: 
break; 
} 
} 
cha = getc(FLogAlla); 
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} 
// Response to Rule 1 violation 
i f ( i s _ t r u e l != 1) 
{ 
p r i n t f ( " \ n Node:9Sd detects node:%d modified hop count at time:%f". 
neighbour,sender.timest); 
getcharO; 
fprintf(FMalNode."\n%f %d %d %s %s", timestM.neighbour.sender.pktTypeM.pktlDM); 
} 
// Response to Rule 2 violation 
i f (is_true2 != 1) 
{ 
p r i n t f ( " \ n Node:%d detects node:96d modified seq number at time:96f". 
neighbour.sender,timest); 
getcharO; 
fprintf(FMalNode,"\n96f 96d 96d 96s %s" , timest,neighbour, sender.pktTypetemp.pktlDtemp); 
//dropCp, DROP_RTR_TTL); 
} 
fclose(FLogAlla); 
fclose(FMalNode); 
} 
i f (sender == src) 
{ 
FLogAlla = fopen("/root/testing/LogAlla.txt","r+"); 
FMalNode = fopen("/root/testing/MalNode.txt"."a+") ; 
is.trueS = 1; 
while ( ((cha = getc(FLogAlla)) != EOF) ) 
{ 
fscanf (FLogAlla, "%d %£ %d %d %d %d %s %s %6 %6 %d %6 
",&idtemp,fitimesttemp,fisendertemp,&receivertemp, \ 
&srctemp,&dsttemp,fipktTypetemp,&pktIDtemp.fibcastidtemp. Shcounttemp, fisrcseqtemp. 
fidstseqtemp); 
//Rules: Fabrication Attack 1 
i f ((sender == srctemp) && (strcmp(pktTypeterap,"RREQ") == 0) && (strcmp 
(pktlDtemp.pktID) 0) \ 
&& (bcastid != bcastidtemp) && (timesttemp == timest)) 
{ 
is_true3 = 2; 
break; 
} 
cha = getc(FLogAlla); 
} 
// Respond to Rule 3 Violation 
i f (is_true3 != 1) 
{ 
p r i n t f ( " \ n Node:Xd detects node:9fid sends duplicate RREQ at time:%f". 
neighbour,sender,timest); 
getcharO; 
f p r i n t f (FMalNode, *'\n%f 96d %d %s %s" , timest .neighbour, sender .pktTypetemp.pktlDtemp) ; 
} 
fclose(FLogAlla); 
fclose(FMalNode); 
} 
} 
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// Local Anomaly Detection and Response 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <string.h> 
^include <aodv/aodv.h> 
#include <aodv/aodv_packet.h> 
#include "agent.h" 
class DetectDrop : public Agent 
{ 
public: 
DetectDropO; 
protected: 
i n t comraand(int argc, const char*const* argv); 
private: 
i n t my_varl; 
double my_var2; 
void Anomaly(void); 
void CountDropCchar pktTYpeterap2[]. char pktIDtemp2[], f l o a t timetemp, i n t 
source, i n t suspect); 
void TestForward(char pktTypetemp2[], char pktIDtemp2[]» float timetemp, i n t 
source, i n t suspect); 
void CheckFriendRequest(char pktTypGtenip2[]. char pktIDtemp2[], f l o a t 
timetemp, i n t source, i n t suspect); 
}; 
static class DetectDropClass : public TclClass 
{ 
public: 
DetectDropClassO : TclClassC'Agent/DetectDrop") { } 
TclObject* create(int, const char*const*) { 
return(new DetectDropO); 
} 
} class_my_agent; 
DetectDrop::DetectDrop() : Agent(PT_AODV) 
{ 
} 
i n t DetectDrop::command(int argc, const char*const* argv) 
{ 
ifCargc == 2) 
{ 
if(strcmp(argv[l], "call-detect-drop") == 0) 
{ 
AnomalyO; 
return(TCLOK); 
} 
} 
return(Agent::command(argc, argv)); 
} 
void DetectDrop::Anomaly(void) 
{ 
float timest, timesttemp; 
i n t sender, receiver, src, dst, receivertemp, sendertemp, srcterap, dsttemp; 
char pktType[15]; 
char pktID[15]: 
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char pktTypetemp[15]; 
char pktIDtemp[15]; 
char ch; 
char ch2; 
char ch3; 
in t terapn=0; 
i n t temp=0;' 
in t templ=0; 
int hopcount, hopcounttemp, i d , idtemp, srcseqtemp, dstseqtemp, srcseq, dstseq; 
i n t bcastid, bcastidtemp; 
i n t senderM. receiverM, senders, receivers; 
char pktTypeM[15]; 
char pktIDM[15]; 
float timestM.timestS; 
FILE *FLogAlla; 
FILE *FLogAllb; 
FILE *FActivity; 
FILE *FMalNode; 
FILE *FSusNodea; 
FILE *FSusNodeb; 
FILE *FSusNodea2; 
FLogAlla = fopen("/root/testing/LogAlla.txt","r+"); 
FLogAllb = fopen("/root/testing/LogAllb.txt","r+"); 
FActivity = fopen("/root/testing/Activity.txt"."a+"); 
float nstime, nsfiletime; 
nstime = Scheduler::instanceO.clock(); 
nsfiletime = 0.0; 
FILE *Frime; 
FTime = fopen("/root/testing/Time.txt"."r+"); 
while ( Ifeof (FTime) ) 
{ 
fscanf(FTime."%f",&nsfiletime); 
} 
fclose(FTime); 
FTime = fopen("/root/testing/Time.txt","w+"); 
fprintf(FTime."%f\n",nstime); 
fclose(FTime); 
printf("Performing Anomaly Detection Mechanism (Detecting suspicious nodes) ...\n"); 
while ( ((ch = getc(FLogAlla)) != EOF) ) 
{ 
fscanf(FLogAlla,"96d %f %d %6 %d %d %s %s %d %d %6 % 
d",&idtemp,&timesttemp,&sendertemp,&receivertemp, \ 
&srctemp, Adsttemp ,&pktTypetemp,&pktIDtemp,&bcastidtemp ,&hopcounttemp,fisrcseqtemp,&dstseqtemp) ; 
i f ((receivertemp != srctemp) && (strcmp(pktTypetemp,"RREQ")==0)) 
{ 
rewind(FLogAllb); 
while ( ((ch2 = getc(FLogAllb)) != (EOF)) ) 
{ 
fscanf (FLogAllb, "96d %f %d %d %d %d %s %s %d %d %d %d", &id. fttimest, fisender, 
&receiver, &src, &dst, \ 
fipktType, fipktlD, fibcastid, &hopcount,&srcseq.&dstseq); 
i f ((sender = receivertemp) && (src = srctemp) && (dst == dsttemp) && (strcmp 
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(pktType,"RREQ")=0)) 
{ 
fprintf(FActivity,"96d %f %d %6 %d %6 %s %s %d %d %6 %d 
\n",idtemp.timesttemp,sendertemp,receivertemp, \ 
srctemp,dsttemp,pktTypetemp, pktlDtemp,bcastidtemp,hopcounttemp, srcseqtemp,dstseqtemp) ; // 
Log normal a c t i v i t y 
terapn = 1; 
break; 
} 
else i f ((sender == receivertemp) && (srctemp == dst) && (dstterap = src) && (strcmp 
(pktType,"RREP")==0)) 
{ 
fprintf(FActivity,"96d % f 96d %d %d %d %s %s %d %d %d %d 
\n*', idtemp, timesttemp, sender temp, receivertemp, \ 
src temp .dst temp, pktTypetemp, pktlDtemp, bcastidtemp, hopcounttemp, srcseqtemp, dstseqtemp); // 
Log normal a c t i v i t y 
tempn = 1; 
break; 
} 
else 
{ 
terapn = 2; 
} 
} 
i f (tempn 2) 
{ 
FMalNode = fopen("/root/testing/MalNode.txt","r+"); 
rewind(FMalNode); 
while ( Ifeof (FMalNode) ) 
{ 
fscanf (FMalNode. "96f %6 %d %s %s" ,&timestM,&senderM,&receiverM.&pktTYpeM.&pktIDM) ; 
i f ((sendertemp == senderM) && (receivertemp == receiverM)) 
{ 
temp=0; 
break; 
} 
else 
{ 
temp = 1; 
} 
} 
fclose(FMalNode); 
i f (temp == 1) 
{ 
printf("Suspicious a c t i v i t y detected ... Node:9Sd suspects NodeiXd malicious 
\n'*, sendertemp.receivertemp) ; 
FSusNodea = fopenC'/root/testing/SusNodea.txt","r+"); 
reivind(FSusNodea); 
tempi = 0; 
while ( Ifeof (FSusNodea) ) 
{ 
fscanf(FSusNodea,"%f %d 56d",&timestS,&senderS,&receiverS); 
i f (((sendertemp == senderS) && (receiverterap == receivers)) && ((timestterap -
timestS)<l)) 
{ 
temp1=0; 
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break: 
> 
else 
{ 
tempi = 1; 
} 
} 
fclose(FSusNodea): 
i f (templ==l) 
{ 
FSusNodea2 = fopen("/root/testing/SusNodea.txt","a+") : 
FSusNodeb = fopen("/root/testing/SusNodeb.txt"."3+"); 
printf("96f %d 56d\n", timesttemp,sendertemp,receivertemp) : 
fprintf(FSusNodea2,"%f 9Sd %d\n", timesttemp.sendertemp,receivertemp): 
fprintf(FSusNodeb,"%f 56d %d\n", timesttemp,sendertemp,receivertemp): 
fclose(FSusNodea2): 
fclose(FSusNodeb); 
} 
TestForward(pktTypeterap, pktlDtemp, timesttemp. sendertemp, receivertemp) ; 
} 
} 
} 
else i f ((receivertemp == srctemp) && (strcmp(pktTypetemp,"RREQ")=0)) 
{ 
fprintf(FActivity."9Sd %f %6 %d %d %d %s %s %d %d %d %d 
\n",idtemp,tiraesttemp,senderterap.receivertemp. \ 
srctemp,dstterap, pktTypetemp, pktlDtemp, bcastidterap. hopcounttemp, srcseqterap, dstseqtemp) ; // 
Log normal a c t i v i t y 
} 
ch = getc(FLogAlla): 
} 
fclose(FLogAlla): 
fclose(FLogAllb): 
fclose(FActivity); 
} 
void DetectDrop::TestForward(char pktTypetemp2[], char pktIDtemp2[].float timetemp, i n t 
source, i n t suspect) 
{ 
printf("Anomaly Test 1: Node:96d checks Node:%d a c t i v i t y history\n".source,suspect); 
FILE *FActivity2: 
FILE *FGood: 
FILE *FGood2: 
int idtemp, receivertemp, sendertemp, srcterap. dsttemp; 
float timestM, timesttemp: 
char pktTypetemp[15]: 
char pktIDtemp[15]; 
char pktTypeM[15]; 
char pktIDM[15]: 
int count: 
int temp = 0: 
int senderM. receiverM; 
int hopcounttemp,srcseqtemp,dstseqtemp.bcastidtemp: 
FActivity2 = fopen("/root/testing/Activity.txt","r+") : 
while ( !feof (FActivity2) ) 
{ 
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count =0; 
fscanf(FActivity2."%d %f %d %6 %d %d %s %s %d %d %d % 
d".fiidtemp,fitimesttemp.fisendertemp,fireceiverterap, \ 
&srctemp, &dsttemp. SpktTypetemp. SpktlDtemp, &bcastidtemp, fihopcounttemp, &srcseqtemp. fidstseqtemp); 
i f ((suspect == sendertemp) && (suspect != srcterap) && (receivertemp == source)) 
{ 
count = 1 ; 
break; 
} 
else 
{ 
count = 0; 
} 
} 
i f (count == 1) 
{ 
printfC'Test 1 Result: Node:%d detects Node:96d not malicious\n".source.suspect); 
FGood = fopen("/root/testing/Good.txf."a+"); 
rewind(FGood); 
while ( !feof (FGood) ) 
{ 
fscanf (FGood, "96f %d %d %s %s",&timestM.&senderM.&receiverM.&pktTypeM,&pktIDM); 
i f ((source == senderM) && (suspect = receiverM)) 
{ 
temp=0; 
break; 
} 
else 
temp = 1; 
} 
fclose(FGood); 
i f (temp==l) 
{ 
FGood2 = fopen("/root/testing/Good.txt","a+'*); 
fprintf(FGood2."96f %d %d %s %s\n", timetemp.source.suspect.pktTypetemp2,pktIDtemp2); 
fclose(FGood2); 
} 
} 
else i f (count != 1) 
{ 
printfC'Test 1 Result: Can't make decision -> Proceed to Test 2\n"); 
CountDrop(pktTypetemp2,pktIDterap2,timetemp,source.suspect); 
} 
fclose{FActivity2); 
} 
void DetectDrop::CountDrop(char pktTypetemp2[], char pktrDtemp2[], f l o a t timetemp, i n t 
source, i n t suspect) 
{ 
printf("Anomaly Test 2: Node:9Sd checks Node:%d packet drop history\n".source,suspect); 
FILE *FSusNodea; 
FILE *FMalNode; 
FILE *FMalNode2; 
FILE *FRequest; 
FILE *FRequest2; 
char ch, ch2. ch3: 
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i n t sender, receiver, src, dst, receivertemp, sendertemp, srctemp, dsttemp; 
int senderM, receiverM, senderR. receiverR; 
char pktType[15]; 
char pktID[151; 
char pktTypetemp[15]; 
char pktIDtemp[15]; 
char pktTypeM[15]; 
char pktIDM[15]; 
int count; 
int temp=0; 
int temp3=0; 
int bcastid,bcastidtemp; 
float timestM, timestterap, timestR; 
float timeM = 11.111111; 
float nstime; 
nstime = Scheduler:: instanceO .clock(); 
FSusNodea = fopen("/root/testing/SusNodea.txt"."r+"); 
count =0; 
rewind(FSusNodea); 
while ( Ifeof (FSusNodea) ) 
{ 
fscanf(FSusNodea,"%f 9fid %6",fitimesttemp,fisendertemp,fireceivertemp); 
i f ((source == sendertemp) && (suspect = receivertemp)) 
{ 
count = count + 1; 
} 
} 
i f (count >=6) 
{ 
printf("Test 2 Result: Node:%d detects Node:96d malicious\n", source,suspect) ; 
FMalNode = fopen("/root/testing/MalNode.txt","r+"); 
reiifind(FMalNode); 
while ( Ifeof (FMalNode) ) 
{ 
fscanf (FMalNode, " % f %d 96d %s 96s" ,&timestM,&senderM,&receiverM.&pktTypeM,&pktIDM); 
i f ((source == senderM) && (suspect = receiverM)) 
{ 
temp=0; 
break; 
} 
else 
temp = 1; 
} 
fclose(FMalNode); 
i f (temp==l) 
{ 
FMalNode2 = fopen("/root/testing/MalNode.txt"."a+"); 
fprintf(FMalNode2,"%f %d %d %s %s\n", nstime,source,suspect,pktTypetemp2.pktIDtemp2); 
fclose(FMalNode2); 
} 
} 
else i f (count < 6) 
{ 
printf("Local anomaly detection f a i l e d to make a decision -> Send global detection 
request\n"); 
FRequest = fopen("/root/testing/Request.txt","r+"); 
rewind(FRequest); 
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while ( Ifeof (FRequest) ) 
{ 
fscanf(FRequest."%f 96d %d".StimestR.&senderR.&receiverR) ; 
i f ((source == senderR) && (suspect == receiverR)) 
{ 
temp3=0; 
break; 
} 
else 
temp3 = 1 ; 
} 
fclose(FRequest); 
i f (temp3==l) 
{ 
FRequest2 = fopen("/root/testing/Request.txt" ,"a+"); 
fprintf(FRequest2,"96f %6 %d\n",nstime,source,suspect); 
fclose(FRequest2); 
} 
} 
fclose(FSusNodea); 
} 
File: /media/FIRELITE/temp thesis/...ming code/globaldetection.txt Page 1 of 4 
//Global Detection 
i n t Friend::command(int argc, const char*const* argv) 
{ 
MobileNode *mn; 
MobileNode *mn2; 
i f (mn->addressO != mn2->address()) 
{ 
in t distance = 0: 
distance = sqrt(((grid_x-grid2_x)*(grid_x-grid2_x)) + ((grid_y-grid2_y)*(grid_y-
grid2_y))); 
i f (distance <= mn->radius()) 
{ 
while ( !feof (FFriendl) ) 
{ 
fscanf(FFriendl,"%d 96d",&firstnode,&secondnode); 
i f ((firstnode == mn->address()) && (secondnode == mn2->address())) 
{ 
ExchangeRequest(mn2->address(). mn->address()): 
} 
} 
while ( !feof (FFriend2) ) 
{ 
fscanf(FFriendl,"%d %d",&firstnode,&secondnode); 
i f ((firstnode == mn->address()) && (secondnode == mn2->address())) 
{ 
ExchangeRequest(mn2->address(), mn->address()): 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
void Friend::ExchangeRequest(int second, i n t f i r s t ) 
{ 
FILE *FRequest; 
FILE *FFriendRequest; 
FILE *FMalNode; 
FILE *FMalNode2; 
FILE *FMalNode3: 
FILE *FActivity2; 
FILE *FGood: 
FILE *FGood2: 
int fnode, snode. Ifnode, Isnode, idnode.id, idA, bcastidA, hopcountA,srcseqA.dstseqA: 
int senderM,receiverM,senderG.receiverG,senderA,receiverA,srcA,dstA; 
char pktTypeM[15] 
char pktIDM[15]: 
char pktTypeA[15] 
char pktIDA[15]; 
char pktTypeG[15] 
char pktIDG[15]; 
int tempi = 0; 
int temp2 = 0; 
int temp4 = 0; 
int count, tempa; 
in t i n p u t l , input2, inputs: 
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float time, Itime, timestM,timeA,timeG; 
float nstime; 
FRequest = fopen("/root/testing/Request.txt","r+"); 
FFriendRequest = fopen("/root/testing/FriendRequest. t x t " , "a+*') ; 
nstime = Scheduler::instance().clock(); 
while ( Ifeof (FRequest) ) 
{ 
f scanf (FRequest. " % f %d 96d" .fitime.&fnode.&snode) ; 
i f (fnode ~ f i r s t ) 
{ 
FMalNode = fopen("/root/testing/MalNode.txt"."r+"); 
rewind(FMalNode); 
tempi = 0; 
while ( !feof (FMalNode) ) 
{ 
fscanf (FMalNode,"%f %d %d %s %s" .&timestM.&senderM.&receiverM,&pktTypeM,&pktIDM) ; 
i f ( ( f i r s t == senderM) && (snode == receiverM)) 
{ 
tempi = 1; 
break; 
} 
} 
fclose(FMalNode); 
i f (tempi != 1) 
{ 
FMalNodeS = fopen("/root/testing/MalNode.txt","r+"); 
rewind (BlalNode3); 
temp2 = 0; 
printf("Global Detection Test 1 -> Check MalNode List\n'*); 
while ( Ifeof (FMalNode3) ) 
{ 
fscanf(FMalNode3,"%f %d %d %s %s",&timestM.&senderM.&receiverM.&pktTypeM.&pktIDM); 
i f ((second == senderM) && (snode = receiverM)) 
{ 
temp2 = 1; 
break; 
} 
} 
fclose(FMalNode3); 
i f (temp2 == 1) 
{ 
printf("Global Detection Result (Test 1) -> Node:%d detect Node:Xd malicious with 
the help of \ 
Node:%d\n". first,snode,second); 
FMalNode2 = fopen("/root/testing/MalNode.txt"."a+") ; 
f p r i n t f (FMalNode2,"96f %d %d %s %s\n",nstime. f i r s t . snode,pktTypeM.pktlDM) ; 
fclose(FMalNode2); 
} 
else i f (temp2 != 1) 
{ 
printf("Global Detection Test 2 -> Check Packet Forwarding History\n"); 
//getcharO; 
FActivity2 = fopen("/root/testing/Activity.txt","r+"); 
count = 0; 
while ( Ifeof (FActivity2) ) 
{ 
fscanf(FActivity2,"96d %f %d %d %d %d %s %s %d %d %d % 
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d",&idA,&timeA,&senderA.&receiverA,&srcA,&dstA, \ 
&pktTypeA,&pktIDA,&bcastidA,&hopcountA,&srcseqA,&dstseqA); 
i f ((snode == senderA) && (snode != srcA) && (receiverA == second)) 
{ 
count = 1; 
break; 
} 
else 
{ 
count = 0; 
} 
} 
fclose(FActivity2); 
i f (count == 1) 
{ 
printf("Global Detection Result (Test 2) -> Node:96d detect Node:«d not malicious 
with the help of \ 
Node:%d\n", first,snode,second); 
FGood = fopen("/root/testing/Good.txt","r+"); 
rewind(FGood); 
tempa =0; 
while ( Ifeof (FGood) ) 
{ 
fscanf (FGood, "9fif %d %6 %s %s" ,&timeG.&senderG,&receiverG.&pktTypeG.&pktIDG); 
i f ( ( f i r s t == senderG) && (snode == receiverG)) 
{ 
tempa=l; 
break; 
} 
else 
tempa = 0; 
} 
fclose(FGood); 
i f (tempa!=l) 
{ 
FGood2 = fopen("/root/testing/Good.txt","a+"); 
fprintf(FGood2,"%f %d %6 %s %s\n", nstime.first,snode,pktTypeA.pktlDA); 
fclose(FGood2); 
} 
} 
else i f (count != 1) 
{ 
printf("Node:96d can't help Node:96d making decision -> Add the suspicious Node:9fid 
to i t s \ 
FriendRequest l i s t \ n " , second, f i r s t , snode); 
rewind(FFriendRequest); 
temp4 = 0; 
while ( !feof (FFriendRequest) ) 
{ 
fscanf (FFriendRequest, "JSd %d %d % f " ,&idnode.&lsnode,&lfnode,&ltime) ; 
i f ((second == idnode) && (Isnode == snode) && (Ifnode = fnode)) 
{ 
temp4 = 1; 
break; 
} 
} 
i f (temp4 != 1) 
{ 
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fprintf(FFriendRequest,"\n96d %d %d 96f",second,snode.first,nstime): 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
fclose(FRequest): 
fclose(FFriendRequest): 
} 
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//Global Response 
in t Friend::command(int argc, const char*const* argv) 
{ 
MobileNode *mn; 
MobileNode *mn2; 
i f (ran->address() != mn2->address()) 
{ 
i n t distance = 0; 
distance = sqrt(((grid_x-grid2_x)*(grid_x-grid2_x)) + ((grid_y-grid2_y)*(grid_y-
grid2_y))); 
i f (distance <= mn->radius()) 
{ 
while ( ifeof (FFriendl) ) 
{ 
fscanf(FFriendl, "96d 96d" ,&firstnode,&secondnode); 
i f ((firstnode == mn->address()) && (secondnode == ran2->address())) 
{ 
exchangelocal(ran2->address(), mn->address()); 
exchangeglobal(mn2->address(), mn->address()); 
} 
} 
while ( Ifeof (FFriend2) ) 
{ 
fscanf(FFriendl,"%d %d",&firstnode,fisecondnode); 
i f ((firstnode == mn->address()) && (secondnode == mn2->address())) 
{ 
exchangelocal(mn2->address(), mn->address()); 
exchangeglobal(mn2->address(), mn->address()); 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
void Friend::exchangelocal(int second, i n t f i r s t ) 
{ 
FILE *FMalNode; 
FILE *FGlobal; 
int fnode, snode, Ifnode, Isnode, idnode.id; 
int temp = 0; 
int dum, dum2; 
char ch, ch2; 
char pktTypeM[15]; 
char pktIDM[15]; 
flpat time, Itime; 
FMalNode = fopen("/root/testing/MalNode.txt","r"); 
FGlobal = fopen("/root/testing/GlobalMis.txt","a+"); 
while ( Ifeof (FMalNode) ) 
{ 
fscanf (FMalNode,"96f %d %d %s 96s" ,&time,&fnode,fisnode,&pktTypeM,&pktIDM) ; 
i f (fnode == second) 
{ 
rewind(FGlobal); 
temp = 0; 
while ( Ifeof (FGlobal) ) 
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{ 
fscanf(FGlobal."%d %d %d %f",&idnode,&lsnode.&lfnode.&ltime); 
i f ( ( f i r s t == idnode) && (Isnode == snode) && (Ifnode == fnode)) 
{ 
temp = 2; 
} 
} 
i f (temp != 2) 
{ 
printf("Node:%d sends i t s local malicious node l i s t to NodeiXd global malicious l i s t 
\n", second, f i r s t ) : 
fprintf(FGlobal."\n9Sd %d %d %f".first.snode.second,time) ; 
} 
} 
} 
fclose(FMalNode); 
fclose(FGlobal): 
} 
void Friend::exchangeglobal(int second, i n t f i r s t ) 
{ 
FILE *FGlobal; 
FILE *FGlobalEx: 
in t gfnode, gsnode, gfnode2. gsnode2, idnode, idnode2,id: 
i n t temp2 =0: 
int dum, dum2; 
char ch, ch2; 
float gtime, gtime2; 
FGlobalEx = fopen("/root/testing/GlobalMisEx.txt"."a+"); 
FGlobal = fopen("/root/testing/GlobalMis.txt","r"); 
while ( !feof (FGlobal) ) 
{ 
fscanf(FGlobal,"yod %d %d 96f",&idnode,&gsnode,&gfnode.&gtirae) ; 
i f ((idnode — second) && (gfnode != f i r s t ) ) 
{ 
rewind(FGlobalEx): 
temp2 = 0; 
while ( Ifeof (FGlobalEx) ) 
{ 
fscanf(FGlobalEx,"96d %d %d %f",&idnode2,&gsnode2,&gfnode2.&gtime2); 
i f ((idnode2 == f i r s t ) && (gfnode2 == second) && (gsnode2 == gsnode)) 
{ 
temp2 = 2; 
} 
} 
i f (temp2 != 2) 
{ 
printf("Node:%d sends i t s global malicious node l i s t to NodeiXd global malicious 
(ex) l i s t \ n " , second, f i r s t ) ; 
fprintf(FGlobalEx,"\n56d %d %d %f",first.gsnode,second,gtirae) ; 
} 
} 
} 
fclose(FGlobal); 
fclose(FGlobalEx); 
} 
Appendix E 
Cbrgen.tcl Script and TCP Transmission Example 
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# 
# Copyright ( c ) 1999 by the U n i v e r s i t y o f Southern C a l i f o r n i a 
# A l l r i g h t s reserved. 
# 
# This program i s f r e e sof tware ; you can r e d i s t r i b u t e i t and/or 
# modify i t under the terms o f the GNU General Publ ic License, 
# vers ion 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation. 
# 
# This program i s d i s t r i b u t e d i n the hope tha t i t w i l l be u s e f u l , 
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; wi thou t even the imp l i ed warranty o f 
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the 
# GNU General Publ ic License f o r more d e t a i l s . 
# 
# You should have received a copy o f the GNU General Publ ic License along 
# w i t h t h i s program; i f not , w r i t e to the Free Software Foundation, I n c . , 
# 59 Temple Place. Sui te 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. 
# 
# The copyr ight o f t h i s module inc ludes the f o l l o w i n g 
# l i n k i n g - w i t h - s p e c i f i c - o t h e r - l i c e n s e s a d d i t i o n : 
# 
# I n a d d i t i o n , as a spec ia l except ion, the copyr igh t holders o f 
# t h i s module give you permission to combine ( v i a s t a t i c or 
# dynamic l i n k i n g ) t h i s module w i t h f r e e sof tware programs or 
# l i b r a r i e s t ha t are released under the GNU LGPL and w i t h code 
# included i n the standard release of ns-2 under the Apache 2.0 
# l i cense or under otherwise-compat ible l icenses w i t h a d v e r t i s i n g 
# requirements (or modi f ied versions o f such code, w i t h unchanged 
# l i c e n s e ) . You may copy and d i s t r i b u t e such a system f o l l o w i n g the 
# terms o f the GNU GPL f o r t h i s module and the l icenses o f the 
# other code concerned, provided tha t you inc lude the source code o f 
# t ha t o ther code when and as the GNU GPL requi res d i s t r i b u t i o n o f 
# source code. 
# 
# Note tha t people who make modi f i ed vers ions o f t h i s module 
# are not ob l iga ted to grant t h i s spec i a l exception f o r t h e i r 
# modi f ied vers ions ; i t i s t h e i r choice whether to do so. The GNU 
# General Public License gives permission t o release a m o d i f i e d 
# vers ion wi thout t h i s except ion; t h i s exception a lso makes i t 
# poss ib le to release a mod i f i ed ve r s ion which c a r r i e s forward t h i s 
# except ion. 
# T r a f f i c source generator f rom CMU's mobile code. 
n 
# SHeader: / n f s / j ade /v in t /CVSR00T/ns -2 / indep-u t i l s / cmu-scen-gen /cb rgen . t c l , v 1.4 
2005/09/16 03:05:39 tomh Exp $ 
# = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = : : = = = = = : = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = t = = = i i = S i = : = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
# Defau l t S c r i p t Options 
set op t (nn) 0 ;# Number o f Nodes 
set opt(seed) 0.0 
set opt(mc) 0 
set o p t ( p k t s i z e ) 512 
set o p t ( r a t e ) 0 
set o p t ( i n t e r v a l ) 0 .0 ;# inverse o f r a t e 
set op t ( t ype ) • I 11 
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# = 
proc usage { } { 
g l o b a l argvO 
puts "\nusage: SargvO \ [ - t y p e c b r | t c p \ l \ [ - n n nodes\] \ [ - s eed seed\] \[-rac 
connect ions \ ] \ [ - r a t e r a t e \ ] \ n " 
} 
proc getopt {argc argv} { 
g l o b a l opt 
lappend o p t l i s t nn seed mc ra t e type 
f o r { se t i 0} { S i < Sargc} { i n c r i } { 
set arg [ l i n d e x Sargv $1] 
i f { [ s t r i n g range $arg 0 0 ] != " - " } cont inue 
set name [ s t r i n g range Sarg 1 end] 
set opt($name) [ l i n d e x Sargv [expr $ i + l ] ] 
} 
proc create-cbr-connect ion { src dst } { 
g l o b a l rng cbr_cnt opt 
set stime [Srng un i fo rm 0.0 180.0] 
puts "#\n# Ssrc connecting to $dst a t t ime $stime\n#" 
##puts "set cbr_($cbr_cnt ) \ [ \ $ n s _ crea te-connect ion \ 
##CBR \$node_(Ssrc) CBR \$node_($dst) 0 \ ] " : 
puts "set udp_($cbr_cnt) \[new Agent/UDP\]" 
puts "\$ns_ attach-agent \$node_(Ssrc) \$udp_(Scbr_cnt)" 
puts "set n u l l _ ( $ c b r _ c n t ) \[new A g e n t / N u l l \ ] " 
puts "\$ns_ attach-agent \$node_($dst) \ $ n u l l _ ( $ c b r _ c n t ) ' 
puts "set cbr_($cbr_cnt ) \[new A p p l i c a t i o n / T r a f f i c / C B R \ ] ' 
puts " \$cbr_($cbr_cnt ) set packetSize_ $ o p t ( p k t s i 2 e ) " 
puts " \$cbr_($cbr_cnt ) set i n t e r v a l . $ o p t ( i n t e r v a l ) " 
puts " \$cbr_($cbr_cnt ) set randonu 1" 
puts " \$cbr_($cbr_cnt ) set maxpkts_ 10000" 
puts " \$cbr_($cbr_cnt ) at tach-agent \$udp_(Scbr_cnt)" 
puts "\$ns_ connect \$udp_($cbr_cnt) \ $ n u l l _ ( $ c b r _ c n t ) " 
puts "\Sns_ at Sstime \ " \ $ c b r _ ( $ c b r _ c n t ) s t a r t \ " " 
i n c r cbr_cnt 
} 
proc create- tcp-connect ion { src dst } { 
g loba l rng cbr_cnt opt 
set stime [Srng un i fo rm 0.0 100.0] 
puts "#\n# Ssrc connecting to Sdst at t ime $stime\n#" 
puts "set tcp_($cbr_cnt ) \ [ \ $ n s _ create-connect ion \ 
TCP \$node_($src) TCPSink \$node_($dst) 0 \ ] " ; 
puts " \$ tcp_($cbr_cnt ) set window. 32" 
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puts " \$ tcp_($cbr_cnt ) set packetSize_ $ o p t ( p k t s i z e ) " 
puts "set f t p _ ( $ c b r _ c n t ) \ [ \ S t c p _ ( $ c b r _ c n t ) a t tach-source FTP\]" 
puts "\$ns_ a t Sstime \ " \ I f t p _ ( $ c b r _ c n t ) s t a r t \ " " 
puts "\$ns_ a t [expr ($s t ime+0.5)] \ " \ $ f t p _ ( $ c b r _ c n t ) s top \ " " 
i n c r cbr_cnt 
} 
getopt Sargc Sargv 
i f { $opt ( type) == "" } { 
usage 
e x i t 
} e l s e i f { SoptCtype) == "cbr" } { 
i f { $opt(nn) == 0 I I $opt(seed) == 0.0 | | $opt(mc) == 0 It $ o p t ( r a t e ) == 0 } { 
usage 
e x i t 
} 
set o p t ( i n t e r v a l ) [expr 1 / $ o p t ( r a t e ) ] 
i f { $ o p t ( i n t e r v a l ) <= 0.0 } { 
puts " \ n i n v a l i d sending r a t e $ o p t ( r a t e ) \ n " 
e x i t 
} 
} 
puts "#\n# nodes: $op t (nn) , max conn: $opt(mc) , send r a t e : $ o p t ( i n t e r v a l ) , seed: Sopt 
(seed)\n#" 
set rng [new RNG] 
$rng seed Sopt(seed) 
set u [new RandomVariable/Uniform] 
$u set min_ 0 
$u set max_ 100 
$u use-rng $rng 
set cbr_cnt 0 
set src_cnt 0 
f o r {se t i 0} { $ i < $opt(nn) } { i n c r i } { 
set X [$u va lue] 
i f {$x < 50} { c o n t i n u e ; } 
i n c r src_cnt 
set dst [expr ( $ i + l ) % [expr $opt(nn) + 1] ] 
# i f { Sdst == 0 } { 
#set dst [expr Sdst + 1] 
#} 
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i f { SoptCtype) == "cbr" } { 
crea te-cbr-connect ion S i $dst 
} else { 
crea te- tcp-connect ion $ i Sdst 
} 
i f { $cbr_cnt == $opt(mc) } { 
break 
} 
i f {$x < 75} { c o n t i n u e ; } 
set dst [expr ($ i+2) % [expr $opt(nn) + 1] ] 
# i f { Sdst == 0 } { 
#set dst texpr Sdst + 1 ] 
#} 
i f { SoptCtype) == "cbr" } { 
crea te-cbr-connect ion $ i Sdst 
} else { 
crea te- tcp-connect ion S i Sdst 
} 
i f { $cbr_cnt == Sopt(mc) } { 
break 
} 
} 
puts "#\n#Total sources/connections: $src_cnt /Scbr_cnt \n#" 
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# 
# nodes: 100, max conn: 20, send r a t e : 0 .0 , seed: 1 
# 
# 1 connecting t o 2 at time 1.4204660437165137 
# 
set tcp_(0) [$ns_ create-connect ion TCP Snode_(l) TCPSink Snode_(2) 0 ] 
Stcp_(0) set window. 32 
Stcp_(0) set packetSize_ 512 
set f t p _ ( 0 ) [$ tcp_(0 ) at tach-source FTP] 
Sns_ at 1.4204660437165137 " $ f t p _ ( 0 ) s t a r t " 
$ns_ at 1.9204660437165137 " S f t p _ ( 0 ) stop" 
# 
# 4 connecting t o 5 at t ime 31.296177176430906 
# 
set t c p _ ( l ) [Sns_ create-connect ion TCP $node_(4) TCPSink Snode_(5) 0 ] 
S t cp_ ( l ) set window. 32 
S t cp_ ( l ) set packetSize . 512 
set f t p _ ( l ) [ S t c p _ ( l ) at tach-source FTP] 
Sns_ a t 31.296177176430906 " S f t p _ ( l ) s t a r t " 
Sns_ at 31.796177176430906 " $ f t p _ ( l ) s top" 
# 
# 4 connecting t o 6 at time 81.64760516101849 
# 
set tcp_(2) [$ns_ create-connect ion TCP $node_(4) TCPSink $node_(6) 0 ] 
Stcp_(2) set window. 32 
Stcp_(2) set packetSize_ 512 
set f t p _ ( 2 ) [Stcp_(2) at tach-source FTP] 
Sns_ at 81.64760516101849 " S f t p _ ( 2 ) s t a r t " 
Sns_ at 82.14760516101849 " S f t p _ ( 2 ) stop" 
# 
# 6 connecting t o 7 a t time 30.90790576809454 
# 
set tcp_(3) [Sns_ create-connect ion TCP Snode_(6) TCPSink $node_(7) 0] 
Stcp_(3) set window. 32 
Stcp_(3) set packetSize_ 512 
set f t p _ ( 3 ) tStcp_(3) at tach-source FTP] 
Sns_ at 30.90790576809454 " $ f t p _ ( 3 ) s t a r t " 
Sns_ at 31.40790576809454 " S f t p _ ( 3 ) stop" 
# 
# 7 connecting t o 8 a t t ime 16.414540641202844 
# 
set tcp_(4) [$ns_ create-connect ion TCP $node_(7) TCPSink Snode_(8) 0 ] 
Stcp_(4) set window_ 32 
Stcp_(4) set packetSize_ 512 
set f t p _ ( 4 ) [Stcp_(4) at tach-source FTP] 
$ns_ at 16.414540641202844 " $ f t p _ ( 4 ) s t a r t " 
$ns_ at 16.914540641202844 " S f t p _ ( 4 ) s top" 
# 
# 7 connecting to 9 a t time 4.2794557308216836 
# 
set tcp_(5) [$ns_ create-connect ion TCP $node_(7) TCPSink Snode_(9) 0 ] 
$tcp_(5) set window_ 32 
$tcp_(5) set packetSize_ 512 
set f t p _ ( 5 ) [$ tcp_(5 ) at tach-source FTP] 
$ns_ at 4.2794557308216836 " S f t p _ ( 5 ) s t a r t " 
Sns_ at 4.7794557308216836 " $ f t p _ ( 5 ) s top" 
# 
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# 8 connecting t o 9 at t ime 11,380824824506801 
# 
set tcp_(6) [$ns_ create-connect ion TCP $node_(8) TCPSink Snode_(9) 0 ] 
$tcp_(6) set window. 32 
$tcp_(6) set packetSize_ 512 
set f t p _ ( 6 ) [$ tcp_(6) a t tach-source FTP] 
$ns_ a t 11.380824824506801 " S f t p .Ce ) s t a r t " 
$ns_ a t 11.880824824506801 " $ f t p _ ( 6 ) stop" 
# 
# 9 connecting t o 10 at time 42.365673623218051 
# 
set t cp_(7) [$ns_ create-connect ion TCP $node_(9) TCPSink $node_(10) 0 ] 
$tcp_(7) set window. 32 
$tcp_(7) set packetSize_ 512 
set f t p _ ( 7 ) [$ tcp_(7) at tach-source FTP] 
Sns_ at 42.365673623218051 " $ f t p _ ( 7 ) s t a r t " 
$ns_ at 42.865673623218051 " $ f t p _ ( 7 ) stop" 
# 
# 9 connecting t o 11 a t t ime 17.480525382552543 
# 
set tcp_(8) [$ns_ create-connect ion TCP $node_(9) TCPSink $ n o d e _ ( l l ) 0 ] 
Stcp_(8) set window_ 32 
$tcp_(8) set packetSize_ 512 
set f t p _ ( 8 ) [$ tcp_(8) a t tach-source FTP] 
$ns_ a t 17.480525382552543 " $ f t p _ ( 8 ) s t a r t " 
$ns_ at 17.980525382552543 " $ f t p _ ( 8 ) s top" 
# 
# 11 connecting to 12 at t ime 34,874102536064619 
# 
set t cp_(9) [$ns_ create-connect ion TCP $node_ ( l l ) TCPSink $node_(12) 0] 
$tcp_(9) set window_ 32 
$tcp_(9) set packetSize_ 512 
set f t p _ ( 9 ) [$ tcp_(9) a t tach-source FTP] 
$ns_ at 34.874102536064619 " $ f t p _ ( 9 ) s t a r t " 
$ns_ at 35.374102536064619 " $ f t p _ ( 9 ) s top" 
# 
# 11 connecting to 13 at t ime 25.808794855051115 
# 
set tcp_(10) [Sns_ create-connect ion TCP $ n o d e _ ( l l ) TCPSink $node_(13) 0] 
$tcp_(10) set window. 32 
$tcp_(10) set packetSize_ 512 
set f t p _ ( 1 0 ) [$ tcp_(10) at tach-source FTP] 
$ns_ at 25.808794855051115 " $ f t p _ ( 1 0 ) s t a r t " 
$ns_ at 26.308794855051115 " $ f t p _ ( 1 0 ) s top" 
# 
# 13 connecting t o 14 at t ime 46.611593638831565 
# 
set t c p _ ( l l ) [$ns_ create-connect ion TCP $node_(13) TCPSink $node_(14) 0 ] 
$ t c p _ ( l l ) set window. 32 
$ t c p _ ( l l ) set packetSize . 512 
set f t p _ ( l l ) [ $ t c p _ ( l l ) a t tach-source FTP] 
$ns_ at 46.611593638831565 " $ f t p _ ( l l ) s t a r t " 
$ns_ at 47.111593638831565 " $ f t p _ ( l l ) s top" 
# 
# 14 connecting t o 15 at t ime 86,206728120430711 
# 
set tcp_(12) [$ns_ create-connect ion TCP $node_(14) TCPSink Snode_(15) 0 ] 
$tcp_(12) set window. 32 
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$tcp_(12) set packetSize_ 512. 
set f t p _ ( 1 2 ) [$ tcp_(12) at tach-source FTP] 
Sns_ a t 86.2067281204307U " $ f t p _ ( 1 2 ) s t a r t " 
Sns_ a t 86.706728120430711 " $ f t p _ ( 1 2 ) s top" 
# 
# 15 connecting t o 16 at time 21.715945946851718 
# 
set tcp_(13) [$ns_ create-connect ion TCP $node_(15) TCPSink Snode_(16) 0] 
$tcp_(13) set window. 32 
$tcp_(13) set packetSize_ 512 
set f t p _ ( 1 3 ) [$ tcp_(13) at tach-source FTP] 
$ns_ a t 21.715945946851718 " $ f t p _ ( 1 3 ) s t a r t " 
$ns_ a t 22.215945946851718 " $ f t p _ ( 1 3 ) s top" 
# 
# 15 connecting t o 17 at t ime 24.122562782896011 
# 
set tcp_(14) [Sns_ create-connect ion TCP $node_(15) TCPSink $node_(17) 0] 
$tcp_(14) set window. 32 
$tcp_(14) set packetSize_ 512 
set f t p _ ( 1 4 ) [Stcp_(14) at tach-source FTP] 
$ns_ a t 24.122562782896011 " $ f t p _ ( 1 4 ) s t a r t " 
Sns_ at 24.622562782896011 " $ f t p _ ( 1 4 ) s top" 
# 
# 16 connecting to 17 at time 67.734894327695898 
# 
set tcp_(15) [$ns_ create-connect ion TCP $node_(16) TCPSink Snode_(17) 0] 
$tcp_(15) set window. 32 
$tcp_(15) set packetSize . 512 
set f t p _ ( 1 5 ) [Stcp_(15) at tach-source FTP] 
Sns_ at 67.734894327695898 " $ f t p _ ( 1 5 ) s t a r t " 
$ns_ at 68.234894327695898 "Sf tp_(15) s top" 
# 16 connecting t o 18 at time 76.223189279540989 
# 
set tcp_(16) [$ns_ create-connect ion TCP Snode_(16) TCPSink $node_(18) 0 ] 
$tcp_(16) set window. 32 
Stcp_(16) set packetSize_ 512 
set f t p _ ( 1 6 ) [Stcp_{16) at tach-source FTP] 
Sns. at 76.223189279540989 "Sf tp_(16) s t a r t " 
$ns . at 76.723189279540989 " $ f t p _ ( 1 6 ) s top" 
# 
# 17 connecting t o 18 at t ime 40.551907727751839 
# 
set tcp_(17) [$ns_ create-connect ion TCP $node_(17) TCPSink $node_(18) 0 ] 
$ tcp . (17) set window. 32 
$tcp_(17) set packetSize_ 512 
set f t p _ ( 1 7 ) [$ tcp_(17) at tach-source FTP] 
Sns. at 40.551907727751839 " $ f t p . ( 1 7 ) s t a r t " 
Sns_ at 41.051907727751839 " $ f t p _ { 1 7 ) s top" 
# 
# 17 connecting t o 19 at time 10.919847158212145 
# 
set tcp_(18) [$ns_ create-connect ion TCP Snode_(17) TCPSink $node_(19) 0 ] 
$tcp_(18) set window_ 32 
$tcp_(18) set packetSize . 512 
set f t p _ ( 1 8 ) [Stcp_(18) at tach-source FTP] 
Sns. at 10.919847158212145 " $ f t p _ ( 1 8 ) s t a r t " 
Sns_ at 11.419847158212145 " $ f t p _ ( 1 8 ) s top" 
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# 
# 20 connecting to 21 at time 94.62649533274886 
# 
set tcp_(19) [$ns_ create-connect ion TCP $node_(20) TCPSink $node_(21) 0] 
$tcp_(19) set window. 32 
$tcp_(19) set packetSize_ 512 
set f t p _ ( 1 9 ) [$ tcp_(19) at tach-source FTP] 
$ns_ a t 94.62649533274886 " $ f t p _ ( 1 9 ) s t a r t " 
Sns_ a t 95.12649533274886 " $ f t p _ ( 1 9 ) stop" 
# 
#Total sources/connections: 13/20 
# 
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Introduction 
Networks are now one of the most popular manifestations of computing technology, and the most 
significant example is the Internet. Online banking, email applications, online trading, instant 
messaging and news broadcasting are only a few examples to show the massive use of the internet. 
Recent progress and advances in the communication technologies have introduced another type of 
computer network. Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs). MANETs represent a combination of pecr-
to-peer techniques, wireless communications and mobile computing, and have become an important 
field of research in recent years. This new technology has been widely used to support communications 
in an environment that might be impossible to deploy infrastructure networks such as in military 
bauleficlds and disaster recovery sites. In addition, this technology might be used to replace 
infrastructure networks where employing the wireless networks is more practical [ I J . However, 
employing MANETs in any environment is not as easy as one might think. Besides the routing 
protocols, other issues such as security, Quality of Service (QoS), resource management, and auto-
configuration must be considered before deployment. In this paper, we will introduce some of the 
important characteristics that make MANETs unique compared to the other type of computer networks. 
We will also present some of the research challenges that can be explored in the area. 
M A N E T s and the Wireless Families 
Wireless networks assist in the communication activities between two nodes to provide more flexible 
and easier connections. According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in [2], 
we can categorize wireless networks into three main categories; Wireless Wide Area Network 
(WWAN), Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN), and Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN). 
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Figure I : Three t>'pes of wireless network 
Figure I illuslniies three types of wireless networks and the descriptions for each technology are as 
follows: 
• IVire/ess IVAN is a computer network using wireless networking devices to transfer data in a wide 
coverage area. Such technology is generally managed by a service provider and usually offers 
ser\'ices to a huge number of users. Examples of WAN technology are CDMA, GSM, GPRS, 
CDPD and satellite networks [3]. 
Wireless PAN is a collection of personal devices connecting to each other in a limited coverage 
area. Technologies related to wireless PAN are IrDA, RFID and Bluetooth. Unlike in a wireless 
WAN, network connectivity in wireless PAN is completely controlled by the user who operates it, 
not by ihe service provider. Another significanl difference compared to a wireless WAN is that 
there is no charge for connection, as it uses free unlicensed frequency allocation. More explanation 
about licensed and unlicensed frequencies can be found in [4]. 
• Wireless LAN is a computer network designed to allow greater flexibility and mobility in a local 
area network connection. Similar to wireless PAN, this technology also uses an unlicensed 
frequency allocation to establish wireless connection. Since no service provider exists in the 
networks, the users must take responsibility to control and manage all the network operations by 
themselves. In general, wireless LAN can, be divided into two main categories, namely 
infrastructure and infrastructure-less networks as described in [5]. However, recent research in [6] 
has introduced the third type of wireless LAN technologies; the hybrid wireless LAN. The 
descriptions of each wireless LAN technology are as follows: 
• Infrastructure wireless network consists of several mobile devices connected directly to an access 
point using wireless transmissions. An access point is a station that transmits and receives data 
from users within the network and can serve as Ihe point of interconnection between ihe WLAN 
and a fixed wire network. 
• Infrastructure-less wireless network, which is also known as MANET, is a network comprised 
only of mobile wireless devices. Nodes communicate directly with each other without the aid of 
any access points or wired backbone. 
• Hybrid networks can be used to ease the deployment of an infrastructure wireless network. The 
main problem in infrastructure wireless networks is the constraints in placing the access points. By 
exploiting multi-hop capabilities in the ad hoc networks, all nodes (including those in the outer 
range) are able to reach the access point to connect to the Internet. 
Figure 2 illustrates an example of wireless LAN technologies consisting of infrastructure wireless 
LAN, MANET and hybrid wireless LAN. White arrows show that mobile devices in MANET can 
connect to each other without an access point. On the other hand, each mobile node in an infrastructure 
wireless LAN needs to connect directly to the access point to establish connections amongst them. 
Black arrows show direct connections between nodes and access point. Nodes in the circle area 
connected to each other to establish connection between MANET and infrastructure wireless LAN. 
Wireless networks created in this way are also known as hybrid wireless networks. 
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Figure 2: Wireless LAN technologies 
M A N E T Characteristics 
The Mobile Ad Hoc Network is one of the emerging technologies nowadays. The emergence of this 
technology are not restricted to the variety of wireless devices and applications inmxiuced to the 
market, but also in the number of research works carried out in this field. Generally, there are three 
main research areas in MANET: enabling technology; networking; and application and middleware [7]. 
Among these areas, only networking has been given special attention by researchers. However, less 
focus in the two remaining areas does not mean that they are not important. The focus has been given 
to the networking area because MANETs have a set of unique characteristics, which add the difficulties 
in providing effective and efficient communications. In general, MANETs have the following 
characteristics [5, 8]: 
• Dytwmic network topology: Ad hoc networks are highly dynamic in nature. Nodes in the ad hoc 
network are mobile and connected to each other via wireless links. Wireless connectivity allows 
nodes to join the network and dynamically associate to establish routing among themselves. The 
associations are often created and torn down without prior notice and thus make ihc ad hoc 
network topologies unpredictable. The topologies become more complex when nodes in ihe ad hoc 
networks established a connection to any public infrastructure network. 
• Distributed operations: Operations in the ad hoc networks are performed in a distributed manner. 
Successful routing in ad hoc networks, for example, needs participation among nodes to 
collaborate in the route discovery process. Besides, since there is no central control for the 
networks, all the management processes in ad hoc networks must be carried out in a distributed 
Infrastructure-less: In ad hoc networks, fixed infrastructure and specialized hardware that help in 
communication operations are necessarily absent. Besides, nodes participating in the network have 
not been given any specific roles such as servers, routers or gateways. These situations prevent the 
deployment of hierarchical node relationships and thus make security mechanisms that depend on 
these relationships inappropriate. 
Limited resources: Generally, most ad hoc network enabled devices are small mobile devices 
ranging from notebooks to PDAs and cellular phones. Most of these devices can be assumed to 
rely on batteries for their power supplies. Complex computational tasks must be avoided, as these 
operations may drain power quickly. Bandwidth is another important resource. Usually MANETs 
have a lower bandwidth capacity than a fixed network, and for that reason irafTic used for 
connection and maintenance must be kept as minimal as possible. In addition, MANETs also have 
a limited CPU processing capability and limited data storage. 
Multi hop routing: MANETs connectivity can be single hop based or multi-hop based depending 
on the distance between source and destination nodes. Conutiunications among nodes in MANETs 
are generally within a short range. Nodes communicate directly using a single hop routing 
algorithm i f they are close to each other. However, because of the geographical constraint and 
distance between source and destination nodes, data will usually traverse through the network via 
one or more intermediate nodes before it reaches the destination. In this situation, connectivity 
between sender and receiver is no longer in single hop mode but it is now in multi-hop mode. 
Shared transmission media: The transmission medium used in MANETs is not as stable as 
transmission medium used in a fixed network. Communication in MANETs is subjected to noise, 
interference and even constraint to bandwidth limitation. Moreover, security requirements arc 
usually higher in mobile ad hoc network than in the wired network because wireless links used for 
communication are subjected to external attacks such as spoofing, eavesdropping and link 
jamming attacks. 
Research Challenges 
All of the MANET characteristics discussed in the previous section have introduced many research 
issues in such networks. Some of them are quite similar to what we have in the other networks, but 
others are specific to the MANET environment. Figure 3 illustrates the main important issues related to 
the networking area in mobile ad hoc network [7]. 
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Figure 3: Main research issues in MANETs 
• Routing: Providing robust and reliable routing mechanisms is the most important issue in ad hoc 
network, and has thus attracted many researchers to tackle ihis issue. Proactive and reactive 
protocols are two approaches in uni-cast routing algorithms considered. Both of these protocols 
have (heir own advantages and weaknesses, but the most important thing is that both rely upon the 
cooperation of all nodes in the networks. Other concerns include multicast routing algorithms and 
broadcast routing algorithms. Because of the random movement of nodes in MANETs, providing 
efficient multicast and broadcast routing algorithms becomes more complex and challenging than 
in a wired network. Various protocols have been proposed to solve all the routing complexities and 
challenges. However, despite much effort in this area, none of the proposed approaches became a 
standard protocol for all mobile ad hoc network configurations [9]. 
• Auio-Conjiguration: MANETs operate in a self-organized manner. Each node in the networks is 
responsible to configure by itself all the services and applications such as routing protocols, 
security mechanisms and IP address allocations. However, this configuration is loo complex to be 
done by end users. Providing auto-configuration mechanisms would be very useful and may help 
in attracting more people to use MANETs. 
• Resource Management: Resource management is crucial in MANETs. Battery power, bandwidth, 
CPU processing capability and storage capacity are the most important resources thus proper 
management towards them is required. All of these resources are limited because of the devices 
physical constraints. For that reason, communication algorithms as well as services offered in 
mobile ad hoc network must be optimized to meet the minimum level of bandwidth usage, CPU 
processing, power utilization and data storage of the ad hoc network enabled devices [8]. 
• Quality ofSerx'ice (QoS): QoS is another challenging issue in MANETs [7]. QoS for any network 
is always related to the characteristics of lhai particular network. Wireless links used for 
communication in mobile ad hoc network have a fluctuating link capacity and connectivity, thus 
making it more difficult to guarantee the QoS in the network. In addition, there are many other 
unique characteristics in MANETs as described earlier which add the difficulties in providing 
reliable QoS in MANET. 
• Security: Providing a robust and reliable security mechanism in MANETs is not an easy task 
because of the unique characteristics described earlier. Although many security mechanisms (e.g. 
public key cryptography and firewalls) are found to work well in wired networks, such 
mechanisms are impractical in MANETs because of the infrastructure constraint [10]. In 
MANETs, all nodes are expected to operate in a self-organized manner, thus the existence of a 
central authority to manage the public key infrastructure cannot be assumed. Besides, the nature of 
instability in the network connections and unpredictable nodes movements add to the difficulty in 
differentiating between malicious activities and 'natural' network problems. 
Providing security for MANETs is the focus of the authors' own research, and in the work to date we 
have characterized some of the most important attacks that might be launched against such networks. 
Details of the work can be found in [ I I ] . 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we have introduced mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), their characteristics, and 
research challenges. Even though MANETs cannot completely replace infrastructure networks, ihey 
could be very useful to enable communications, especially in the case where deploying the 
infrastmcturc networks is not practical (e.g. in military operations, or when the infrastructure networks 
are not available e.g. i f destroyed by disaster). Realizing the potentials that MANETs could provide to 
assist us in our communications, we believe that (he research challenges discussed earlier need to be 
addressed. In our future work, we will address the security issues related to MANETs and later will 
propose an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) suited appropriately to MANETs characteristics and 
requirements. 
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Absfract-This paper outlines some important issues (hat relate 
to security attacks against mobile ad hoc networks from 
research carried out at Network Research Group, University of 
Plymouth, on designing intrusion detection system Tor mobile ad 
hoc network. In designing security mechanisms for mobile ad 
hoc net^vorks, one must consider the attacks variations as well as 
the characteristics of the attacks that could be launched against 
the ad hoc net^vorks. The discussions of these two aspects are 
summarized in this paper. This paper also classifies several 
common attacks against the ad hoc networks routing protocols 
based upon the techniques that could be used by attackers to 
exploit routing, messages. Those technique are modification, 
interception, fabrication, and interruption. 
I. I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Recent advances in computer networking have introduced 
a new technology for future wireless communication, a 
mobile ad hoc networlc ( M A N E T ) . Th is technology, which is 
the combination of peer-to-peer techniques, wireless 
communications, and mobile computing, provides convenient 
infrastructure-less communications and could be very useful 
to provide communications for many applications especially 
when the infrastructure networks is not feasible. M A N E T 
could be used to overcome geographical constraints in a 
military operation. A s it is easy to deploy, it may also very 
useful to assist in the disaster relief operations where 
temporary network infrastructure is immediately needed to 
replace the damaged infrastructure networks. 
However, similar to other networks, M A N E T also 
vulnerable to many security attacks. M A N E T not only 
inherits all the security threats faced in both wired and 
wireless networks, but it also introduces security attacks 
unique to itself [ 1 ] . A s people will be encouraged to use a 
secured network, it is important to provide M A N E T with 
reliable security mechanisms i f we want to see this exciting 
technology become widely used in a next few years. Before 
the development of any security measure to secure mobile ad 
hoc networks, it is important to study the variety of attacks 
that might be related to such networks. With the knowledge 
of some common attack issues, researchers might have a 
better understanding of how mobile ad hoc networks could be 
threatened by the attackers, and thus might lead to the 
development of more reliable security measures in protecting 
them. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate some of the 
important issues that might be related to security attacks in 
mobile ad hoc networks. In Section II, we see how attacks 
against ihe ad. hoc networks may vary depending upon in 
which environment the attacks are launched, what 
communication layer the attacks are targeting, and what level 
of ad hoc network mechanisms are targeted. After 
considering these three variations, it is also important to 
investigate the characteristics o f attacks against the ad hoc 
networks. Th is issue is discussed in Sect ion III. In this paper, 
we give a special attention to attacks that could be launched 
against the routing protocols. W e idenlified thai most of the 
attacks against ad hoc networks routing protocols are actually 
launched by exploiting the routing messages, and further 
classify them based upon the techniques that could be used to 
exploit routing messages in Section I V . Finally, we conclude 
our study and present our future work i n Section V . 
II. A T T A C K S V A R I A T I O N S 
A. Ad hoc networks environments 
A d hoc network can exist in one o f three environments; 
organized, localized, and open environments. Nodes in all o f 
these environments are generally threatened by the same 
security problems. However, there are some security 
problems, that are unique to one environment and need more 
attention in that environment than i h c others need. Vast 
numbers o f unstructured nodes and the absence of a priori 
relations are some of the main characteristics of the open 
environment ad hoc networks. Such networks are quite 
similar to the localized environment networks, but the larger 
amount o f nodes, and the wider coverage area, renders nodes 
in the open environment to more sophisticated security 
attacks than the localized networks do. For instance, nodes in 
both open and localized environments suffer from the 
absence o f a central authority. However , this is not a big issue 
in a localized environment, because nodes in that 
environment might have a physical contact with each other to 
employ any security measures. Securi ty could also be easily 
enforced in the organized environment because nodes in thai 
environment are usually pre-employed with appropriate 
security measures before they participate in any specific tasks 
such as in a military operation. 
B. Communication layers 
E a c h layer in the ad hoc networks communication 
protocols has its own vulnerabili l ies. In a physical layer, 
mobile nodes as well as the communication links are 
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sysiem resources, but fail to use ihese resources in a way ihey 
should be [6]. Internal nodes might misbehave to save their 
limited resources, such as the battery powers, the processing 
capabilities, and the communication bandwidth. Attacks that 
are caused by the misbehaving internal nodes are difficult to 
delect because to distinguish between normal network 
failures and misbehaviour activities in the ad hoc networks is 
not an easy task. 
C . Mobile vs. wired attackers 
Mobile attackers are attackers that have the same 
capabilities as the other nodes in the ad hoc networks. Since 
they have the same resources limitations, their capabilities to 
harm the networks operations are also limited. For instance, 
with the limited transmitting capabilities and battery powers, 
mobile attackers could only jam the wireless links within its 
vicinity. They are not capable to launch the network jamming 
attacks to disrupt the whole networks operations. 
On the other hand, wired attackers are attackers that are 
capable o f gaining access to the external resources such as the 
electricity. Since they have more resources, they could launch 
more severe attacks in the networks, such as jamming the 
whole networks or breaking expensive cryptography 
algorithms. Existence of the wired attackers in the ad hoc 
networks (especially in the open environment networks) is 
always possible as long as the wired attackers arc able to 
locale themselves in the communication range and have 
access to the wired infrastructures. 
D. Single vs. multiple attackers 
Attackers might choose to launch attacks against the ad 
hoc networks independently or by colluding with the other 
attackers. One man action or single attackers usually generate 
a moderate traffic load as long as they are not capable to 
reach any wired facilities. Since they also have similar 
abilities to the other nodes in the networks, their limited 
resources become the weak points to them [7]. For instance, 
complex cryptography algorithms could be used to help in 
defending the authentication, integrity, and the confidentiality 
services from a single attacker. A s it becomes very expensive 
for the single attackers to break the encrypted messages, 
nodes in the networks could share the expensive 
cryptography workloads with each other by exploiting the 
distributed operations and the multiple connections they had 
among them. 
However, i f several attackers are colluding to launch 
attacks, defending the ad hoc networks against them will be 
much harder. Colluding attackers could easily shut down any 
single node in the network and be capable to degrading the 
effectiveness of network's distributed operations including 
the security mechanisms. Adding to the severity, colluding 
attackers could be widely distributed or reside at the certain 
area where they presumed high communication rate in the 
networlcs exist. I f no suitable security measures employed. 
nodes in that targeted area arc susceptible to any kind o f 
denial of service ( D o S ) attacks that could be launched by the 
colluding attackers. 
IV . A T T A C K S A G A I N S T R O U T I K G M E S S A G E S 
Routing is one of the most vital mechanisms in the ad hoc 
networks. Improper and insecure routing mechanisms wil l not 
only degrade the performance o f the a d hoc networks, but 
wil l also render such networks vulnemble to many security 
attacks. One of the basic elements in the routing mechanism 
is the routing message, which is used to establish and 
maintain relationships between nodes in the networks. The 
importance of the routing message has made it a main target 
by the attackers to launch attacks against the ad hoc networks 
[3, 8). Attacks against the routing messages could be 
launched in many forms and m a y include all the 
characteristics described in Section 111. In this work, attacks 
against routing messages are classif ied based on the 
classification suggested by Stall ings in [9]. In such 
classification, information or messages could be deviated 
from the normal operation fiow using modification, 
interception, interruption or fabrication attacks. In a more 
severe case, attackers also might use any combination of 
these attacks to disrupt the normal information fiow. A s far as 
our concern, this study is the first to address security attacks 
against the ad hoc networks routing messages. 
A. Modification 
In a message modification attack, adversaries make some 
changes to the routing messages, and thus endanger the 
integrity of the packets in the networks. Since nodes in the ad 
hoc networks arc free to move and self-organize, 
relationships among nodes at some times might include the 
malicious nodes. These malicious nodes might exploit the 
sporadic relationships in the network to participate in the 
packet fonvarding process, and later launch the message 
modification attacks. Examples o f attacks that can be 
classified under the message modification attacks arc packet 
misrouting and impersonation attacks. 
1) Packet misrouting attacks: In a packet misrouting attack, 
malicious nodes reroute traffic from their original path to 
make them reach the wrong destinations [10]. Attackers 
might misroute a packet to make it stay in the network longer 
than its lifetimes, thus render it to be dropped from the 
network. A s a result, the source node needs to retransmit the 
lost packets and this wi l l consume more bandwidth, as well 
as increasing the overhead in the networks. 
2) Impersonation attacks: The impersonation attacks, also 
called the spoofing attacks, arc attacks where malicious node 
assumes the identity of another node i n the networks [11]. B y 
impersonating another node, attackers are able to receive 
routing messages that are directed to the nodes they faked. 
Impersonation allacks arc possible in the ad hoc networks 
because most o f the current ad hoc routing protocols do not 
authenticate ihc routing packets. A s a result, malicious nodes 
might exploit this loophole to masquerade as another node by 
modifying the contents of the packets. 
B. Interception 
Attackers might launch the interception attacks to get an 
unauthorized access to the routing messages that are not 
intentionally sent to them. Th is kind o f attack jeopardizes the 
integrity of the packets because such packets might be 
modified before being fonvarded to the next hop. Besides, the 
intercepted packets might also be analysed before passed to 
the destination thus violating the confidcntiaiily. Examples of 
attacks that can be classified under the interception attacks 
are wormhole attacks, black hole attacks, and routing packet 
analysis attacks. 
I ) Wormhole attacks: In the wormhole attacks, a 
compromised node in the ad hoc networks colludes with 
external attacker to create a shortcut in the networks. B y 
creating this shortcut, they could trick the source node to win 
in the route discovery process and later launch the 
interception attacks. Packets from these two colluding 
attackers are usually transmitted using wired connection to 
create the fastest route from source to the destination node. In 
addition, if the wormhole nodes consistently maintain the 
bogus routes, they could permanently deny other routes from 
being established. A s a result, the intermediate nodes reside 
along that denied routes are unable to participate in the 
network operations. 
routing, packets need to be forwarded through several 
intermediate nodes before reaching the actual destination. 
Malicious nodes might exploit this opportunity by locating 
themselves in any location along the route to participate in 
the message forwarding process and later launch the routing 
packet analysis attacks. 
C . Fabrication 
Instead o f modifying or interrupting the existing routing 
packets in the networlcs, malicious nodes also could fabricate 
their own packets to cause chaos in the network operations. 
They could launch the message fabrication attacks by 
injecting huge packets into the networks such as in the sleep 
deprivation attacks. However, message fabrication attacks arc 
not only launch by the malicious nodes. Such attacks also 
might come from the internal misbehaving nodes such as in 
the route salvaging attacks. 
1) Sleep deprivation attacks: Th is kind of attack is actually 
more specific to the mobile ad hoc networks. The aim is to 
drain off limited resources in. the mobile ad hoc nodes (e.g. 
the battery powers), by constantly makes them busy 
processing unnecessary packets. In a routing protocol, sleep 
deprivation attacks might be launched by flooding the 
targeted node with unnecessary routing packets. For instance, 
attackers could flood any node in the networks by sending a 
huge number of route request ( R R E Q ) , route replies ( R R E P ) 
or route error ( R E R R ) packets to the targeted node. A s a 
result, that particular node is unable to participate in the 
routing mechanisms and rendered unreachable by the other 
nodes in the networks. 
2) Black hole attacks: In this attack, malicious nodes trick 
all their neighbouring nodes to attract all the routing packets 
to them. As in the wormhole attacks, malicious nodes could 
launch the black hole attacks by advertising themselves to the 
neighbouring nodes as having the most optimal route to the 
requested destinations. However, unlike in the wonnhole 
attacks where multiple attackers colluded to attack one 
neighbouring node, in the black hole attacks, only one 
attacker is involved and it threatens all its neighbouring nodes. 
3) Routing packet analysis attacks: Since no disruptive 
action occurs, routing packet analysis could be classified as 
one of the passive attacks against the ad hoc networks. One 
way to launch this attack is by exploiting the promiscuous 
mode employed in the ad hoc network. In a promiscuous 
mode, i f node A is the neighbour of both nodes B and C at a 
particular time, node A can always hear the transmissions 
between node B and node C . By exploiting this nature, node 
A is able to analyze the overheard packets transmitted 
between node B and node C . More explanation regarding the 
promiscuous mode in the ad hoc networks can be found in 
[12]. Besides, malicious nodes could also launch this attack 
by exploiting the nature in a multi hop routing. In mulli hop 
2) Route salvaging attacks: Route salvaging attacks arc 
launched by the greedy internal nodes in the networks. In a 
mobile ad hoc network, there is no guarantee that each 
transmitted packet will successful ly reach the desired 
destination node [13]. Packets might not reach the destination 
node because of the natumi network failures or might be 
under attacks by the adversaries. Therefore, to salvage their 
packets from such failures, misbehaving internal nodes might 
duplicate and retransmit their packets although no sending 
error messages received. The effects o f the route salvaging 
attacks might be more severe i f there ore many greedy nodes 
in the networks. Besides draining o f f more resources in 
intermediate and destination nodes, this attack might also 
cause the consumption of unnecessary' bandwidth. 
D. Interruption 
Interruption attacks are launched to deny routing messages 
from reaching the destination nodes. Adversaries could do 
this by either attacking the routing messages or attacking the 
mobile nodes in the networks. Actual ly , most of the attacks 
launched in the modification, interception, and fabrication 
attacks are aimed to interrupt the normal operations of the ad 
hoc networks. For instance, adversaries aiming to interrupt 
the availability service in the networks might destroy all 
paths to a particular victim node by using the message 
modification attacks. In a message fabrication attack, 
adversaries could overload the networks by injecting huge 
unnecessary packets. Examples of attacks that could be 
classified under the interruption attacks category are packet 
dropping attacks, flooding attacks, and tack of cooperation 
attacks. 
1) Packet dropping attacks: Direct interruption to the 
routing messages could be done by using ihe packet dropping 
attacks. In a standard packet dropping attack, an adversary 
collaborates as usual in the route discovery process and 
launches the constant packet dropping attacks i f it is included 
as one o f the intermediate nodes. In addition, instead o f 
constantly dropping all the packets, adversaries might vary 
their techniques using random, selective, or periodic packet 
dropping attacks to help their interrupting behaviour remain 
concealed [14]. 
2) Flooding attacks: Adversaries also might iniemipt the 
normal operations in the packet for\\'arding process by 
flooding the targeted destination nodes with huge 
unnecessary packets. Nodes under the flooding attacks are 
unable to receive or forward any packet thus all the packets 
directed to them will be discarded from network. 
3) Lack of cooperation attacks: Lack of cooperation from 
the internal nodes to participate in the network operations can 
also be seen as an attempt to launch a refusal of service attack. 
In such attacks, internal nodes arc discouraged to cooperate in 
the network operations that did not benefit them because 
participating in such operations will drain off their resources. 
Misbehaving internal nodes might use different strategies to 
save their limited resources. They might refuse to fonvard the 
other node's packets, not send back the route error report to 
the sender when failing to forward packets, or might turn off 
their devices when not sending any packet in the networks. 
V . C O N C L U S I O N S 
In this paper, one can see that attacks against the ad hoc 
networks may vary depend on ( I ) which environment the 
attacks are launched, (2) what communication layer the 
attacks are targeting, and (3) what level of ad hoc network 
mechanisms are targeted. One can also see that there are 
several attack characteristics that must be considered in 
designing any security measure for the ad hoc network. B y 
investigating the characteristics and variations of the attacks, 
one can make a long list of attacks that could be launch 
against the ad hoc networks. However, since this study is 
focusing on the vulnerabilities of the ad hoc networks routing 
protocols, only some o f the common attacks that could be 
launched against the ad hoc network routing protocols have 
been investigated. From the investigation, we identified that 
most of the common attacks against the ad hoc networks 
routing protocols are actually launched by exploiting the 
routing messages. From there, we further classify attacks 
against the routing protocols based upon the techniques that 
could be used by the attacker to exploit routing messages. In 
a future work, several security solutions that have been 
proposed to secure routing protocols w i l l be investigated and 
classified based on this classification. T h e investigation wil l 
include various techniques that might be employed in 
protecting, detecting, and responding to the attacks against 
the routing messages. 
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Motivations & Objectives 
Motivations 
• Recent advances.in communication 
technologies introduce mobile ad hoc 
net\^orks (MANET) 
• MANET = autonomous nodes, random 
network topology, conhecled by wireless 
links, self-organized, stand alone or attach 
to wired network 
• Introduces now security threats and 
inhprits all security attacks against wired 
networks 
'Addressing MANET security Issues will 
encourage people to use this technology 
Objectives 
• Prevent security attacks 
• Authentication (key management, 
tnjst relationships) 
- Secure Routing (incentives, penalties, 
reputations) 
• Detect and respond to security attacks 
- Neighbourhood watch 
• Intrusion Detection System (our focus) 
Applications 
Military operations 
- Geographical 
constraints in battlefield 
- Physical connection will 
discloso location 
Rescue operations 
- Replace damaged 
network infrastmcture 
- Easy to deploy 
Conference room 
• P2P connections 
-without cable 
- Scalable without 
fixed connections 
Issues 
Ad Hoc Network Characteristics 
• Dynamic network topology 
• Distributed operations 
• Infrasimcturo-less 
• Limited resources 
• Multi-hop routing 
Research Challenges 
• Routing mechanisms 
• Quality of service (QoS) 
• Security 
• Resource management 
• Auto-configuration 
Security Issues t^ i 
Attack Variations 
' Attacks against different types of ad hoc 
networks environments (organized, 
localized, open environments) 
" Targeting different communication layers 
(physical, data link, network, transport, 
application layers) 
• Launch to disrupt two different important 
mechanisms in ad hoc networks (basic 
and security mechanisms) 
Attack Characteristics 
• Passive vs. Active 
Passive - Difficult to detect 
Active - Intend to Interrupt, detectable 
•Internal vs. External 
Internal - Compromised, misbehave 
External - Not authorized user 
• Single vs. Multiple 
Single • Moderate attacks 
Multiple - Colluding attackers, severe 
• Mobile vs. Wired 
Mobile • Same capability & limitations 
Wired - Gain external resources 
Security Attacks ni 
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Detection-Mechanisms 
Characteristics of intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) t^ l 
-Audit source location 
- Host-based 
- Network-based 
" Detection method 
- Anomaly dotection/behaviour-basod 
- Misuse detection/knowtedge-based 
• Usage frequency 
- Real-time detection 
- Periodic detection 
' Behaviour on detection/response 
- Passive (alarm) 
• Active (corrective mechanisms, counter 
attacks) 
Conclusions & Future Work 
• MANET races security attacks from both 
internal and external attackers 
• IDS can be a second defensive wall when 
prevention mechanisms failed to block 
attacks 
• IDS still new in MANET and more research 
works need to be carried out 
• For future wori<. investigate new methods 
for effective intrusion detection and 
response mechanisms in MANET 
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Abstract: Providing a robust and reliable Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is 
not as straightforward as in the wired networks because of the characteristics, threats and vulnerabilities, and security 
requirements related to such network. This paper discusses these issues along with a discussion of the existing 
research works that have been proposed to secure MANET. After considering these issues, a novel IDS framework 
(a two-tier IDS for MANET), is proposed to improve the performance of existing IDS in MANET environment. 
Keywords: MANET, IDS. Two-tier detection. Trusted friends 
1. Introduction 
M A N E T represents a combination of peer-to-peer techniques, wireless communications and mobile 
computing, and has become an important field of research in recent years . This new technology has been 
widely used to support communications in an environment where it may be impossible to deploy 
infrastructure networks, such a s in military battlefields and disaster recovery s i tes. In addition, this 
technology might be used to replace infrastructure networks where employing the wire less networks is 
more practical (Foo 2004). Although M A N E T utilizes a wireless medium for communications a s in other 
wireless networks (e.g. Wireless Wide Area Network (WWAN), Wire less Local Area Network (WLAN), 
and Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN)), it h a s its own unique characteristics that make it differ 
from the others. With a MANET, nodes communicate to e a c h other in a dynamic network topology, 
operate in a distributed manner, share the unstable wireless transmission medium, and own limited 
resources to support their operations. A s such , providing robust and reliable communication in M A N E T 
can be very challenging. The chal lenges include routing mechan isms , auto-configuration, resource 
management, Quality of Service (QoS) , and security i s s u e s . 
Among these challenges, routing issues have been given special attention by previous researchers 
because of its role as the most basic function In M A N E T . However, a s proven by history, security i s s u e s 
for any new technology need to be addressed at the early s tages of its development. For that reason, 
security i ssues need to be considered a s important a s the routing i s s u e s , and need to be addressed at 
the early stages of the M A N E T emergence. Securing M A N E T is not a s straightfonArard a s securing a 
wired network. Again, this is because of the unique characterist ics p o s s e s s e d by s u c h network. The 
problem will become more complicated when we try to implement security m e a s u r e s in a different 
M A N E T environment. For instance, open M A N E T will require more complicated security measures to 
defend it against both internal and external attackers compared to localized and organized MANET, 
where most of the threats usually came from external attackers. Different environments require different 
security measures and the requirements depend on several factors s u c h a s the type of the user 
participating in the network, the density of nodes, and the radius of the coverage area . Although M A N E T 
requires the same basic security requirements a s other networks (i.e. availability, confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication, non-repudiation, and authorization), they need to be addressed in a specific way that suits 
the M A N E T environment. 
Several works have been proposed to ensure these security requirements are fulfilled in MANET, and 
such works can be classified into one of the three steps in a security lifecycle (i.e. prevention, detection, 
and response) (Mark 2002). T h e s e three steps are important and dependent to e a c h other to provide 
reliable protection against threats in M A N E T . In this paper, a novel Intrusion Detection S y s t e m ( IDS) that 
suits the M A N E T environment is presented to complement existing security m e a s u r e s that have been 
proposed to secure MANET. This new IDS framework has been designed after considering ideas and 
suggestions from the previous works a s d iscussed in Section 2. A detailed description of the new IDS 
framework can be found in Section 3. 
2. MANET security: State of the art 
In general, security measures that have been proposed to secure M A N E T can be categorized into two 
groups: prevention and detection/response mechanisms. The following are examples of previous work 
that h a s been proposed to secure MANET. 
2.1 Prevention mechanism 
Prevention is one of the important p h a s e s in the security life cycle and is usually used a s a first defensive 
wall from malicious external attackers (Mark 2002). However, despite being widely used in a wired 
network, the implementation of such a mechanism in M A N E T environment faces many problems. For 
instance, the non-existence of central administrators in M A N E T to manage the authentication service 
makes the authentication mechanism one of the challenging i s s u e s . Responding to this problem, 
researchers have devised several mechanisms that suit the M A N E T environment, and s u c h mechanisms 
can be broken down into these three categories: authentication s c h e m e s , secure routing protocols, and 
cooperation enforcement mechanisms. 
2.1.1 Authentication 
Since we cannot a s s u m e the existence of a Central Authority ( C A ) in M A N E T , most of the researchers 
suggest that the authentication mechanism in s u c h networks should be carried out in a distributed fashion. 
(Srdjan 2003) proposed a self-organized authentication, s c h e m e for M A N E T where nodes can 
independently establish security associat ions among them in an offline mode. E a c h node creates its own 
private and public keys and exchanges the keys with the other adjacent nodes through the secure short-
range connectivity channels such a s infrared. 
Imprinting is another way to establish secure transient associat ions among M A N E T nodes in the a b s e n c e 
of an online authentication server. In such approach, each node (slave) will be imprinted with a 'soul' that 
binds it to the other node (master) over a non-wiretess channel. O n c e imprinted with a master soul, s lave 
nodes will only follow instructions that come from the master node throughout its participations in the 
network operations (Frank 1999). There are also efforts to make the C A virtually exist in M A N E T 
environments. For instance. (Lidong 1999) proposed a security mechanism that enable several nodes in 
the network to hold a partial share of the system private key, which is needed by the n e w users who wish 
to join the network. Another approach that might be related to the emulation of C A ' s role is a cluster-
based mechanism (Lakshmi 2000). In such mechanisms, each cluster head will hold a system private key 
and be responsible to manage, distribute, and authenticate every node in its cluster. 
2.1.2 Secure routing 
MANET operations require participation from all nodes in the networks. S ince M A N E T nodes are 
autonomous, there is a lways a possibility for the authorized nodes (nodes that have been authenticated to 
use network resources) to misbehave during their participation in network operations. R e a s o n s for nodes 
to misbehave could be that they want to s a v e some of their limited resources or simply because they are 
malicious nodes. Most of the researchers agree that this threat can be made l e s s harmful by adding some 
security features when forwarding packets a c r o s s the networks. Hash functions (Y ih-Chun 2002), end-to-
end authentications (Kimaya 2002), and digital signature (Manel 2002) are some of the available security 
measures that can be used to secure every packet from misbehaving intermediate nodes . 
2.1.3 Cooperation enforcement 
M A N E T operations are much dependent on each node's will ingness to cooperate in the network. 
However, some nodes in the network might refuse to cooperate. Two mechan isms have been proposed 
to.overcome this problem. (Sheng 2003) proposed a credit-based system to stimulate nodes' cooperation. 
Nodes will lose their credit when sending own packets but will gain s o m e credits if forwarding other 
nodes' packets. After utilizing all their credits, nodes v\nll not be able to send packets to the network. A s a 
result, they will be self-motivated to cooperate in fonwarding others* packets. Another way to enforce 
node's cooperation is by employing a reputation mechanism (Pietro 2002) . E a c h node has its own 
reputation rate that can be used by other nodes a s an indicator of its behaviour. E v e r y node in the 
network will try a s hard a s they can to avoid any communication with a node that has a lower reputation 
rate. 
2.2 Detection and response mechanisms 
Prevention mechanisms alone are not enough to protect M A N E T from attacks that might come from 
external and internal attackers. Detection and response mechanisms (e.g. IDS) could be very useful a s a 
second defensive wall once the prevention mechanism fails to protect the network. Efforts from 
researchers to provide reliable IDS for M A N E T can be s e e n by looking at the methods or strategies they 
proposed in addressing one of these issues : how to collect the audit data, what is the appropriate method 
to detect Intrusion, how to minimize false alarm, and how to respond to intrusion. 
2.2.1 Audit data source 
As in a wired network, audit data in M A N E T can be gathered from two sources : host -based and network-
based audit data sources. Since host-based audit data source is not dependent on any network 
architecture, similar data collection techniques a s applied in wired networks can be u s e d in MANET. For 
instance, we can use a Simple Network Monitoring Protocol (SNMP) to log user activities or by using 
agent technology to collect available audit data. However, this does not apply to the network-based audit 
data source. No such concentration point or dedicated node exists in M A N E T that can be used to collect 
the whole network information like in the wired networks. However, this does not mean that the network 
information cannot be collected in MANET environment. O n e of the most common assumptions made by 
researchers is that, each node in MANET is capable of hearing the transmission in and out from other 
nodes In the networks a s long a s they are v^rilhin e a c h other's radio range. R e s e a r c h e r s claimed that by 
using this assumption, partial or localized network activities can be collected by e a c h node, which later 
can be shared among them a s a virtual network-based audit data source (Sergio 2000) . 
2.2.2 Method of detection 
As In wired networks, one can use either misuse or anomaly detection techniques to detect intrusion in 
MANET. Both techniques have their own advantages and disadvantages. However, between these two 
mechanisms, researchers claimed that the anomaly detection would perform better than the misuse 
detection in MANET. This is because M A N E T technology is still new, and the p rocess of compiling the 
attack signatures for misuse detection technique for such networks is harder than in the matured 
technology (e.g. wired networks). There is also an Issue of updating the attack signatures database. 
Unlike in an anomaly detection where patterns of normal activities c a n be trained autonomously, attack 
signatures used in a misuse detection mechanism need to be managed and updated by a system 
administrator. However, this does not mean that the misuse detection mechanism is completely 
Inappropriate in MANET. A s mentioned earlier, both misuse and anomaly detection mechanisms have 
their own advantages and disadvantages, and perhaps the combination of these two mechanisms v^ll 
improve the performance of intrusion detection mechanism in M A N E T . Examples of anomaly IDS in 
MANET are (Sowjnya 2002), (Yi-An 2003), and (Yongguang 2003). 
2.2.3 False alarm acceptance level 
Fa lse alarms are very common in intrusion (detection sys tems that employ an anomaly detection 
technique. They happen when the system misjudges normal activity a s being abnonnal . It i s . a very big 
problem in intrusion detection system b e c a u s e if too many false a larms are triggered in the system, u s e r s 
will start ignoring the alarms, and thus possibly overiook real intrusion attempts. This problem becomes 
more difficult in MANET because to classify what is normal and what is abnormal activity in such networks 
is not an easy task. Sometimes, nodes fail to forward packets in M A N E T b e c a u s e of natural network 
failure, not because of any malicious activity occurred in the networks. O n e solution to this problem h a s 
been proposed in (Hao 2002) vjhere the authors employ a threshold mechanism to reduce the number of 
false alarms in their IDS . E a c h node will not be penalized for a single malicious behaviour. Every 
malicious activity for each user will be recorded and once the activities reach the threshold value, 
confirmation can be made that the particular node is malicious and v^ll be discarded from the network. In 
another approach, (Sergio 2000) proposed a rating mechanism to e a s e the problem of false accusat ions 
from the malicious nodes. S ince nodes are able to share the intrusion alerts to s p e e d up the response 
mechanism, malicious node might take this opportunity to blackmail other nodes in the networks by 
advertising false accusat ions. With all nodes having positive or negative reputations according to their 
behaviours, each node c a n have an idea whether to accept or discard any accusation received by other 
nodes in the networks. 
2.2.4 Response mechanisms 
In MANET, since there is no network administrator to manage the network, e a c h node is responsible for 
response to any intrusive behaviour. This makes the response issue more challenging than in wired 
networks. O n e of the chal lenges is how to alert other nodes about the detected intrusive activities in the 
presence of blackmail attackers. One of the solutions to this problem is to trigger a voting mechanism 
once the intrusion alert is broadcasted to the neighbouring nodes (Sonali 2001). 
3. A two-tier MANET IDS framework 
3.1 Conceptual framework 
A two-tier hybrid IDS for M A N E T is a novel I D S architecture proposed to improve the efficiency of existing 
MANET IDS architectures. The main idea of the proposed system is to provide a reliable IDS that can 
detect any intrusion attempts and at the s a m e time can reduce the number of false a larms raised in the 
system. With the focus to improve the detection strategies, only a simple response mechanism is 
deployed in the proposed system a s a complement to the detection mechan isms . The conceptual 
framework of the proposed IDS architecture is a s illustrated in Figure 1. 
3.2 System Components 
The proposed IDS framework h a s six main modules, covering from the audit data source to the response 
mechanism. Details of e a c h module and their roles are described a s follows. 
3.2.1 Real time audit data source (self-experience and friends observation) 
This is where the audit data will be gathered for further investigation. In the proposed architecture, two 
audit data sources have been identified as appropriate to detect intrusive activities in the networks. Any 
network operation, v ^ i c h has been initiated or having a direct connection with the user itself are classified 
as self-experience audit data. For instance, in a packet fonwarding process , the source , destination, and 
all the intermediate nodes will have a direct experience of such process and are capable of logging the 
related activities of the process for further investigation if something suspicious is detected. Data are not 
restricted to be gathered by directly participating nodes (source, destination, and all the intermediate 
nodes). Neighbours that are close to the participating nodes are a lso able to capture the overheard 
network activities using a promiscuous mode. Th is kind of audit data is known as friends' observation 
audit data in the proposed framework and c a n make the detection process faster compared to the 
intrusion detection system that only relies upon a single audit data source . 
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework of the two-tier hybrid IDS for M A N E T 
3.2.2 Misuse detection mechanism 
The misuse detection mechanism is the primary detection method used in the proposed IDS architecture. 
At the initial stage, the attack database might only cover a few attack signatures, but a s time goes by, with 
the aid of the anomaly detection mechanism and the signature management module, the attack signature 
database will reach its maturity level and thus be able to detect more attacks. This module comprises a 
misuse detection engine to detect activities that match the attack signatures a s stored in the signature 
database. 
3.2.3 Anomaly detection mechanism 
Attacks that cannot be detected by a misuse detection mechanism will be p a s s e d here for further 
investigation. The failure of detecting the attacks could be b e c a u s e of the attack signature database is still 
immature or could be because of insufficient evidence. The anomaly detection mechan ism applied here is 
similar to the existing techniques proposed by previous researchers and its main components include an 
anomaly detection engine and a profile database. Similar to the misuse detection engine, the anomaly 
detection engine in this module will try to detect malicious activities in the network. However, this time, 
comparison will be made with the normal user /system behaviour a s stored in a profile database. 
3.2.4 Signature management 
This module will enable a dynamic update to the misuse detection mechanism. The signature generator 
will automatically generate the attack signature each time the anomaly detection mechanism successful ly 
identifies deviation from normal user /system profiles. The auto-generated attack signatures will then be 
checked and veriHed through the management console before being periodically appended to the existing 
signature database located in a misuse detection mechanism module. 
3.2.5 Friends detection mechanism 
Any suspicious activity that has not been detected a s intrusive by a local detection mechanism will be 
sent to the global detection mechanism for further investigation. Th is global detection mechanism requires 
cooperation from all nodes in the networks to detect intrusions. However, s ince M A N E T operates without 
the aid of a network administrator or third party authentication server, not a single node in the network can 
be trusted except the node itself. A friend detection mechanism h a s been proposed to overcome this 
node trustworthiness problem in MANET. Any suspicious activity that w a s unsuccessful ly detected a s 
intrusive by the misuse and anomaly detection mechanisms will be further investigated with the help of 
friends. Two types of friends have been identified a s appropriate to be applied in the sys tem; 1^ ' and 2*^ 
degree friends. 1 '^ degree friends are nodes in the networks that have a direct connection with the source 
node (node that initiates the global detection process) . Nodes in the network will have a direct connection 
to each other if they are friend in a real world or they are able to establish a mutual trust between them in 
a secure channel. On the other hand. 2"^ degree friends are nodes in the networks that do not have a 
direct connection to the source node. 1*' degree friends can participate in the globai detection process 
without any problem because their identity can be verified by the source node. 
However, source node might only have a few 1 '^ degree friends especial ly at the eariy stage of its 
participation in the networks. A s a result, a global detection mechan ism might lake a longer time to 
complete or might not be completed because the insufficient number of 1*" degree friends' reports 
received. For that reason, 2"^ degree friends' reports can be accepted to speed up the detection process. 
However, since 2"^ degree friends are the indirect friends to the source node and their identity cannot be 
directly verified, a referee (node that has, 1st degree relationships with both source and 2™* degree node) 
is needed to verify the 2™* degree node's identity. Referees buffer provides temporary storage for all the 
reports received by the 2™* degree friends before the referee nodes will verify them, it is important to 
mention here that a referee node must be a 1 '^ degree friend to both the source node (node that triggered 
the global detection mechanism) and to the 2™* degree friend, which made the report. Reports from both 
1^ ' and 2™* degree friends (verified by referees) will be counted by a voting mechan ism. Once the reports 
reached the preset threshold limit, the response mechanism will be triggered. 
3.2.6 Response mechanism 
This module is responsible to react to any intrusive activity detected by the misuse , anomaly, or friend 
detection mechanisms. However, s ince the focus of the proposed architecture is on the detection 
mechanism, only the basic response strategies have been applied in the system. A local response unit in 
this module will raise an alarm to alert the local user about the detected intrusive activity. The intrusion 
alarm then will be broadcasted to the other nodes in the networks by a global response unit. Neighbouring 
nodes that receive the intmsion alarms will add the intrusive nodes to their own bad node tables to avoid 
collaborating with the bad nodes in future packet-fooA^arding p r o c e s s e s . However, to avoid false 
accusations, only alarms received from 1^ ' degree friends c a n be accepted. 
3.3 Related Issues 
The proposed IDS framework h a s been designed after considering several i s s u e s , which have been 
identified from the investigation of previous works. The following are some of the considerations that have 
been made when designing the proposed IDS framework a s summarized in Table 1. 
3.3.1 A two-tier detection architecture 
The idea of having a two-tier detection architecture is to provide a faster detection mechan ism that is 
capable of detecting intrusive activities at their initial s tages. Relying upon a local-based detection method 
alone is not sufficient to detect intrusion eariy. S ince information gathered in a local -based IDS is limited 
to the local activities, e a c h node in the network must have enough exper iences before any suspicious 
activities can be judged a s intrusive or not. Th is limitation will slow down the detection p r o c e s s , which can 
be made faster if the host-based detection method is combined with the network-based detection method. 
For that reason, a global detection mechanism, which emulates the roles of a network-based detection 
method, has been proposed in this new IDS architecture. A local-based IDS is located in the first tier, and 
will be triggered ftrst to investigate any suspicious activity before being p a s s e d to the global detection 
mechanism, which is located at the second tier. This Is because the information gathered in a local-based 
IDS is the first hand information collected from a local audit data source , which c a n be trusted and can be 
made available instantly. On the other hand, detection p r o c e s s e s in the global detection mechanism will 
require more time to be completed because the information supplied by the other nodes will require more 
time to reach the requested node and must be validated to ensure integrity. 
3.3.2 Real time audit data source 
Since the objective of the proposed architecture is to detect intnjsion at an eariy stage of its appearance, 
a real time data collection strategy h a s been proposed in this architecture. A periodic data collection 
strategy might not be suitable in a high mobility M A N E T environment a s the collected information might 
be valid for a short period only. For instance, the attackers might already leave the network when the IDS 
detects their intrusive activities if such activities were gathered using a periodic data collection strategy. 
3.3.3 Hybrid detection method 
The core element of an intnjsion detection system is the detection method. In general , there are two 
detection methods that can be used and they are misuse detection and anomaly detection methods. 
Although researchers have made clear the advantages and disadvantages of both detection strategies 
(Oleg 2002). to choose between these two methods is still not an e a s y task especial ly in a M A N E T 
environment. Misuse signatures are difficult to build In M A N E T b e c a u s e of the immaturity and the 
characteristics (high mobility, transient connection, fluctuate wireless links, etc) of the network. This 
situation has driven most of the researchers working on the M A N E T I D S to choose the anomaly detection 
method for their proposed architectures (Sowjnya 2002), (Yongguang 2003) . However, the capability of a 
misuse detection method cannot be simply ignored. Misuse detection can give results that are more 
accurate in term of detecting true intrusion attempts and to reduce the number of false a larms compare to 
the anomaly detection method. Considering both misuse and anomaly detection capabilities, the 
proposed framework tries to combine these two detection methods in one hybrid system with an aim to 
study its performance compared to the most frequently used (an anomaly detection strategy), in M A N E T 
environment. However, the difficulty of building the attack database is not the only reason that makes 
researchers choose to employ anomaly detection rather than a misuse detection method. Another reason 
is the absence of a system administrator In M A N E T makes the process of updating the attack database 
more difficult in such networi^s compared to the infrastructure networks. To e a s e this problem a signature 
management mechanism is deployed in the proposed framework. A s time goes by, with the ongoing 
updated attack database, the misuse detection mechanism will reach its maturity level and be able to 
detect more intrusive activities within the acceptable false alarm rates. 
3.3.4 Friend for global detection 
The main issue to clarify here is the reason for using friends to ass is t in the global detection mechanism. 
A s mentioned eariier, M A N E T operates in a self-organized manner without the existence of any 
authentication server to authorize each user in the network. Without a reliable identity verification 
measure, information about any intrusive activities gathered by e a c h node cannot be shared with other 
nodes as the information might be falsified to blackmail other users . (Yongguang 2003) proposed a voting 
mechanism to overcome this problem. Voting mechanisms can be very useful to defend against a single 
blackmail attacker but it is not immune against multiple colluding blackmail attackers. However, this voting 
mechanism can be improved by filtering the votes. For instance, only votes from friends can be counted 
to judge any intrusive activity. In the proposed IDS framewori^. the concept of 1 '^ and 2™* degree friends 
has been introduced to improve the existing voting mechanism. 
Tab le 1: Problems and vulnerabilities of existing ID sys tems and how the proposed two-tier IDS can fix 
the problems 
IDS 
Requ i rements 
T e c h n i q u e s u s e d 
in ex is t ing I D S 
P r o b l e m s / 
Vulnerabi l i t ies 
P r o p o s e d s o l u t i o n s in 
two-tier IDS 
Network-based 
audit data 
sources 
Rece ive audit data 
gathered by other 
trusted nodes 
Information might be 
altered by malicious nodes 
S e l f - e x p e r i e n c e : Capture 
overheard audit data of 
adjacent nodes only 
Mobile agents to 
collect audit data 
for global detection 
Mobile agents are 
vulnerable to attacks 
F r i e n d s - o b s e r v a t i o n : Audit 
data for global detection v^ll 
be captured a n d analyzed by 
friends 
Detection 
methods 
Misuse detection 
Difficult to compile attack 
signatures 
S i g n a t u r e m a n a g e m e n t : 
Generating n e w attack 
signatures derived from true 
anomaly detection alerts 
Unable to detect novel 
attacks 
Hybr id de tec t ion: Misuse/ 
anomaly detection 
Anomaly detection High false alarms 
2"° tier g lobal detect ion: 
Request further investigation 
and votes from trusted 
friends before making any 
decision 
Global 
detections 
Receive single 
report from trusted 
friends/ neighbours 
Vulnerable to blackmail 
attacks 
Vot ing m e c h a n i s m : Pool 
reports/votes from 1^ * and 2"** 
degrees friends. Votes from 
2 degree friends boost the 
global detection but require 
referees for integrity 
Voting threshold for 
several reports 
received 
Vulnerable to colluding 
blackmail attackers 
4. Conclusions 
M A N E T is threatened by several threats and vulnerabilities, which require special prevention, detection, 
and response mechanisms to be deployed in the system. In this paper, we have d i s c u s s e d these M A N E T 
security-related issues and have presented a new I D S framework suitable for s u c h networks. The two-tier 
IDS for M A N E T h a s been designed to improve the performance of existing I D S , which have been 
proposed by other researchers . This new framewori< is expected to give us a faster and more reliable 
detection results than what h a s been offered by previous efforts. In future wori^, a prototype of this IDS 
framework will be designed and its performance will be analyzed. 
References 
Foo. Y . L. (2004) Ad Hoc Network: Prospects and Cfiallenges, Graduate School R e s e a r c h Paper 
(Rinkou), Department of Information and Communication Engineering. University of Tokyo. 
Mari< K. (2002) "Security Lifecycle- Managing the Threat". G S E C Practical, V o l 3. 
Srd jan;C. , Jean-Pierre H., and Levente B. (2003) Mobility Helps Security in f\Aobile Ad Hoc Networks, 
MobiHoc'03, Annapolis. Maryland, U S A . 
Frank S . and R o s s A. (1999) Tfie Resurrecting Duckling: Security Issues for Ad-Hoc Wireless Networks. 
1999 AT&T Software Symposium. 
Lidong Z. and Zygmunt J . H. (1999) "Securing ad hoc networt^s". IEEE Network, Vol 13, No. 6, pp24-30. 
Lakshmi V. and Dharma P. A. (2000) A Novel Authentication Scheme for Ad Hoc Networks, I E E E 
Wireless Communications and Networking Conference ( W C N C 2000). pp1268-1273. 
Yih-Chun H., David. B. J . , and Adrian P. (2002) SEAD: Secure efficient distance vector routing for mobile 
wireless ad hoc networks. Fourth I E E E Wori^shop on Mobile Computing S y s t e m s and Applications. 
Callicoon, New York. 
Kimaya S . . Bridget D., Brian N. L.. C lay S . . and Elizabeth M. B-R. (2002) A Secure Routing Protocol for 
Ad Hoc Networks, 2002 I E E E International Conference on Networtt Protocols ( ICNP) , pp78-89. 
Manel G . Z. and N. Asokan (2002) Securing ad hoc routing protocols, A C M workshop on Wireless 
security, Wise*02. Atlanta. Georgia. U S A . 
Sheng Z.. Yang R. Y. , and Jiang C . (2003) Spr/7e; A Simple, CheatProof, Credit-Based System for Mobile 
Ad Hoc Networks, I E E E INFOCOM'03 . S a n Francisco. 
Pietro M. and Refik M. (2002) Core; A Collaborative Reputation Mechanism to Enforce Node Cooperation 
in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, Sixth IFIP Communications and Multimedia Security Conference, Portorosz, 
Slovenia. 
Sergio M., T. J . Giuli. Kevin L., and Mary B. (2000) Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad hoc 
networks. Sixth annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking. pp255-265. 
Sowjnya R., Hiren S . , Vishal S . , Jeffrey U.. and Anupam J . (2002) Neighborhood Watch: An Intrusion 
Detection and Response Protocol for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, Student R e s e a r c h Conference, University 
of Maryland at Baltimore County (UMBO). 
Yi-An H.. Wei F., Wenke L.. and Philip S . Y . (2003) Cross-Feature Analysis for Detecting Ad-Hoc Routing 
Anomalies, 23rd International Conference on Distributed Computing S y s t e m s ( I C D C S ) , pp478-489. 
Yongguang Z.. Wenke L., and Yi-An H. (2003) "Intrusion Detection Techniques for Mobile Wire less 
Networi^s". Journal of Wireless Networks, Vol 9, No. 5, pp545-556. 
Hao Y. , Xiaoqiao M., and Songwu L. (2002) Self-organized network-layer security in mobile ad hoc 
networks, A C M M O B I C O M Wireless Security Wori^shop (WiSe'02) , Atlanta. 
Sonali B. and Dharma P. A. (2001) Security Enhancements in AODV protocol for Wireless Ad Hoc 
Networks, Vehicular Technology Conference. Atlantic City. 
Oleg K. and Ratan G . (2002) Intrusion Detection Using Mobile Agents in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks, I E E E 
Wori^shop on Knowledge Media Networiting (KMN*02). Kyoto, J A P A N . 
A Two-Tier Intrusion Detection System for Mobile Ad 
Hoc Networks - A Friend Approach 
Shukor Abd Razak', Steven Fumcll\ Nathan Clarke', and Phillip Brooke^ 
'Network Research Group, School of Computing, Communications & Electronics, Univer-
sity of Plymouth, Plymouth. United Kingdom 
info@network-research-group.org 
'School of Computing, Universiiy of Tccsside, Middlesbrough, United Kingdom 
P.J.BrookeQtees.ac.uk 
Abstract. Existing Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) in Mobile Ad Hoc Net-
work (MANET) environments suffer from many problems because of the in-
herent characteristics of the network. Limited audit data, along with the prob-
lems faced in achieving global detection and response mechanisms, creates 
challenges for establishing reliable IDS for MANETs. In this paper, several sce-
narios are investigated where a 'friend' concept has been applied to solve 
MANET problems. This same concept is applied to a new IDS framework, and 
discussion is presented into how it can help in minimizing the problems that are 
faced in existing IDS. The key advantages of this two-tier IDS framework arc 
its ability lo detect intrusion at an early stage of such behaviour in the network, 
and its capability to minimize the impact of colluding blackmail attackers in the 
systems. 
1 Introduction 
MANET is a computer network lhat combines the capabilities of peer-!o-peer, wire-
less, and mobile network technologies and has been used to support communications 
in various environments such as in military and disaster relief operations [ I ] . It has 
several unique characteristics lhat make it differ from other types of computer net-
works. It operates in a fully distributed fashion without the aid of a central authority, 
has random network topologies, and uses wireless links for communications. Since 
the conception of MANET several security measures, concepts and architectures have 
been proposed to counter many of the inherent security concerns the network topol-
ogy introduces. However, most of these are focused upon prevention mechanisms to 
protect MANET from external attackers. It is suggested that by employing an IDS as 
a second line of defense could be very useful whenever prevention mechanisms failed 
to protect the network. In this paper, two. important issues in MANET IDS are dis-
cussed: what is the best way to detect intrusions in a collaborative fashion; and how to 
minimize the impacts of blackmail attacks/false accusations. This paper proposes a 
new IDS framework for MANET to provide solutions for such problems. 
The paper proceeds to provide some background of a friend concept in small world 
phenomenon and discusses how it can be applied in a MANET environment. Section 
3 summarizes some existing work in MANET security, which is related to the concept 
of friend, and Section 4 oullincs some of the important features of a two-tier IDS 
framework. 
2 Friends as Short Cut in Ad Hoc NctAvorks 
The small world phenomenon is a concept that suggests any two individuals, selecied 
randomly from almost anywhere on the planet, are connected via a chain of no more 
than six acquaintances. Milgram [2] conducted an experiment in which he sent 60 let-
ters to various recruits in Wichita, Kansas who were asked to forward the letter to the 
wife of a divinity student living at Cambridge, Massachusetts. The letters could only 
be fonvarded by hand to personal acquaintances (directly or through friend o f a 
friend) who they thought might be able to reach the recipient. Milgram claimed that 
he has proved the concept when 3 out of 60 letters that he sent reached the recipients 
but neglected to say about the low (i.e. 5%) chain completion percentage. However, 
his experiment has motivated other researchers to investigate more on this concept, 
such as in the Internet context, as observed by Adamic [3]. In his study, he suggested 
that the World Wide Web is a 'small world' in a sense that all the sites are highly 
clustered yet the path length between them is small. Hclmy [4] established a relation-
ship between the small world concept and wireless networks. Simulations result from 
his study proved that by adding a few 'short cut' nodes in the wireless networks^ the 
degree of separation between nodes could be decreased drastically. One question 
emerging from this study is how to select few 'short cut' nodes in an autonomous, 
fully distributed, and self-organized ad hoc network. The author proposed the concept 
otcontacts, which will act as short cuts to transfonn the wireless network into a small 
world. However, the author did not discuss how these contacts can be made available 
in the system, and this problem remains an open issue. 
The concept of 'friends' has been introduced in M A N E T environments to solve 
many problems, especially those that relate to security issues. One of the common as-
sumptions made by researchers to create friend relationships is that each node must be 
known to each other in a real world before they can establish a friend relationship in 
MANirr environment. Based upon the concept that a friend in the real world is also a 
friend in the M A N E T , along with the concept of six degree separations between 
friends in real world, we propose a two-tier IDS framework for M A N E T to investi-
gate how we can benefit from these concepts. Several previous works that make use 
of 'friendship' concept are discussed in the next section followed by the details o f the 
proposed IDS framework in Section 4. 
3 Related Work 
Establishing a security association between nodes is very important because without 
it, secret infomiation such as users' personal information or network infonnation 
might be passed to unauthorized parties. One way to establish security associations is 
by deploying an encryption mechanism (e.g. private/public key system). Each mes-
sage will be encrypted with the recipient's public key so that it can be decrypted using 
the corresponding private key. While this system could work perfectly well in wired 
networks, where there exists a central server to manage and to distribute the public 
keys of each node, the same scenario does not apply in MANET. Since wc cannot as-
sume the existence of a central authority to manage and distribute the keys, it seems 
impossible for each node to know the public keys of others without having a physical 
contact. However, this problem can be eased with the help of friends as suggested by 
Capkun et al. [5]. They suggested that each node is capable of establishing a security 
association with another anonymous node in the system by requesting a recommenda-
tion from friends. Friend nodes in their system arc nodes that one has physically met 
in a real world. With a recommendation from a friend, a trustworthiness level for an 
anonymous node can be determined, thus a security association between two anony-
mous nodes can be established without the need of a physical contact in a real world. 
In a real world, when wc apply for a job, usually we are required to supply the em-
ployer with names of referees, who know about our background, capabilities and en-
thusiasm, and may also be used for security purposes. The same concept has been ap-
plied in a MANET environment, as proposed by Weimerskirch and Thonet [6]. Their 
concept is somewhat similar to the work proposed in [5] where recommendation from 
a friend is needed to authenticate an anonymous node in the system. However, in ihcir 
system, the anonymous node will supply a few names as its references so thai its 
trustwonhiness can be judged. 
In another scenario, a friend concept has been used to prevent node selfishness in 
the routing mechanism. In a MANET, nodes might sometimes refuse to participate in 
network operations in order to save their own limited resources. As mentioned in [7], 
nodes can be forced to participate in network operations in two ways; either penaliz-
ing them for not cooperating, or rewarding them for their participation. However, this 
mechanism creates unfairness especially for the nodes that are located outside the 
'busy' area. Nodes need credits to send their own packets in the network and the only 
way to gain credits is by forwarding others' packets. However, for nodes located out-
side the 'busy' area,- the chances for them to be selected in a packet forwarding proc-
ess arc low, and this will make it difficult for them to gain more credits. Miranda and 
Rodrigucs [8] suggest a solution for this problem by using a friend concept. They pro-
posed a concept of selective forwarding, where each node will only participate in a 
packet forwarding process if the packets come from, or need to be sent to, one o f its 
friends. Each node will advertise to others about its friend list so that it cannot be ac-
cused for not forwarding other nodes' packets that arc not in its friend list. 
4 A Two-Tier IDS for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 
A two-tier hybrid IDS for MANET is a novel IDS architecture proposed to improve 
the efficiency of existing MANET IDS architectures with the help of friend nodes. 
The main idea of the proposed system is to provide a reliable IDS that can detect any 
intrusion attempts and at the same time reduce the number of false alarms raised in 
the system. 
4.1 System Components 
Fig. I . Conceptual framework of ihe iwo-iier hybrid IDS for MANET 
Real time audit data source. In the proposed architecture, two audit data sources 
have been identified as appropriate to detect intrusive activities in the networks. Any 
network operations initiated by, or having a direct connection with the participating 
nodes (source, destination, and all the intermediate nodes) are classified as sctf-
cxpcricnce audit data. Neighbours that arc close to the participating nodes are also 
able to capture the overheard network activities using a promiscuous mode. This kind 
of audit data is known as friends' observation audit data in the proposed framework. 
Misuse detection mechanism. This module comprises a misuse detection engine to 
detect activities that match the attack signatures as stored in the signature database. At 
the initial stage, the attack database might only cover a few attack signatures, but as 
lime goes by, with the aid of the anomaly detection mechanism and the signature 
management module, the attack signature database will reach its maturity level and 
thus be able to detect more attacks. 
Anomaly detection mechanism. Attacks that cannot be detected by a misuse detec-
tion mechanism will be passed here for further investigation. The failure of detecting 
the attacks could be because of the attack signature database is still immature or could 
be because of insufficient evidence. The anomaly detection mechanism applied here 
is similar to the existing tecluiiques proposed by previous researchers, and its main 
components include an anomaly detection engine and a profile database. 
Signature management. This module completes the feedback loop by enabling a dy-
namic update to the misuse detection mechanism. The signature generator automati-
cally generates the attack signature each time the anomaly detection mechanism suc-
cessfully identifies deviation from normal user/system profiles. 
Friends detection mechanism. Any suspicious activity that was unsuccessfully de-
tected as intrusive by the misuse and anomaly detection mechanisms in local detec-
tion will be further investigated with the help of friends. First degree friends are nodes 
in the networks that have a direct connection with the source node (i.e. the node that 
initiates the global detection process). Nodes in the network will have a direct connec-
tion to each other i f they arc friends in a real world. On the other hand, second degree 
friends are nodes in the networks that do not have a direct connection to the source 
node. First degree friends can participate in the global detection process without any 
problem because their identity can be verified by the source node. However, source 
node might only have a few first degree friends especially at the early stage of its par-
ticipation in the networks. As a result, a global detection mechanism might take a 
longer time to complete or might not be completed because of the insufficient nimiber 
of first degree friends' reports received. For that reason, second degree friends' re-
ports can be accepted to speed up the detection process. However, since second de-
gree friends are the indirect friends to the source node and their identity cannot be di-
rectly verified, a referee (a node that has first degree relationships with both the 
source and the second degree node) is needed to verify the second degree node's iden-
tity. Reports from both first and second degree friends arc equal in weight and wi l l be 
counted by a voting mechanism. Once the reports reached the preset threshold limit, 
the response mechanism will be triggered. 
Response mechanism. A local response unit will raise an alarm to alert the local user 
about the detected intrusive activity. The intrusion alarm then will be broadcasted to 
the other nodes in the networks to make them aware about the existence of intrusive 
nodes. However, to avoid false accusations, only alarms received from first degree 
friends can be accepted. 
4.2 Friends' Role in Two-Tier IDS 
Speed up (he detection process. Cooperative detection could speed up the detection 
process but this method is vulnerable to packet modification attacks. Friend detection 
mechanism in the two-tier IDS can case this problem as each node in the system will 
carry out the detection process based on its own local audit data, and will only share 
the result of the decision whether the suspicious node is malicious or not. 
Minimizing the risk of cooperative blackmail attacks. The problem of blackmail 
attack has been discussed in [9], and the authors suggested that a voting mechanism 
could ease the problem. However, a voting mechanism could only be used to protect 
the network from a single blackmail attacker, but not a cooperative blackmail attack. 
A friend mechanism is capable of minimizing the risk of such problems as only detec-
tion results from friends can be accepted in the proposed system. In case of there be-
ing a lot of blackmail attackers, the immunity of a friend mechanism can be strength-
ened by increasing the number of positive detection results that must be gathered from 
friends before any suspicious activity can be confirmed intrusive. 
Reliable global response mechanism. Broadcasting intrusion alerts is a big chal-
lenge in a MANET because each node is anonymous to others, and there is always a 
possibility that some of the alerts are not genuine (i.e. broadcasted by attackers). The 
reliability of a global response mechanism can be increased with the help of friend 
nodes. Since each node is only interested in the alerts that came from its friends, all 
other alerts (including the fake ones) will be dropped. This will solve the false accusa-
tion problem caused by the fake alerts in the system. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, a new IDS framework for MANET environments based upon the con-
cept of a friend in a small world phenomenon has been proposed. Current anomaly 
detection mechanisms as proposed in previous work make the detection process 
longer, as the system needs to gather sufficient evidence before a decision can be 
made against any suspicious activity. In another scenario, existing techniques for 
global detection suITer from the potential for blackmail attackers and false accusa-
tions. The proposed two-tier IDS framework has been designed to overcome these is-
sues with the help of friend nodes. For future work, simulations will be carried out to 
investigate the performance of the proposed IDS framework in various MANET sce-
narios. It is hypothesized that with the introduction of friend nodes, the impacts o f the 
IDS problems mentioned eariier can be minimized. 
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